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Abstract 
 
This thesis is about the measurement of health care output and the relationship 
between health care outcomes, physician practice patterns and individual physician 
characteristics within a very specific and particular health care sector, the health 
care sector on the Islands of Malta. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the appropriateness of introducing a Diagnosis Related Group 
(DRG) casemix classification system on Maltese data.  A number of tests are applied 
to gauge the ability of Grouper software to capture the heterogeneity between the 
obtained DRG groups and the degree of homogeneity gained in explaining resource 
use from the grouping of cases by DRG categories.  This serves to provide a measure of health care Ǯoutputǯ whilst providing a tool to help describe and manage resource 
use.  Chapter 3 of this thesis explores differences in the expected relationship 
between volume and competing risk outcomes and whether this relationship varies 
in view of different consultant job contract conditions.  Finally, Chapter 4 of this 
thesis studies the behaviour of individual consultants working in the context of the 
specific incentives and work practices of the Maltese health care system.  The role 
of the specific consultant job contract type is investigated to explain heterogeneity 
arising among treatment practice patterns over two specific periods related to the patientsǯ stay at the hospital: the first two days of hospital stay and their remaining 
stay. 
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This thesis is a compilation of three research papers that investigate differences in 
hospital outcomes and physician practice variation patterns observed within a very 
specific and particular health care sector.  The focus is the activity undertaken 
within the only publically funded general acute hospital on the Islands of Malta.  
Whilst acknowledging the importance of differences due to patient, physician and 
environmental characteristics that can help to explain variations in outcome, 
particular focus is given to variations arising from individual consultant and surgeon 
practice related characteristics, especially job volume levels and consultant job 
contract conditions.  Indeed, these particular characteristics of the health care sector 
are expected to influence and define the relationships between health care 
providers, the hospital and the patients.   
The thesis focuses on the measurement of output within the Maltese health care 
sector with an emphasis on the factors which are expected to affect hospital 
outcomes and practice variation among consultants within this hospital setting.  The 
analysis aims to assess the feasibility of introducing a casemix grouper software as 
a tool in obtaining a measure of current hospital output.  The ability to measure 
outcomes can lead to better accountability in the use of public funds which in turn 
would enable policy makers to achieve greater efficiency in the overall operation of 
the hospital whilst ensuring the sustainability of the health care system.    
The performance of the health care system can be improved only if its output is  
adequately measured.  This thesis also aims to understand the main factors which 
affect performance within the health care sector.  In view of the contribution of 
health professionals towards the overall running of the hospital, this study seeks to 
identify the influence of particular consulant characteristics on patient outcomes 
19 
 
and consultant practice patterns.  This is important so as to identify the existence, 
nature and possible channels of the contribution of health professionals towards 
outcome effectiveness. Variations in practice patterns are expected to have 
important consequences on the quality and cost of health care treatment.  The job 
contract type of consultants working with the public hospital is expected to be a 
determining factor in explaining the behaviour of the consultants.  The study aims 
to identify and measure the impact of job contract type on both patient outcomes 
and on practice behaviour patterns of consultants.  This understanding helps in the 
setting of policy, based on empirical findings, to address the needed reforms which 
have been at the top of the health care agenda over recent years.   
In the absence of a clearly defined casemix classification system for the Maltese 
health care sector, this thesis opens with an evaluation of the feasibility of 
introducing a casemix system based on Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs).  DRGs 
have been advocated in the literature and used in a number of countries as a primary 
tool to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of hospitals in providing acute patient 
care.  The setting up of DRG groups could provide an effective measure of health care Ǯoutputǯ for the hospital.   
DRG categories provide a measure for identifying hospital patient cases which 
involve the use of excess resources in comparison to the average patient case.  There 
is a continual strive to understand these differences in resource use, identify reasons 
for such differences and address such differences.  The measurement of Ǯoutputǯ 
within this setting would thus provide a consistent and reliable indicator for the 
analysis of differences in practice arising from factors which are not taken into 
account by the DRG grouping method.  Such factors are likely to include, amongst 
20 
 
others: the behavioural characteristics of the consultant and the surgeon when 
dealing with the patient.  This can have important consequences for the 
implementation of policy measures within the health care sector.     
The data collated and prepared for use in this thesis has been provided by the 
Clinical Performance Unit within Mater Dei Hospital,1 and cover a three year period 
(2009-2011).  The dataset provides information on individual patients admitted to 
hospital and the consultants and surgeons practicing within the hospital.  The data 
also identify the diagnosis (a six level digit code based on ICD-10)2 and procedures 
(a three level code based on ICD-9-CM)3 related to each patient admitted to hospital, 
the date of the patientǯs admission and discharge, their age and sex, the final 
destination of the patient following discharge and all of the investigations and tests 
that were ordered and carried out during their hospital stay, including the date 
when the investigations were performed.   
Furthermore, the dataset includes a number of characteristics which describe the 
surgeons who carried out the procedures and the consultants who had overall 
responsibility for each of the patients treated at the hospital.  A data preparation 
exercise was undertaken to eliminate cases with invalid data and a number of 
technical edits and algorithms on the coding structure of the data were performed 
to ensure it was able to be used with the DRG Grouper software.  A set of diagnostic 
and procedural variables was also constructed. This included counts of diagnoses 
per patient, counts of procedures and also a range of differing counts of consultant 
                                                        
1 Mater Dei Hospital is the only public general acute hospital providing services on the Islands of 
Malta.   
2 International Classification of Diseases – 10th revision (WHO). 
3
 International Classification of Diseases – 9th revision – Clinical Modification (WHO). 
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and surgeon volume measures.  The availability of individual level data provided a 
more robust dataset for estimation and analysis purposes. 
Consultants are major players in the overall running of a public hospital and their 
level of activity and behaviour decisions are expected to significantly influence the 
overall outcomes for patients.  Consultants are employed within the public hospital 
on one of two possible contract options: they can work exclusively with the public 
hospital or they can decide to opt for a contract which allows them to work in private 
practice alongside their public sector commitments.   It is expected that within the 
context and characteristics of the Maltese health care system, the prevailing 
consultant job contract conditions will explain some of the variation observed in 
practice patterns evidenced from the data.  
As suggested from a review of the literature, a first attempt by an organisation at 
implementing a DRG casemix system involves the use and application of a tried and 
tested casemix system imported from another country.  Chapter 2 of this thesis looks 
at the specific application of the MS-DRG4 (Version 27) Grouper system on the 
Maltese data and applies the Coefficient of Multiple Determination (R2) and the 
Coefficient of Variation (CV) to assess the heterogeneity between the obtained DRG 
classes and the degree of homogeneity gained in explaining resource use from the 
grouping of cases by DRG categories respectively.  The Length of Stay (LOS) at the 
hospital for each individual patient is used as a proxy for resource intensity use.  The 
results obtained from the study compare well with those obtained in other countries 
                                                        
4
 Medical Severity Diagnosis Related Groups (MS-DRG) provided by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, Department of Health and Human Services, USA. 
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and this supports the view that the management of the health care system in Malta 
would benefit from the implementation of a DRG casemix system.  
Following on from the findings presented in Chapter 2, the analysis presented in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this thesis focuses on a particular procedure, 
Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty (PTCA), performed within this 
particular hospital setting.  Chapter 3 looks at differences in the expected 
relationship between volume and competing risk outcomes and whether this 
relationship varies in view of different consultant job contract conditions. An 
extensive literature review summarises the wide-ranging work on the relationship 
between volume and outcome within varying hospital settings and between varying 
individual physicians.  Whilst acknowledging this relationship, the study specifically 
considers the strength of this relationship in the context of a single provider public 
hospital.  Furthermore, it was deemed important to look deeper into the resulting 
outcomes following a hospital intervention and analyse the factors which affect such 
outcomes.  
The main event of interest is  failure within the 60 day period following the discharge 
from hospital after the undertaking of a PTCA procedure.  Patients can be readmitted 
to hospital following discharge within the 60 day period or may otherwise die either 
during the hospitalisation period or within the 60 day period following discharge.   
The occurrence of the events readmission or death, are both treated as failure events.  
An event is considered to be a success if no event takes place within the 60 day time 
period following discharge.  In line with a number of suggestions in the literature, 
both non-parametric and semi-parametric survival analysis methods are applied to 
study the rates for the occurrence of the events of interest.  A multinomial logistic 
23 
 
model is also estimated to gauge the robustness of the results obtained from the 
survival analysis methods.  
The results obtained support the view that differences in outcomes for the event of 
interest are dependent on the patient volume levels of consultants and surgeons and 
also on the particular job plan contract type of the consultants.  Even within a single 
hospital setting, one would expect differences in the behaviour of consultants and 
surgeons when treating patients to occur. Variations in medical practice arise when 
patients with similar characteristics make use of different levels of hospital 
resources.  Such differences at the individual level are expected to have an impact 
on the overall performance, both in terms of quality and cost, of the health care 
system.  A reduction in variation would be expected to lead to an improvement in 
the overall efficiency of the health care system and would have an impact on patient 
welfare and overall health outcomes.  
Whilst many studies focus on the variation between hospitals, Chapter 4 of this 
thesis studies the behaviour of individual consultants working in the context of 
specific incentives and work practices of the Maltese health care system.  Within this 
context, the role of the consultant job contract type is expected to be a prime 
determinant of heterogeneity arising among treatment patterns.  Practice variation 
is measured by the number of investigations ordered and carried out on the patient 
undergoing a Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty (PTCA).  In the study, data were used to distinguish between Ǯnecessaryǯ investigations in the 
treatment of PTCA undertaken in the first two days of a patientǯs hospital stay, and 
those undertaken afterwards and thus considered Ǯless importantǯ.  This paper 
contributes to the literature by analysing how practice variation differs by 
24 
 
consultant job contract type in relation to the different time periods during which 
the patient is in hospital.   
The consultant responsible for the admitted patient has direct control over the 
number of investigations carried out at the hospital.  Variation in such decisions 
could reflect consultantǯs strategic behaviour due to his type of contract and/or 
consultant treatment preferences.  In this study, a theoretic utility function is 
developed to analyse the utility associated with the behaviour of doctors working 
within the context of a single hospital who choose to either work exclusively for the 
government or also practice in the private sector.  
In the literature, the variation in utility has been linked to physician and patient 
characteristics in addition to the organisational practices within the health care 
system.  Both the uncertainty of a choice of treatment and its resulting effect have 
been identified as prime determinants of variation.  Of importance to the study is 
the fact that due to the small size of the health care sector, patients are expected to 
be knowledgeable of physicians who carry out this particular procedure, whilst 
practicing physicians are concerned about their overall reputation.    
A two-stage multilevel modelling approach is used in Chapter 4 of this thesis to 
study the relationship between the specific consultant contract conditions and the 
number of investigations ordered by the consultant.  This level of analysis ensures 
that causes of variation, which might be omitted if the analysis is carried out at an 
aggregated level, are included and taken into account.  A one-stage multilevel model, 
including group level effects, is also used to gauge the robustness of the obtained 
results.  
25 
 
The results show that both the job contract type and the volume levels of the 
consultant significantly affect practice variation.  Furthermore, it was found that the 
responsiveness of practice variation to such characteristics varies in relation to the 
period of analysis, i.e. during the first two days of hospital stay compared to the rest 
of the days spent at hospital.    
This thesis concludes with a summary of the main findings and implications of the 
analysis undertaken and presented in the respective chapters.  In addition, some 
possible extensions to the research are discussed.  The need to be able to benchmark 
hospital activity against an Ǯacceptableǯ practice which is viable, is crucial 
information for the better management of the available limited resources and in 
monitoring health care providersǯ behaviour effectively.  The understanding of the 
relationship between health care outcomes, patient, consultant and surgeon 
characteristics is crucial for the hospital authorities in the setting up of effective 
policy throughout the health care system.  
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Abstract 
The healthcare system in Malta is financed through public funds with free healthcare 
provided at the point of service.  The aim of this paper is to examine the feasibility 
of introducing a Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) casemix system for Malta, not 
necessarily for payment and funding purposes, but as a tool to help describe, 
manage and measure resource use.  
Like many other countries, Malta faces a growing concern of how to cope with the 
ever-increasing demands for health services within the context of limited resources 
available for health care needs. To date there has been no previous application of a 
casemix system for Malta. Based on the experience of other countries, a first step 
towards the use of a patient classification system normally involves the importation 
of a pre-existing casemix system already used and tested elsewhere.  This study 
evaluates the practicability of the MS-DRG (Version 27.0) Grouper casemix software 
developed in the US within the context of the existing acute hospital care sector in 
Malta.  
The classification of 151,615 individual patient cases admitted to hospital between 
2009 and 2011 resulted in 636 different DRG categories being defined. Around half 
of these DRGs accounted for 99% of the total activity at the hospital. 296 DRG 
categories had less than 15 cases over the period, which highlights the need to 
carefully deal with relatively small sized DRG groups. The patient Length of Stay 
(LOS) is the indicator used as a proxy for resource use and the extent to which the 
DRG system is able to explain resource use is measured by two coefficients: the 
Coefficient of Multiple Determination (R2) and the Coefficient of Variation (CV). In 
this study an initial R2 value of 0.19 was obtained and this improved to 
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approximately 0.25 when a number of trimming algorithm methods were applied to 
the data.  A good proportion of the resulting DRGs had a CV which was less than 1, 
indicating a considerable low degree of variability within the obtained DRG groups.  
Based on the analysis undertaken, there is good evidence to support the 
introduction and use of a DRG based system in Malta.  The derived DRGs will help to 
define the service mix of the hospital and can be further used by the management of 
the hospital to assess efficiency and effectiveness within the Maltese hospital 
setting.   
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2.1  Introduction and Motivation 
The ability to measure the outcome of health care is critical to improving the 
effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of any health care system.  Hospitals are 
deeply rooted in the political and administrative organisation of their country and 
typically account for the majority of spending by Government within the health care 
sector of a country.  As stated by Lord Darzi (2008) Ǯwe can only be sure to improve what we actually measureǯ.  Casemix systems, particularly Diagnosis Related Groups 
(DRGs), have been implemented in a number of countries as part of a reform process 
to improve efficiency within the health care sector.  DRGs help policy makers obtain 
an estimate of the activity undertaken within the hospital and thus assist in the 
understanding and measuring of the output of the hospital entity.   
Measuring health care output through the use of indicators such as the number of 
beds, deaths or discharges, although all valid, do not provide the necessary measure 
of output from the health care system. The primary focus of this paper is the 
measurement of output in the Maltese health care sector through the use of a DRG 
casemix system.   
This study seeks to assist policy makers in their endeavour to evaluate and adopt 
the appropriate policy guidelines to ensure the sustainability of the provision of free 
health care services.  By applying DRGs in this context, the study will contribute to 
the debate of the relevance of such systems when applied to small countries with 
very particular hospital characteristics.  Furthermore, a DRG casemix system would 
provide the necessary framework to studying the performance of physicians 
working within the hospital system.   
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To date, there has not been a study on the application of a DRG casemix classification 
system to health care in Malta.  Scheller-Kreinsen et al., (2009) noted that most 
countries which introduced DRG systems as part of their reform initiatives have 
often imported a pre-existing casemix system from another country even though it 
may not fully reflect their own health care practice patterns.  It is only later that 
countries decide to refine the implemented casemix system to better reflect their 
own health care system.  This paper explores the practicability of applying the 
Casemix Grouper5 software MS-DRG6 (Version 27.0) used in the US in the context of 
the Maltese health care sector data.  The derived DRG categories will be evaluated 
in terms of the homogeneity and power of the generated DRG groups to explain 
resource use.  The DRG casemix system is now in use in a number of countries and 
has been applied to a variety of health care systems.  
The multi-product nature of hospital output is a major factor to be dealt with when 
defining hospital activity.  Classes of patients with similar clinical attributes and 
similar processes of care provide the necessary framework to aggregate patients 
into case types or products which entail the use of similar resources.  DRGs provide 
a management tool which views the delivery of health care as a service, a production 
process in which outputs (health care episodes) are delivered to consumers 
(patients).   
The results presented in this paper show that there is a good basis for 
recommending the introduction of a DRG based system to describe the hospital 
                                                        
5 A DRG Grouper is an algorithm which takes clinical and demographic data as input and gives a 
corresponding Diagnosis Related Group as output. 
6 Medical Severity Diagnosis Related Groups (MS-DRG) is a grouper software provided by the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Department of Health and Human Services, USA. 
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output activities in the Maltese health care system.  This will help to partition the 
episodes of care in an informative and meaningful way for the better management 
of resources within the health care sector.  The formulation of DRGs would 
encourage administrators to view the use and costs of hospital services along 
product lines based on DRGs and in so doing, provide information on whether 
resources used for particular episodes of care are in line with what is expected for 
an average case within a particular DRG group. 
The paper is organized as follows: the following section, Section 2.2, provides an 
overview of the literature related to the process of introducing a DRG casemix 
system together with the expected consequences on hospital activity resulting from 
its implementation.  Section 2.3 gives a brief description of the main characteristics 
of the health care sector in Malta together with a detailed analysis of the available 
data and the necessary adaptations required to ensure that the grouper software is 
suitably applied.  The methodology used to assess the reliability of the obtained 
DRGs is described next, followed by a discussion of the results obtained when 
measuring hospital output within the Maltese acute health care sector using DRGs.  
Finally a number of conclusions are presented.   
 
 
 
 
32 
 
2.2  Literature 
Casemix is defined by Anderson (1984) as a system which ǲgroups individual cases 
into a smaller number of case types so that the cases within a given group are 
homogeneous and the case types themselves are heterogeneous from other groups 
in some meaningful wayǳ.  Patients within a clinical group are expected to have 
reasonably consistent resource consumption levels and such levels are expected to 
differ from other groups.  DRGs are a tool which describes the number and type of 
treated patients in a hospital setting.   According to Zhiping et al., (2004b) a casemix 
system has to have three important characteristics: clinical meaningfulness, 
resource use homogeneity and a manageable number of classes.  The DRG system is 
the most well known casemix system, designed to group together acute inpatients, 
who are similar clinically and who have a similar pattern of resource use.   
The first DRG classification system was designed in the United States following work 
at Yale University by Fetter, Thompson and Averill in 1969. The intended primary 
use was to achieve quality improvement and to review utilisation. However this 
changed in the funding of hospitals in the 1980s.  The constant rising cost of health 
care in the US was the primary motive for developing a prospective payment system.  
Scheller-Kreinsen et al., (2009) highlight three main reasons for the introduction of 
DRGs: increased transparency,  greater efficiency and supporting in-hospital 
management.   
Most EU nations recorded a period of recession throughout the 1980s and this was 
the time when most countries initiated a process of reform within their health care 
systems.  Given the fact that the acute hospital sector generally constitutes a major 
component of health care expenditure, most European governments sought to use 
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the introduction of a DRG system to primarily target improvements in efficiency, in 
resource allocation and cost containment within their respective health care system.  
Governments also sought other objectives, not primarily economic in nature, such 
as reductions in waiting lists and improvements in the quality of care.  The 1990s 
saw the implementation and application of DRG systems within most European 
countries such as the UK, Italy, France, Ireland and Portugal to mention just a few.  
As highlighted by Wiley (1999) this was at a time of increasing pressure on health 
care expenditure within a number of countries leading to the implementation of a 
number of reform options within the respective health care systems. 
The motives underlying the introduction and the development of DRG systems, 
together with the particular design features of the system, vary greatly across 
countries (HOPE, 2006).  The provision of health care systems, their historical 
background and cultural environment within which they operate, have impacted on 
the process of implementing a DRG system.   Within the setting of global budgets (as 
was the case seen in most European countries) the introduction of DRGs was mostly 
directed towards fairness and efficiency rather than cost containment. Countries 
adopting a DRG casemix system now had a way of obtaining information on 
individual services offered and also on the costs per case incurred (provided that 
these were available).   
In countries where the inpatient sector is dominated by the public sector and where 
most workers are on fixed salaries, the incentives of introducing DRGs tend to differ.  
Scheller-Kreinsen et al., (2009) concludes though that one would still expect DRGs 
to increase incentives for effective and efficient service delivery in such a setting.  
Introducing DRGs would also help to establish a financial mechanism which would 
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ensure that production costs, in terms of resource use were capped to a certain level.  
Once hospital activity levels and casemix have been determined, health authorities 
can allocate annual hospital budgets, both prospectively and retrospectively.  
Furthermore, the documentation needs associated with the setting up of DRGs 
would provide managers with the information needed to monitor and control the 
work of clinicians.  DRGs provide the information to help identify cases which could 
be judged as being relatively Ǯin line with the normǯ in comparison with cases for 
which treatment is less efficient in terms of resource use. 
The widespread use of DRGs across countries is in itself a sign of the success of such 
systems in helping health services achieve pre-set targets of better management and 
greater efficiency levels.  However, the success of adopting DRGs depends on the 
interlinkages between the various entities which make up a health care system, in 
particular, the role of clinicians and the political commitment of governments to 
implement the necessary changes within the health care system.   
The introduction of a DRG system led to a number of benefits within the various 
health care systems in which they where introduced, in particular,  as presented in 
the literature these include:  reducing waiting times, increasing activity, stimulating 
provider competition and facilitating patient choice of hospital, controlling costs, 
improving transparency in hospital facilities and harmonising payment systems 
(Dismuke and Sena, 1999; Louis et al., 1999; Mikkola et al., 2002).  Furthermore, 
hospitals tend to be better at coding their activity in view of the fact that this would 
serve to ensure that funding is in line with the activity carried out within the 
hospital.  The better coding of activity undertaken within the hospital ensures that 
more accurate information and more transparency is achieved in terms of 
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undertaken activity.  The DRG system provides more data on hospital production 
and costs in comparison to other management systems.  The data used for the DRG 
system would serve as an instrument for the allocation of public hospital budgets 
funded by the national government.  
 Following the introduction of a new financing system based on DRGs,  Aparo et al., 
(2009) found significant lower costs per discharge and a reduction of more than 
50% in patient Length of Stay (LOS) having thus an impact on resource allocation 
within the hospital.  This study however fails to consider the possible impact on the 
quality of care.  DRGǯs provide the necessary data which allows for the setting up of 
an appropriate benchmark in terms of resource use for each of the assigned DRG 
categories within the hospital setting.  The hospital would thus be in a position to 
plan prospectively in terms of resource usage.  
 There is broad agreement in academic and policy circles that the introduction of 
DRGs also affects provider behaviour (Scheller-Kreinsen et al., 2009).  The 
introduction of DRGs has led to an increased level of activity in the short term, which 
results from the fact that the introduction of DRGs provides an incentive for shorter 
hospital LOS periods (Dismuke and Sena, 1999; Louis et al., 1999; Mikkola et al., 
2002).  In a study of the impact on outcomes following the introduction of changes 
in the hospital payment system, Moreno-Serra and Wagstaff (2010) conclude that 
inpatient admissions do not seem to be affected by a shift from budgets to patient 
based payment methods whilst Average Length of Stay (ALOS) seems to be reduced 
by about 4%. 
DRGs offer hospital management not only the reason, but also the management and 
measurement tools needed to have better control over resource use.  In particular, 
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Berki (1985) finds that one could collect information on hospital resources used by 
individual physicians and those identified as using wasteful resources could be 
persuaded to change their practices.  Therefore, the success of introducing a DRG 
system should not only be gauged by changes in efficiency but also by the effect of 
incentives on provider behaviour that result from the introduction and  
implementation of the DRG system.   
Busse et al., (2006) balances the gains from DRG use of generating valuable 
information on costs, casemix and better cost control per diagnosis, against the 
problems resulting from cream skimming, up-coding or DRG creep, cost shifting and 
quality skimping.  Indeed physicians working within a health system, based on case 
mix classification, would prefer to treat low risk patients over other patients with a 
higher risk factor assuming that both are classified under the same DRG category. 
Furthermore there is also the possibility of shifting patients, which are relatively 
more costly to treat to other centres/hospital.  
There is infact an added incentive for the hospital concerned to up-code cases 
treated at the hospital.  DRG creep would help the hospital to attract more funds or 
would serve to justify the use of more resources within the hospital.  The fact that 
the use of resources is specifically set by the assigned DRG category reduces the 
incentive of practitioners to seek improvements in quality (referred to as quality 
skimping) over and above that required by the DRG assigned category.  This 
resultant unintended behaviour, which can arise after DRG implementation, is 
identified as a cause of concern.   
Kahn et al., (1990) find that after the adoption of the DRG based payment system 
patients were overall sicker at admission, the LOS o
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became less stable at discharge whilst in-hospital mortality decreased.  Similar 
results were obtained by Louis et al., (1999) in a study using Italian data whereby 
the implementation of the DRG system resulted in a decrease in ordinary hospital 
admissions, a decrease in ALOS,  an increase in day admissions and greater severity 
of illness amongst hospitalised patients.  No change is noted in mortality and 
readmission rates.  Finger (2000) however, finds that the authorities in the US 
became concerned about the number of readmissions registered in hospital cases 
following the introduction of a DRG system.  The introduction of DRGs led to cost 
shifting whereby costs were shifted to other parts of the health care system away 
from the acute hospital (Jonsson, 1996; Morrissey et al., 1988) and/or cream 
skimming practised by hospitals as evidenced by  Bibbee and Padrini (2006).   
Experience shows that many countries introducing a DRG system share common 
difficulties, in particular the ever increasing demand to meet the expectations of 
their population in terms of health care needs and the pressure to curtail 
expenditure.  The response of countries varies in relation to the historical, cultural 
and political interlinkages within their particular societies.  What seems clear 
though is that most countries have turned towards DRGs and casemix tools to 
control costs, improve quality and achieve improved efficiency levels.  The DRG tool 
has been seen to be flexible enough to be adapted to support different country needs 
and health care system characteristics, whether tax-based, insurance based or even 
financed through budgeting practices or contracting.   
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2.3  The situation in Malta 
 
Malta has an integrated health care service, organized at a national level with one 
main acute general hospital which services the entire population.  Health services in 
Malta are provided mainly by the state with an increasing contribution from the 
private sector being registered over the most recent years.  Health care expenditure 
is primarily of a public nature, which expenditure is though complemented by 
private financing through out of pocket payments and private insurance.  The total 
expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP is of around 8% and two-thirds of this 
is state financed.  The statutory health care system is funded by general tax revenue, 
with all forms of taxation feeding into the Consolidated Fund from which the annual 
budget allocation for health is drawn.  The Ministry for Finance determines the size 
of the health care budget yearly.  There is no reimbursement system operating in 
the Maltese health care system as all public health care services are provided on a 
free basis at the point of use.  There are no co-payments for any part of the health 
care system.  
 
The public health care centres and hospitals provide free access to preventive, 
investigative, curative and rehabilitation services, irrespective of income or ability 
to pay.  Most hospital care is provided within the Mater Dei Hospital (MDH), which 
is the only acute general hospital in Malta.  It is estimated that over 80% of the 
population of the Maltese Islands rely on the health care services provided by the 
state.  MDH also offers services in all other specialties which include amongst others: 
radiology, ophthalmology, urology and pathology.  Given the geographical 
characteristics of Malta and particularly its relatively small size, the hospital caters 
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for all the needs of the population, even though some cases which require particular 
treatment or which are relatively uncommon are usually referred to specialized 
centres abroad.   
Although universal coverage for government health services exists, people tend to 
use the private sector for what they perceive to be more personal attention and care 
together with the desire to be seen by the consultant of their choice. Until fairly 
recently, direct out-of-pocket payment used to be the method of payment for all 
private health care services ranging from consultations to interventions.  The setting 
up of a number of private hospitals and clinics over the recent years has led to  
considerable changes within the private health care insurance market. 
 
Out of pocket payments are still though the predominant method of payment for 
private general treatment given that there are no incentives for people to take out 
private health insurance at present.  Private health insurance is mainly taken out for 
the eventuality of elective surgery, hospital care and medical treatment overseas. 
There exists a perception that ǲcomplexǳ interventions are only possible, or are safer 
if carried out at the public hospital.  Private insurance companies also offer a cash 
rebate per diem for insured persons who opt to make use of the state hospital to 
treat particular and specific conditions.  As a result, the state bears most of the brunt 
of the financial burden of health care. 
 
Consultants working at MDH are engaged as government employees, paid in 
accordance with a salary grade scheme which applies to all other government 
employees.  Consultants choose between two work plan options, public-only, 
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whereby consultants cannot undertake any private practice and dual practice 
whereby consultants can practice in both the private and the public sector.   
Within this context the Government of Malta is committed to keeping health care free at the point of delivery and it is the Governmentǯs intention to improve 
resources and ensure that they are managed efficiently (Ministry of Health - 
Government of Malta, 2008).  A major challenge of the current health care system in 
Malta is to ensure the sustainability of the system whilst developing the necessary 
mechanisms to adequately measure quality and outcomes.  It is in this context that 
this paper evaluates the construction and relevance of DRG practicability for Malta's 
health care system.   
 
2.4  Data  
This study uses patient level data provided by the hospital management unit7 of 
MDH for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011.  Given the high degree of data 
fragmentation, a matching and database linking process was carried out to ensure 
that a workable dataset was available. This involved the use of a mapping algorithm 
to map the Maltese data to the requirements of the Grouper software. Three 
different datasets8 at the patient level were integrated together through the use of 
an encrypted patient ID code.  Data up to a six level digit diagnosis code, based on 
the ICD-109 classification system of the World Health Organisation (WHO), was 
made available for this study whilst data for procedure codes up to three coding 
                                                        
7 The Clinical Performance Unit (CPU). 
8 The Surgical and Operations Register, The Admissions and Transfers Discharge Database and the 
Hospital Activity Analysis Database. All databases are maintained by the CPU at MDH. 
9 International Classification of Diseases – 10th revision (WHO). 
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levels was based on the ICD-9-CM10 classification system.  A number of technical 
edits and assumptions, in consultation with the hospital management authorities, 
were applied to the dataset in order to obtain data in the requested classification 
system (ICD-9-CM) for the diagnosis codes required by the MS-DRG Grouper11 used 
in this study.  In particular, this involved eliminating cases with invalid data such as 
invalid age or sex, dealing with cases with a missing primary diagnosis, re-specifying 
the admitting diagnosis codes as well as fine-tuning the discharge status codes for a 
number of cases.  The DRG software was applied to a final dataset of 151,615 patient 
cases.    
Data drawn from the following categories at patient level were the main inputs for 
the DRG classification Grouper: admission and discharge date, age, sex, diagnosis 
and procedure codes together with discharge status.  Other data related to different 
consultant and surgeon characteristics and to investigations carried out during a 
hospital stay was provided.  The dataset used in this study relates to episodes of 
inpatient care for individuals who have been given a bed at MDH.  This includes day 
cases for which the LOS would be recorded as zero.   
LOS: The LOS variable is an important indicator of resource utilization. It is also 
easily extractable, well standardized and generally reliable.  LOS is a physical 
measure of hospital resource use and provides a suitable measure for intermediate 
                                                        
10 International Classification of Diseases – 9th revision – Clinical Modification (WHO). 
11 Data for diagnosis codes was initially converted from the ICD-10 coding structure to the ICD-10-
CM structure.  This involved a detailed and meticulous process of allocating cases from the more 
general ICD-10 structure to the more specific ICD-10-CM. A number of assumptions, based on the 
recommendations of the clinincal performance unit within the hospital, had to be implementated 
given the lack of required detail in the available ICD-10 database.   A backward mapping algorithm 
(General Equivalence Mapping (GEM)) provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) of the US government was then applied to the data to obtain data in the ICD-9-CM coding 
structure required by MS-DRG version 27.  
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products used in the treatment of the inpatient.  In the original design of the DRG 
system by Fetter and colleagues in 1969, the LOS variable was found to correlate 
well with resource consumption (Fetter et al., 1980).  Whilst recognising the 
shortcomings of using LOS as a proxy for resource intensity in the production of 
hospital products, Rhodes et al., (1997), highlight that it is nevertheless, in the 
absence of a practical alternative, the measure most often used.  Cost-accounting 
data for measuring resource consumption in the treatment of patients in Malta is 
not available12 and therefore in this study, the LOS variable will be the proxy 
variable for resource use. 
Outliers: Of particular interest and concern to the analysis of DRG groups is the 
treatment of outlier cases and their expected impact on the homogeneity of the 
assigned DRG groups.  The treatment of outlier cases in Maltaǯs context is of prime 
relevance given the relative small size of the health care sector and the likelihood 
that a considerable amount of DRG categories would only comprise relatively few 
observations.  As highlighted by Cots et al., (2003) outliers ought to be valued 
differently from inliers as their presence would lead to a mean value of resource use 
which is not representative of the DRG group. There is thus a case for removing 
outlier observations which cause much of this disturbance. 
A common approach applied in the literature is to remove at the outset values 
outside a pre-set limit given that they have an unrepresentative impact on the 
overall average within that particular group. The real reason for excluding such Ǯextremeǯ cases ȋapart from the statistical problems which they causeȌ is that such 
cases represent unusual occurrences not necessarily predictable from diagnosis or 
                                                        
12 A cost accounting exercise is currently being undertaken at the Ministry of Health. 
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procedural information such as, lack of beds for transfer and lack of available 
services related to home assistance and care.     
The identification and removal of outlier observations  in statistical analysis helps 
to provide a sounder basis for examining the characteristics of a population under 
review (Reid et al., 1997).  Outliers ȋfollowing the removal of the Ǯextremeǯ casesȌ 
can be defined as observations that appear to be different from other similar 
observations in the dataset or DRG group.  The inlier status of a patient is thus 
defined on the basis of the assigned DRG and on the population of episodes selected.  
Two types of outliers are identified: cases of patients with LOS which is much longer 
or shorter than the average (a stay outlier) or cases of patients with costs which are 
more or less than the average for that group (a cost outlier). Only stay outliers will 
be considered in this study. Lichtig (1986) and Reid et al., (1997) identify a number 
of reasons related to the existence of outliers: data errors, unusual combinations of 
clinical conditions, hospital-acquired complications and misadventures.  Some DRG 
categories might be more susceptible to problems of generating outliers, whilst 
treatment mishaps in particular categories can also be highlighted as possible 
causes of outlier cases.   
 
2.5  Methodology 
 
In this section the main features of the Grouper used to derive the DRG categories 
will be reviewed, highlighting the characteristics which will determine the assigned 
DRG groups.  An overiew of the trimming methods applied in this paper to identify 
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outlier cases are included in this section.  This is followed by a description of the 
Coefficient of Variation, (CV), and the Coefficient of Multiple Determination, (R2), 
used to assess the performance of the casemix classification Grouper.  
MS-DRG: The MS-DRG Grouper delivers the operational means of determining the 
types of patients treated and relates this to the resources consumed within the 
hospital.  The Grouper partitions the data, prepared to specification, in such a way, 
that information is provided to the user on the clinical inputs required and on the 
resources expected to be consumed by each episode in question.  Although all 
patients are unique, groups of patients have demographic, diagnostic, and 
therapeutic attributes in common that determine the intensity level of their 
resource usage.   
The guiding principle of DRG casemix systems is to divide patients into 
homogeneous groups in terms of age, sex, diagnosis, procedures and discharge 
status, groups which are clinically meaningful and relatively homogeneous in 
resource use.  Such characteristics are important in explaining resource use and are 
thus incorporated into the preset algorithm used to determine the particular DRG.  
MS-DRG executes an algorithm based on a number of characteristics reviewed in a 
particular order: presence of operating room procedure, principle diagnosis, age, 
sex, complication or comorbidity, various secondary diagnoses, and discharge 
status. 
The MS-DRG version chosen for this study uses the ICD-9-CM international coding 
classification for both diagnosis and procedures.  DRGs are formed by first allocating 
all possible diagnoses into 25 mutually exclusive Major Diagnostic Categories 
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(MDCs)13 reflecting the part of the body organ system which is being affected.  Cases 
with at least one operating room procedure are referred to as surgical and those 
with no procedures are treated as medical cases; these are characterised by the 
principle diagnosis for which patients are admitted.  Once the medical and surgical 
classes for an MDC are formed, each class of patients is evaluated to determine whether complications and comorbidities, the patientǯs age or discharge status, 
consistently affect the consumption of hospital resources.  Grouping continues by 
assigning cases from the appropriate MDC categories to the particular DRG groups 
within each MDC based on those patient characteristics which are expected to 
impact on resource consumption patterns.  The DRG logic algorithm within MS-DRG 
defines around 1,000 different DRG groups.14  
Trimming: A number of techniques have been applied in the literature for defining 
outliers, many of which have a purely statistical underpinning (Bender and McGuire, 
1995; Coombes et al., 1995; Reid et al., 1997).  Lichtig (1986) uses multiples of the 
standard deviation of the original or logarithms of the data to define trimming 
points.   Reid et al., (1997) and Zhiping et al., (2004a) stress the use of an algorithm 
based on the interquartile range (IQR) whereby the low trim point is defined as Q1-
1.5*(Q3-Q1) where Q1 is the first quartile, Q3 is the third quartile and (Q3-Q1) is the 
interquartile range.  The high trim point is defined at 1.5*(Q3-Q1)+Q3.  Palmer et al., 
(2001) also use the interquartile range method to define an upper trim point beyond 
which all cases are defined as outliers.   
                                                        
13 A list of all the 25 Major Diagnostic Categories is provided in the Appendix to this chapter 
(Table2.8). 
14 The definitions manual with the full logic tables is provided by 3M Health Information Systems 
2010, USA.  
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The trimming methods described above are applied to the dataset, following the 
removal of cases considered by the management of the hospital as Ǯextremeǯ cases. 
Casemix systems have not been designed to deal with such cases and thus the 
removal of such cases has to be done arbitrarily.  It is within this context and in 
consultation with the management of the hospital that it was decided to remove 
from the data set all Ǯextremeǯ cases with a LOS in excess of 60 days.  
The exclusion of extreme cases is imperative for the elimination of outlier values 
that otherwise would have had a significant and unrepresentative impact on the 
average for the respective DRG groups.  Following the arbitrary elimination of the 
extreme cases a further process of distinction between inlier and outlier cases 
within the respective DRGs is carried out.  The trimming of outliers would remove 
from the DRG group, cases which do not appear to belong to the underlying 
distribution postulated by the LOS for the majority of the cases within the DRG. 
A number of trimming methods15 will be evaluated in this study.  These methods are 
applied to each of the particular DRG groups generated by the Grouper software.  
Two particular trimming methods stand out in the literature.  One is based on the 
distribution of the elements that make up the DRG group, attempting to make the 
arithmetic mean of the group more robust (referred to in this study as the GM2 and 
GM3 methods),  A second group of trimming methods is based on the interquartile 
range whereby a multiple of the range between the 25th percentile and the 75th 
                                                        
15 A number of trimming methods are tested:  
   GM2 =  geometric mean + 2*standard deviation 
   GM3 = geometric mean + 3*standard deviation 
   IR1.5 = 75th Percentile + 1.5*interquartile range 
   IR2.0 = 75th Percentile + 2*interquartile range  
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percentile is added to the 75th percentile (referred to in this study as the IR1.5 and 
the IR2.0 methods).  
The preferred method in this study, the IR1.5, also used by the British National 
Casemix Office and the Australia Department of Health and Family Services is based 
on the interquartile method (percentile methods).  This non parametric method 
makes no strong assumptions on the distributional form of the dependent variable 
and the trim points are not readily distorted by extreme values (Queensland Health, 
2004).  Furthermore, this method is relatively easy to understand apart from the 
fact that the method has a long history in the use of preliminary editing of data in 
statistical analysis (Palmer, Reid 2001).  The IQR method has been used in a number 
of evaluation studies for countries adopting DRG systems; Freeman (1991) used IQR 
for European data (UK, Norway, Spain), whilst Casas and Tomas (1993) used IQR for 
data on Ireland, Portugal, Switzerland and Spain.  The choice of this trimming 
method is also based on work by Soderlund (1996) for the National Health Service 
(UK) wherby the trimming method is chosen on the basis of the fact that such 
method should detect the greatest number of outlier cases whereby resulting in a 
more robust mean value for the DRG.   
Furthermore, given the characteristics of the dataset, this study will thus not apply 
a lower trim point to the data.  This strategy was also applied in a number of cases 
in the literature (Palmer et al., 2001).  Trimming at the lower end would result in 
deleting LOS data on patients which are very important for the overall 
understanding of LOS patterns in the hospital at large.  
 
The performance and adequacy of the MS-DRG Grouper to describe Maltese health 
care data, in terms of grouping episodes of care is evaluated through the use of the 
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CV and R2 statistics.  These are the two main statistical tools which are used for the 
evaluation of heterogeneity in LOS between DRG classes and homogeneity in LOS 
within DRG classes.   
CV: This statistic is used to measure the within group variability or homogeneity in 
terms of LOS within established DRG categories and is obtained by dividing the 
standard deviation of LOS by the mean of LOS for each of the DRG groups.  A value 
of zero is an indication that the group has no variance from the mean whilst a CV 
greater than 1 is an indication of heterogeneity within the group.  The homogeneity 
of the DRG groups adds to the robustness of the DRG design.  Fischer (2000) and 
Palmer et al., (2001) conventionally take a CV of less than 1 as an indication of DRGs 
with an acceptable degree of variation.  Other studies by (Aisbett et al., 2007; 
Ghaffari et al., 2008; Reid et al., 1991; Zhiping et al., 2004a) use the same criteria to 
assess the performance of the DRG classification structure.    
R2:  This statistic is a measure of the gain in explanatory power of the grouping 
classification in terms of resource usage (LOS in this case), which provides a 
measure of the extent to which the DRG system explains variation in resource use 
based on the characteristics of the individual patient.  Averill et al., (1998) describe 
R2 as the proportion of the variance of the whole population around the population 
mean (total variance) that is due to the variance of group means around the 
population mean (between group variance).  The extent to which variation of LOS 
occurs between casemix groups, rather than within them, determines the strength 
of the grouping system.  If n observations are divided into n different groups, and if 
all the variation is between groups and none within the group, then an R2 value of 1 
is obtained.  The higher this ratio, the more of the total variance is said to be 
49 
 
explained by the variance between groups as opposed to variance within groups and 
this is thus an indication that the groups are relatively heterogeneous between one 
another, as is required. 
As is common practice in casemix research, a regression16 model is used to explain 
the variation in resource use through the use of a LOS variable.  The assigned DRG 
index category for the individual patient case is the independent variable used in the 
estimation process.  This variable incorporates all the visit related information 
(including the patient characteristics) used by the grouper software to assign the 
particular DRG category.  Most LOS distributions are asymmetric, usually with a long 
right tail and some very large observations (Zhiping, 2004).  As clearly highlighted 
in most literature, the presence of even a few high observations (outliers) of the LOS 
dependent variable will greatly affect the R2 value due to the skewed nature of the 
distribution for the LOS variable.  The OLS method requires that the distribution 
assumption of normality in the error term holds and thus the emphasis of the 
analysis shifts to the trimmed data, after the treatment of such outliers.  The 
trimming and the removal of extreme cases significantly contributes towards the 
attainment of distributional properties which are more in line with the 
requirements of the OLS method (Reid et al., 1991).  
A high R2 is an indication that the DRG classification explains a significant proportion 
of the variation in LOS, and thus the DRG could be used as a suitable basis for 
explaining variations in resource use for different hospital outputs.  The explanatory 
power of the DRGs, represented by the R2 in this study is compared to that obtained 
                                                        
16 Based on the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method.  
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in other studies which seek to evaluate the appropriateness of introducing a casemix 
system within a health care setting.   
R2 values are also estimated for different MDC categories to show that variations are 
registered not only across DRG classifications but also for different MDCs. In line 
with the distributional property requirements of the applied estimation method, the 
trimming process applied within the MDC categories is expected to yield significant 
improvement in terms of such properties within the respective MDC groups.  Averill 
et al., (1998) highlight that there is a systemic variation in R2 across MDCs reflecting 
the fact that LOS is more predictable in some MDCs such as the circulatory system 
and less predictable in others such as mental health.  The R2 results obtained from 
this study, for the different MDC categories, are compared to similar results in the 
literature to gauge the adequacy of the DRG casemix system in such a context.   
 
2.6  Results 
This section commences with a general description of the hospital output results 
obtained from the DRG Grouper applied to the acute health care sector in Malta. 
Basic descriptive statistics for the most commonly assigned DRG cases are also 
provided.  There then follows a presentation of the results obtained for both the CV 
statistic and the R2 statistic under the different trimming options and for the various 
assigned MDC categories.  
2.6.1 General description of hospital output 
The classification of the 151,615 cases using MS-DRG resulted in 636 different DRGs, 
approximately 55% of which accounted for 99% of the total activity generated in 
the hospital.  Further analyses showed that around 2% of the DRGs represented 
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approximately 31% of the activity at the hospital.  There were 296 DRGs with fewer 
than 15 cases each over the three year period (1,481 patient cases in total).  Out of 
these, only 31 DRGs with fewer than 15 cases each had an ALOS shorter than 4 
days.17  This indicates that most of these cases are complex cases that absorb a 
significant amount of hospital resources to be treated.  DRGs with few episodes are 
harder to interpret, as utilisation measures obtained for them are subject to relative 
sample variation not reduced by the law of large numbers (Aisbett et al.,  2007).18 
This also applies to particular DRG groups with very low volumes, as can be found 
in health care systems with significantly large datasets as well as those like Malta.     
Table 2.1 shows information on the DRGs with the most common occurrences for 
the years 2009-2011.  The ALOS for each of the DRG categories and the size of each 
of the DRGs in percentage terms is given.  The ALOS varied between DRGs and the 
sensitivity of the ALOS to outliers within the DRGs categories was analysed further 
by applying a number of trimming options to the data.   
Table 2.1: DRGs with the 10 most common occurrences for the 2009-2011 period 
DRG 
 
Description Occurrences ALOS % of 
cases 
392 Esophagitis, Gastroent. & Misc. Digest Disorders 
w/o mcc 
9727 2.5 6.5 
313 Chest Pain 7508 1.9 5.0 
117 Intraocular procedures w/o cc/mcc 6776 0.5 4.5 
775 Vaginal delivery w/o complicating diagnoses 5437 2.7 3.6 
951 Other factors influencing health status 4125 0.6 2.7 
950 After care w/o cc/mcc  3531 0.3 2.3 
581 Other skin, subcut. tissue & breast proc. w/o 
cc/mcc 
3179 1.1 2.1 
293 Heart Failure and shock w/o cc/mcc 2728 6.4 1.8 
766 Cesarean section w/o cc/mcc 2445 6.6 1.6 
607 Minor skin disorders w/o mcc 2312 0.7 1.5 
Source: Analysis of MS-DRG Grouper output. 
                                                        
17 3.97 days is the ALOS when all patients in this study are taken into account. 
18 DRG categories with less than 15 cases over the 3 years of data are not considered in the analysis.  
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Table 2.2 shows the variation in ALOS when cases with different LOS periods were 
removed from the analysis.  When cases considered as extreme (more than 60 day 
LOS) were excluded from the analysis, the ALOS fell to 3.63 days.  In total there were 
519 cases which reported a LOS in excess of 60 days.  There are only 202 cases with 
LOS in excess of 90 days.  Approximately 44% of the cases accounted for short stay 
patients (0 or 1 day) and the ALOS, when excluding short stay patients, was 
observed to go up to 6.77 days.  Around 60% of the cases treated in the hospital had 
an ALOS of less than or equal to 2 days.  Most distributions of LOS were asymmetric, 
with a long right tail and some very large frequency observations.   
 
Table 2.2: ALOS (days) after removing outlier cases 
 All cases <120 days <90days <60days <30days 
Average length of stay  3.97 3.84 3.78 3.63 3.27 
Source: Analysis of hospital episode data. 
 
Figure 2-1 shows the frequency distributions for all cases with LOS which are less 
than or equal to 30 days.  All other cases with LOS in excess of 30 days had an 
occurrence of less than 1.5% in the overall dataset.   Patients with very large LOS 
were treated as extreme cases and were removed for analytical purposes, while 
others with atypical long or short stays, which are usually treated as outliers, were 
also trimmed.    
 
 
 
53 
 
Figure 2-1: Frequency distribution by LOS (less than 31 days) 
 
    Source: Analysis of hospital episode data. 
 
As part of the preliminary output, the MS-DRG Grouper initially assigned individual 
cases to one of 25 MDCs reflecting the part of the organ system which was being 
affected in the particular case. The study found that MDC 5 (Diseases and Disorders 
of the Circulatory System) was the MDC with the highest volume at 23,325 cases, 
accounting for 15.4 per cent of the total cases in the three year period.   
 
Table 2.3: MDCs with the 10 most common occurrences 
MDC Description Occurrences ALOS % of cases 
5 Circulatory System, Diseases & 
Disorders 
23325 4.8 15.4 
6 Digestive System, Diseases & 
Disorders 
20685 3.1 13.6 
14 Pregnancy, Childbirth, & The 
Puerperium 
10942 3.3 7.2 
9 Skin, Subcutaneous Tissue & Breast, 
Diseases & Disorders 
10723 2.5 7.1 
8 Musculoskeletal System & Connective 
Tissue, Diseases & Disorders 
10671 5.4 7.0 
2 Eye, Diseases & Disorders 10151 0.5 6.7 
23 Factors On Health Status & Other 
Contacts With Health Services 
9883 1.2 6.5 
4 Respiratory System, Diseases & 
Disorders 
9877 6.1 6.5 
11 Kidney And Urinary Tract, Diseases & 
Disorders 
9124 3.9 6.0 
1 Nervous System, Diseases & Disorders 7374 5.3 4.9 
Source: Analysis of MS-DRG Grouper output. 
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Table 2.3 and Figure 2-2 show that a significant proportion of hospital activity is 
grouped into a small number of MDC categories, in fact 81% of all the cases fell 
within 10 MDCs.  The variation in ALOS between different MDCs reflects the 
particular characteristics of each MDC group.  Groups with very low ALOS reflected 
treatment undertaken on a day care basis or treatment requiring only an overnight 
stay in hospital.  
 
Figure 2-2: Frequency distribution by MDC groups 
 
 Source: Analysis of MS-DRG Grouper output. 
 
The presence of outliers in the dataset is due to a number of factors, such as the age 
of the individual, case severity, the availability of discharge to other institutions, and 
the social circumstances of the patients admitted to hospital.  Table 2.4 shows the 
number of outliers identified using the trimming methods applied in the analysis.  It 
also includes the ALOS as a result of the trimming method adopted and the 
percentage of outlier cases which were trimmed.  A universal trim was applied to 
the data and cases with a LOS in excess of 60 days were removed from the analysis.  
This resulted in the removal of 519 cases. It is recommended that these cases are 
subjected to further study.  
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Table 2.4: Analysis of outlier cases by different trimming methods 
Trimming method No. of trimmed cases ALOS % of outlier cases 
universal >60 days 519 3.805 0.3 
GM2 7788 2.938 5.1 
GM3 4553 3.210 3.0 
IR1.5 15141 2.834 10.0 
IR2.0 12709 2.989 8.4 
Source: Analysis of MS-DRG Grouper output. 
 
The four trimming methods used in Table 2.4 were applied to the remaining cases 
and the resulting number of trimmed cases for each method is an indication of the 
variation in resource use within the particular DRGs. The IR1.5 method yielded a  
trim of around 10.0% of the available dataset.  This is in line with the guidelines 
provided by Palmer and Reid, (2001) and the percentage of cases trimmed with this 
method is similar to that in other studies found in the literature.  As a result the ALOS 
for the whole hospital fell to 2.8 days, or by around 25% implying that dealing with 
such outliers would lead to a reduction of around 1 day from the ALOS within the 
whole hospital; this represents a considerable saving in terms of resource use.   
 
2.6.2  Statistical Analysis of Goodness of Fit 
 
CV: The results presented in Table 2.5 stem from the derived DRG categories after 
the removal of extreme cases and those DRGs with 15 cases or less.  This is referred 
to as partial trimming and it was found that 42% of such DRGs had a CV which was 
less than 1.  When the IR1.5 trimming method was further applied to the data19, the 
proportion of DRGs with a CV of less than 1 rose to 85%, being the highest 
                                                        
19 The application of the other methods yielded the following percentages of cases with a CV < 1:  
GM2 – 78%, GM3 – 70% and IR2.0 – 82%.  
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proportion compared to the other trimming methods.  The lesser the variation 
within the grouped DRGs, the better the performance of the classification system 
(Palmer et al., 2001).  The IR1.5 method thus resulted in a significant number of 
DRGs (290) with a CV less than 1, highlighting the ability of the Grouper to produce 
homogeneous groups.    
Table 2.5: Distribution of the DRGs with CV>1 
           Partial trimming            After IR1.5 trimming 
               (no of cases)               (no of cases)  
       CV>5 1            CV 1-2   48 
       CV 3-5 7            CV<1   290 
       CV>2 35   
       CV>1 195   
       CV<1 143   
Source: Analysis of MS-DRG Grouper output. 
 
The results suggest that following the trimming process an acceptable level of 
variation exists within the DRG groups and that trimming is a necessary task to 
improve homogeneity within DRG categories.  The effect of trimming, especially by 
using the IR1.5 method, resulted in sizeable changes in the CV of the different DRG 
groups, helping to reduce the CV values by a significant amount.  It was also noted 
that the impact of trimming on the CV for each of the DRG categories was also 
sensitive to the trimming method applied. 
Aisbett et al., (2007) highlight that trimming would be useful if the removal of a 
small number of records greatly improves the Grouperǯs R2 value and CV value for 
the specific groups.  This requires the analysis of both the full set of data (inliers and 
outliers) and then specifically the inliers to gauge the differences in the coefficient 
of multiple determination as a result of trimming.   
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 R2: Table 2.6 shows R2 values at different levels of trimming.  In the absence of 
trimming, the DRG classification serves to explain 18.6% of the variation in resource 
use as measured by LOS.  Trimming cases with a LOS greater or equal to 61 days 
improved R2 to 21.1% and, further trimming by using the IR1.5 method, resulted in 
a further improvement in R2 to around 25%.  Nothwithstanding the variations in the 
number of trimmed cases resulting from the use of the different trimming methods 
applied in Table 2.6,  the R2 statistics obtained are relatively similar.    
 
Table 2.6: R2 under different trimming methods 
 All cases <60 days GM2 GM3 IR1.5 IR 2.0 
R2 0.186 0.211 0.258 0.236 0.243 0.235 
No of Cases 151,615 151,095 143,624 146,859 136,271 138,703 
Source: Analysis of MS-DRG Grouper output. 
 
The resultant trimmed R2 values measure both the performance of the classification 
system (MS-DRG in this case) and also the characteristics of the patients trimmed.  
The results obtained suggest that the extra cases being trimmed under the choosen 
method (IR1.5) are in fact cases which should be removed from the dataset as they 
are not contributing to the performance of the classification system in explaining 
resource use.  This helps to obtain cases within the DRG groups which are more 
comparable in terms of resource use. 
 
Trimming increased the homogeneity within the DRG groups and the heterogeneity 
between groups. This further proves the ability of the derived DRGs to explain the 
differences in resource use.  Based on the above results it can be concluded that the 
DRG classification can explain close to 30% of the total variation in LOS and 
therefore resource use between cases across the hospital.  Further support of this 
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conclusion was obtained by analyzing variations in R2 across the different MDCs, an 
analysis which highlighted variations within different case specialties within the 
hospital.   
Table 2.7 shows the degree of variance within each MDC20, based on the allocation 
of cases to DRGs under different trimming scenarios.  The percentage of cases 
trimmed under the full trimming scenario as a proportion of all cases under each 
MDC category is also provided.  The percentage of cases trimmed varied between 
MDC categories and when all cases were taken together, an R2 of around 19% was 
obtained. This highlights the fact that a significant proportion of cases within each 
MDC exhibited resource allocations which varied from the expected average of the 
particular MDC group.  Figure 2.2 illustrates how R2 varied across MDCs (after full 
trimming was performed).  The higher R2 values indicate that resource use was 
more predictable in some MDCs and that in these MDCs, variation in resource use 
can be better explained by the DRG classification.    
In summary, it can be concluded that the trimming process yielded higher R2 values 
in the majority of the MDCs analysed, with the exception of a few cases.  It was also 
noted that there was a significant percentage point increase in R2 for a number of 
MDC categories (14, 20, 21, 4, 5, and 16) after the IR1.5 trimming method had been 
applied to the data.  One possible explanation for this is that once the removal of 
trim points was applied, the remaining cases in these particular MDCs had a high 
level of homogeneity within the group and higher levels of heterogeneity with the 
other groups.  This resulted in a significant improvement in R2 values.  The 
difference observed arose from the particular patient characteristics being treated 
                                                        
20
 Table 2.8 in the appendix provides a description of the different MDC categories. 
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and also due possibly to differences in practice by physicians in the treatment of 
patients.   
 
Table 2.7: R2 by MDC categories under different trimming scenarios 
MDC All cases Partial 
trimming21 
             Full 
trimming22 
% of cases 
trimmed (full)23 
 % % % % 
All 18.6 21.1 25.6 18.7 
0 12.0 19.9 18.0 25.4 
1 9.2 16.5 20.0 16.2 
2 10.3 10.3 1.4 25.8 
3 24.0 31.8 40.9 30.2 
4 30.0 45.4 60.3 13.8 
5 19.7 34.0 47.2 15.0 
6 13.6 25.2 31.1 15.4 
7 32.7 43.5 53.5 9.9 
8 25.3 34.8 42.5 23.9 
9 5.3 14.7 14.3 20.3 
10 26.1 37.7 43.7 13.1 
11 13.6 31.1 38.1 21.1 
12 17.9 34.5 46.7 20.4 
13 19.5 39.6 48.3 18.1 
14 35.2 40.6 64.2 16.8 
15 39.1 52.3 58.5 11.7 
16 31.2 36.5 51.9 18.5 
17 19.5 28.5 22.0 20.7 
18 28.8 40.3 51.5 17.0 
19 36.5 58.1 63.8 25.4 
20 19.5 26.8 55.6 20.2 
21 14.1 26.9 48.4 11.7 
22 45.7 47.9 48.9 9.1 
23 4.5 17.2 8.7 23.0 
24 45.2 n/a n/a n/a 
25 48.5 40.1 n/a n/a 
n/a represent values which cannot be calculated given the small amount of cases within such MDCs. 
Source: Analysis of MS-DRG Grouper output. 
 
An analysis of R2 by MDC allows us to gauge whether the performance of the hospital 
is consistent across all types of cases.  More than 70% of the derived MDCs had an 
                                                        
21 Represents trimming of cases with more than 60 days LOS only. 
22 Represents trimming of cases with more than 60 days LOS, those with less than 15 cases within 
each DRG and using the IR1.5 method. 
23 Represents percentage of cases trimmed based on the full set of cases. 
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R2 value higher than 0.4 after the trimming process.  This indicates that in most of 
the MDCs the DRG classification can explain a significant part of the variation in LOS.  
Resource use is more predictable in some MDCs and less predictable in others.  A 
low R2 value was recorded for MDCs 0, 2, 9 and 23 after the trimming process.  For 
each of these MDCs, a low R2 value was recorded even when the untrimmed data 
was applied possibly indicating that in such cases the LOS variable might not be a 
good indicator of resource use.    
A number of reasons could account for these low MDC values.  One reason could be 
related to the particular set of grouping algorithms within these MDCs which did not 
specifically reflect the data of the Maltese health care sector.  Another reason is that 
the nature of treatment within these particular MDCs may have been different in 
terms of procedures used and would vary on a case by case basis depending on other 
factors, such as differences in consultant and surgeon practice styles.  Further 
analysis might therefore be needed to identify whether particular differences exist 
with the treatment of such categories in Malta and whether this is reflected in the 
assumptions taken into account by the MS-DRG grouping algorithm.     
 
2.7 Discussion 
Overall R2 values of around 0.3 were found for LOS using trimmed data.  The R2 
values obtained on untrimmed data were low (0.19) but this has to be viewed in line 
with the known quality limitations of the available hospital data.  R2 values also 
varied across the different MDC categories with some categories reaching levels 
close to 0.6 once trimming had been performed.  Casas & Tomas (1993) and Reid et 
al., (1997) highlight that R2 values based on untrimmed data may indeed be more 
61 
 
than 20 percentage points lower after outliers are removed.  The same studies by 
Casas & Tomas (1993) and Reid et al., (1997) suggest that cases removed as outliers 
have a substantial impact of around 25% on the ALOS.  The adequate treatment of 
such outliers would imply an average reduction of around 1 day from the ALOS at 
the Maltese hospital.  This is indeed a significant saving in terms of resource use 
within such a hospital setting. 
The R2 reported in this study compares well to that reported by Zhiping et al., (2004) 
in a Chinese hospital (0.12) using the Australian Refined DRGs (AR-DRG).  Other 
studies by Closon & Roger (1989) report an R2 value of 0.42 using Belgian data 
applied to the Health Care Financing Administration DRG (HCFA-DRG) Grouper 
software, whilst Casas & Tomas (1993) report R2 values of around 0.4 using data 
from Ireland, Portugal, Switzerland and Spain.   
Values for R2 tend to vary between different Groupers and significant variations are 
also observed following the implementation of trimming methods to the available 
data.  This conclusion is also evident in the work of Benton et al., (1998) who 
compare R2 values arising from different Groupers.  Reid et al., (1997) highlight the 
wide variation in R2 at the MDC level, using both US DRGs and Australian DRGs.  
More recent studies compare specific locally designed systems with the US Groupers 
or other international available DRG systems.  Sutch and Reid (2003) and Reid and 
Sutch (2008) quote a number of studies of this type, in particular work carried out 
on Welsh data using British Health Resource Groups (HRGs), US All Patient DRGs 
(AP-DRGs) and AR-DRGs.  R2 values ranging from 0.31 to 0.41 were reported.  
Furthermore, UK data applied to each of the three Groupers, yielded an overall R2 of 
around 0.45.   
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However, a number of data deficiencies in the dataset used for this research need to 
be highlighted to illustrate the need for improvements in coding practices.  
Currently, coding at MDH is not carried out to fulfil the requirement of setting up 
and maintaining a DRG system.  Therefore, shifting management thinking towards 
establishing such an objective would significantly help improve the data coding 
structures at the hospital.  Furthermore, a significant proportion of available data 
(around 40%) lacked some important coding information.  The success of a DRG 
system heavily depends on the quality of the coded data and the provision of 
additional years of data together with an improved coded dataset would help 
improve the accuracy of DRG Grouper outputs. The introduction of a well-defined 
purpose for current coding work would help improve the level of coding and ensure 
a more pragmatic picture of the activity levels within the hospital. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
A health care Grouper software is considered to be useful if it partitions the hospital 
episode population in an informative way, both clinically in terms of inputs required 
and also in terms of the resources that are expected to be consumed (Aisbett et al.,  
2007).  Homogeneous DRG categories provide knowledge to the policy maker on the 
average utilisation rate of episodes of care and serve as a good benchmark for 
comparison and evaluation purposes. 
The CV and the R2 coefficients obtained as a result of this study provide a suitable 
basis for recommending the use of DRGs in the Maltese health care system.  The 
introduction of a DRG classification system can serve to explain some of the 
variation in the resource use within the hospital and is a positive step to further 
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helping the management of resource use within the health care sector.  The 
formulation of DRGs would encourage administrators to view the use and costs of 
hospital services along product lines based on DRGs and provide information on 
whether resources used for particular episodes of care are in line with what, on 
average, is expected.  This therefore is an added tool, available to policy makers, for 
the better use of hospital resources.  Furthermore, the implementation of a DRG 
system, apart from introducing a new purpose for the accurate collection of patient 
data, would also serve to make available to the hospital management authorities a 
greater range of information to control and monitor activities undertaken within the 
hospital. 
This study evaluated the use of a casemix system to describe hospital activity in 
Malta.  Viewing the output of MD( through the ǮDRG lensǯ gives a clearer picture of 
what is being produced as a result of the investment made in this important and 
growing sector of the economy.  Policy makers require accurate information on 
hospital activity to manage limited resources and monitor health care providers 
behaviour effectively (Ghaffari et al.,  2008).  This study concludes that one Ǯparticularǯ Grouper software can be applied to the currently available data for the 
Maltese health care sector with relatively good results.  
Experience has shown that the introduction of such as system into a country is a 
long and complex process requiring a change in the political and cultural setting of 
the hospital services.  Results from this study show that a good foundation exists to 
start such a process and the creation of DRGs will be of benefit for management and 
implementation of policy in the Maltese health care sector.  The use of DRGs for 
financing purposes might still be far away but the introduction of this system for 
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policy and analysis purposes is to be encouraged.   As a start, the information gained 
from the setting of a DRG system could serve as an instrument for the allocation of 
public hospital budgets funded by the national government.  
 
In terms of further work, a study on the adoption of the grouping methodology to 
describe hospital output could be extended into a number of areas, initially by 
carrying out a comparison of the above results to those provided by other Grouper 
methodologies already applied in other countries.  The application of the data to 
different Grouper software used by other countries is to be encouraged to identify 
the applicability and readiness of the Maltese data and thus ensure realibility and 
consistency in the obtained results.  Furthermore, the availability of additional years 
of data and the expected improvement in the data recording systems should provide 
an added stimulus in realizing the benefits of such casemix systems.  The statistical 
tools applied in this paper show that the results obtained are comparable to those 
observed in other countries, and that these methods can indeed be used to analyze 
the Maltese health care sector.  
Considerable care should be taken in the interpretation of the results given the 
relatively small size of the dataset used in this study.  A more detailed analysis of the 
outlier cases and their impact on ALOS and resource use would further improve the 
understanding of hospital output.  Indeed, this study has shown that trimming 
options do affect the results and that other factors might have to be controlled for to 
fully understand differences in resource utilisation within hospital DRGs.  Further 
work on the variation in outcomes within a particular defined DRG category, due to 
differences in consultant and surgeon volume levels is described in later chapters of 
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this thesis.   Variation in outcomes and practice patterns arising from differences in 
consultant job contract conditions are also presented.   
The attention of governments to casemix use has been stimulated by the concerns 
of escalating health expenditure and the demand for transparent and efficient 
utilisation of resources in a period of increasing pressure to control health care 
spending.  Wilke et al., (2001) stress that every medical relevance relating to illness 
carries with it an economic relevance and thus there is a growing need to define 
valid and reliable measures of output.  This research is a first step in the laying down 
of an essential building block for the better understanding of the output currently 
being produced within the health care sector in Malta.  DRG classification increases 
transparency of operations and projects a clearer picture of the hospitalǯs activities.  
Defining the product categories of hospitals is a first and necessary important step.  
The introduction of a DRG system is also expected to have an effect on clinical 
behaviour and therefore have an effect on deviations from the optimum level of 
medical treatment.  The introduction of a DRG classification system would serve to 
create an economic underpinning to management decisions taken within the 
hospital setting.  All of these factors are ultimately expected to influence the overall 
outcome of medical interventions.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 2.8: A description of the MDC categories 
MDC 
CODE 
MDC DESCRIPTION 
00 UNGROUPABLE 
01 NERVOUS SYSTEM, DISEASES & DISORDERS 
02 EYE, DISEASES & DISORDERS 
03 EAR, NOSE, MOUTH, & THROAT, DISEASES & DISORDERS 
04 RESPIRATORY SYSTEM, DISEASES & DISORDERS 
05 CIRCULATORY SYSTEM, DISEASES & DISORDERS 
06 DIGESTIVE SYSTEM, DISEASES & DISORDERS 
07 HEPATOBILIARY SYSTEM & PANCREAS, DISEASES & DISORDERS 
08 MUSCULOSKELETAL SYSTEM & CONNECTIVE TISSUE, DISEASES & 
DISORDERS 
09 SKIN, SUBCUTANEOUS TISSUE & BREAST, DISEASES & DISORDERS 
10 ENDOCRINE, NUTRITIONAL, AND METABOLIC, DISEASES & DISORDERS 
11 KIDNEY AND URINARY TRACT, DISEASES & DISORDERS 
12 MALE REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM, DISEASES & DISORDERS 
13 FEMALE REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM, DISEASES & DISORDERS 
14 PREGNANCY, CHILDBIRTH, & THE PUERPERIUM 
15 NEWBORNS AND NEONATE CONDITIONS BEGAN IN PERINATAL PERIOD 
16 BLOOD, BLOOD FORMING ORGANS, IMMUNOLOGICAL, DISEASES & 
DISORDERS 
17 MYELOPROLIFERATIVE DISEASES & POORLY DIFFERENTIATED 
NEOPLASMS 
18 INFECTIOUS & PARASITIC DISEASES 
19 MENTAL DISEASES & DISORDERS 
20 ALCOHOLDRUG USE AND ALCOHOLDRUG INDUCED ORGANIC MENTAL 
DISEASES 
21 INJURIES, POISONINGS, AND TOXIC EFFECTS OF DRUGS 
22 BURNS 
23 FACTORS ON HEALTH STATUS & OTHER CONTACTS WITH HEALTH 
SERVICES 
24 MULTIPLE SIGNFICANT TRAUMA 
25 HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS INFECTIONS 
Source: MS-DRG Grouper manual, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, USA 
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Volume and Competing Risk Outcomes under Different 
Consultant Contract Types: the Case of Malta 
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Abstract 
 
This paper provides insight into the relationship between volume and outcomes, within 
the context of competing risk events.  The majority of the literature on this subject has 
focused on analysing the volume-outcome relationship in a context of a number of 
hospitals but little is known of this relationship in the case of a single provider hospital.  
Therefore, the primary focus of this paper is to examine the prevalence of the volume-
outcome relationship within the context of a single and unitary general public hospital.  
There is also the uncertainty of the nature of the hospital/physician volume effect and 
the channels through which such an effect might operate.  In addition, this paper will 
contribute to the literature by analysing the role of the consultant job contract type and 
the impact that this has on the volume-outcome relationship. 
Data from the Maltese health care system are evaluated from patients who underwent 
Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty (PTCA) in the period 2009 to 2011.  
The main event of interest is failure within the first 60 day period following the 
undertaking of the PTCA procedure, where readmission or death over the same period 
are treated as possible failure events.  The procedure is deemed a success if no event 
occurs within the 60 day period following the undertaking of the PTCA.  The cumulative 
incidence function for the event of interest is used in this study to estimate the 
competing risk model.  These results are compared with other estimates obtained using 
the Kaplan-Meier method and the cause specific hazard function.  A multinomial logistic 
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model is estimated to gauge for the robustness of the obtained results based on the 
survival analysis methods.  
The results of the study support the view that there is some evidence of a difference in 
the hazard rate for the event of failure from the PTCA procedure which is dependent 
upon the volume of patients seen by consultants and surgeons and also by the job 
contract type of the consultants.  The study finds that there is a lower risk of failure for 
patients who were under the care of consultants who practice exclusively within the 
public sector compared to those being under the care of dual practice contract 
consultants.  There is also a higher hazard of treatment failure from the procedure if 
the patient is under the care of consultants with high patient volume levels or surgeons 
with low patient volume levels.  
Furthermore, an increase in the volume of patients seen by consultants has a different 
impact on the hazard of treatment failure depending on whether the patient is being 
seen by consultants on public-only or dual practice contracts.  As volume levels for 
consultants on public-only contracts increases the hazard of failing from the procedure 
increases.  The hazard of failing from the procedure for patients under the care of 
consultants on dual practice contracts remains relatively unchanged, even when 
volume levels change.  
The above conclusions are an important contribution towards understanding the 
relationship between volume and competing risk outcomes in the context of a single 
and unitary public hospital setting.   
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3.1 Introduction and Motivation 
 
The investigation of the relationship between volume and survival outcome in the 
provision of health care services has attracted a lot of interest from researchers over 
the years.  The majority of the literature finds a positive relationship between both 
hospital/physician volume and health care outcomes (Gandjour et al., 2003; Halm et al., 
2000).  Dudley (2000) states that the relationship between outcome and volume is so 
common and consistent over time that one would expect it always to hold in practice.  
Furthermore, if the procedure performed is complex then success is expected to be 
more dependent on the skill of the particular surgeon  (Srinivas et al., 2006).  There is 
though uncertainty as to the nature of this hospital/physician volume effect and very 
little is known as to the channels through which such an effect might operate.  In 
particular, two different explanations have been proposed to explain the volume-
outcome relationship: the practice makes perfect theory or the selective referral theory, 
as proposed by Luft et al., (1987).  
The majority of the literature has focused on analysing the volume-outcome 
relationship in a context of competing hospitals but little is known of this relationship 
in the case of a single provider hospital.  The primary focus of this study is therefore to 
understand the volume-outcome relationship within the context of a single and unitary 
general public hospital.  This study contributes to the literature by analysing the role 
played by the consultant job contract type and the impact which this has on the volume-
outcome relationship.   
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In line with the practice makes perfect hypothesis, the higher the volume levels of the 
consultant the higher would be the chance of outcome success following a hospital 
procedure.  Furthermore, based on the selective referral hypothesis, consultants with 
favourable outcomes are more likely to have higher volume levels.  Consultants 
working with the Government hospital are given an option to choose between two work 
plan types; public-only, whereby consultants cannot undertake any private practice and 
dual practice whereby consultants can practice in both the private and the public sector.  
Data on the job plan contract type of each of the consultants is provided by the hospital 
management for the purposes of this study. Consultants working only at the public 
hospital have all the necessary infrastructure to perform at the highest levels, whilst 
consultants on dual practice contracts have an incentive to achieve success in view of 
the expected impact on their private practice reputation given their performance 
within the public hospital.   
 
Differences in the probability of achieving an event success or a failure event are thus 
studied in relation to the volume and job contract type of the consultant.  A difference 
in the responsiveness of outcomes to volume changes is expected to exist in relation to 
the particular consultant job contract type.  This difference might be related to the 
current capacity levels at which the particular consultants are operating at and/or to 
the ability of the particular consultant to alter his performance at the hospital.   
 
To this end, the volume-outcome relationship will be evaluated in the context of 
competing events that follow the procedure for Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary 
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Angioplasty1 (PTCA) after controlling for a number of characteristics pertaining to the 
consultants, surgeons and to the patients undergoing treatment.  The study will review 
the role of a number of different volume measures and how each of these impact PTCA 
outcomes, taking possible competing risk events into account.   
The study will use data from the Maltese health care system, which has one large 
publically funded acute general hospital, the Mater Dei Hospital, which provides free 
services at the point of use.  In view of the available data, a distinction will be made 
between the consultant, who is primarily responsible for the patient case, and the 
surgeon who actually undertakes the procedure.  Patients are assigned to consultants 
on the basis of the diagnosis made and the date when they are admitted to hospital.   
Patients have little choice of the hospital they can attend, although they can decide to Ǯopt outǯ and visit a private hospital/clinic2 if they so wish.  The majority of private 
hospitals are run and staffed by the same consultants and surgeons who provide 
services at the public hospital.   
The data cover the years 2009 to 2011 and are compiled on a patient level basis 
specifically for this study.  The outcome effectiveness of undertaking PTCA is measured 
by the complications-free or event-free survival probability.  The presence or 
occurrence of an event which is in competing risk to the event of interest, may preclude 
the incidence of the event of interest or may alter the probability of occurrence for this 
                                                        
1 PTCA is a common cardiac procedure to open up partially blocked arteries in the heart. The physician threads a catheter through a large artery in the patientǯs arm or leg and into the artery which leads to the 
heart.  
2 A number of small private clinics/hospitals can be found in Malta. Activity levels in such sectors are 
relatively low and activity is serviced by a small private health insurance market. 
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event.  The main event of interest is failure within the 60 day period following the PTCA 
procedure, where readmission or death within the 60 day period are treated as two 
possible failure events.  The choice of the 60 day time period was based on the advice 
provided by the Clinical Performance Unit (CPU) of the hospital.  This time period was 
considered to best reflect the time frame which captures procedural related 
complications and activity which even though might not be necessarily arising from 
procedure related complications is still considered to be related to the needs of the 
same patients undertaking the PTCA procedure.   
According to the literature, the Cumulative Incidence Function (CIF) can be used to 
model competing risk events (Gooley et al., 1999; Prentice et al., 1978; Satagopan et al., 
2004; Schwarzer et al., 2001).  Other estimation techniques like the Kaplan-Meier (KM) 
method applied by Tai et al., (2001) and the Cause Specific Hazard Function (CSHF), 
used by Bakoyannis and Touloumi (2011), will also be applied for comparison 
purposes.  Furthermore, to test the robustness of the results obtained from the survival 
analysis methods a multinomial logistic model of outcomes is also estimated.3  
The results presented in this paper will show some evidence of difference in the hazard 
rate for the event of failure from the procedure which depends on the volume of 
patients seen by consultants and surgeons and also by the job plan contract type of the 
consultants.  The study finds that an increase in volume has a different impact on the 
hazard rate of the event of interest depending on whether the patient is being seen by 
a consultant on a public-only or a dual practice job contract type. 
                                                        
3
 A detailed description of the results can be found in Appendix B to this chapter. 
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This paper is organized as follows: the following section, Section 3.2, provides an 
overview of the literature that relates to the volume-outcome relationship and gives 
special reference to competing risk events.  Section 3.3 describes the available 
population dataset and highlights some preliminary findings.  An overview of the 
methodologies for analysing competing risks data in the context of the possible 
strategies to model the covariates influencing outcomes is presented in Section 3.4 and 
Section 3.5 presents the key results of the study.  Finally, Section 3.6 presents the studyǯs conclusions.      
 
3.2 Literature  
 
Whilst the volume-outcome relationship is by no means universally accepted, it has in 
the literature been observed extensively in a variety of procedures.  This section 
presents an overview of the main theories underpinning this relationship focusing on 
the fact that most studies distinguish between a volume-outcome relationship either at 
the hospital or at the physician level.  Are doctors more effective in bigger hospitals 
with relatively high volumes?  Do particular characteristics, related to the doctor, and 
do the working conditions of physicians affect the volume-outcome relationship?  
Answering these questions is crucial for the drafting of health care policy. 
While it may be difficult to compare findings across a number of studies there does 
seem to be consensus among researchers that a positive relationship exists between 
procedure volume (at the level of the hospital and/or physician) and provider quality, 
as measured by a variety of patient outcomes.  An extensive literature review 
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undertaken by Halm et al., (2000) and Gandjour et al., (2003) supports the existence of 
a volume effect in most diseases and operation categories.  At the end of this section a 
review is provided of the different measurement options of outcome applied in this area 
of study.   
Theoretical underpinnings: The pioneering work by Luft et al., (1979) presents two 
hypotheses for the relationship between volume and outcome: the practice makes 
perfect theory and the selective referral theory.  The practice makes perfect theory 
assumes that as physicians and/or hospitals perform more operations, they become 
more skilful and thus their positive outcome rates would be expected to improve.  The 
performance of the physician is said to depend on the individual skills of the physician, the resources available to the physician at the hospital level and the Ǯspill-overǯ impact 
of both effects.  Srinivas et al., (2006) conclude that for primary Percutaneous Coronary 
Intervention (PCI), physician experience, measured by the frequency levels of 
performing a certain task, modifies the hospital volume-outcome relationship and 
serves to offset the risks associated with the treatment of primary PCI in low volume 
hospitals.  Hamad et al., (1988) show that in a single hospital setting, both low 
frequency and high frequency physicians can perform PTCA with success but for more 
complex cases, outcomes are likely to be better when the procedure is undertaken by 
more experienced physicians.   
Gowrisankaran et al., (2006) found that there was also an element of forgetting when 
explaining the volume-outcome relationship given that the success rate of the physician 
may deteriorate when they do not perform regularly.  Huesch and Sakakibara (2009) 
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proposed that itǯs the most recent Ǯon the jobǯ experience that is the most important 
factor affecting the outcome of the intervention.  Furthermore, Ramanarayanan (2008) 
finds that the experience and competence gained by cardiac surgeons carrying out 
CABG4 is not limited to the hospital in which the physician practises.  Indeed, the 
outcomes of a physician in a particular hospital are said to improve from the added 
volume experience of practicing in another hospital or health care setting.  This 
contrasts with earlier findings of Huckman and Pisano (2006) whereby improvements 
in performance are related to experience gained within the same hospital. 
On the other hand, physicians and hospitals with better outcomes are likely to receive 
more referrals and more of these referrals may be more appropriate patients for certain 
procedures.  Patients, if they have the option, are also inclined to show their preference 
for institutions or individuals who provide better outcomes, therefore suggesting the 
potential for selective referral.  Indeed, Hamilton and Hamilton (1997) found that the 
volume-outcome relationship for hip fracture patients in Quebec hospitals reflected 
differences between hospitals that are fixed over time.  This result is consistent with 
the selective referral hypothesis, identified by a number of authors, whereby high 
quality hospitals are likely to attract more patients (Farley and Ozminkowski, 1992; 
Hamilton and Hamilton, 1997; Hamilton and Ho, 1998).  Tsai et al., (2006) obtain 
similar results when they studied the effect of hospital volume on the 30 day mortality 
of patients with congestive heart failure, suggesting that causality runs from outcomes 
                                                        
4
  Coronary Artery Bypass Graft. 
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to volume.  It is thus the personal characteristics of the physician and the hospital which 
explain the impact of volume on outcome.   
Hospital and/or physician volume:  The establishment of a hospital volume threshold 
level tends to affect outcomes.  Ritchie et al., (1993) use the rates of CABG interventions 
performed during the same hospital stay following a PTCA procedure, as a measure of 
outcome success and find that it is lower in hospitals in which more than 400 PTCAs 
are undertaken annually.  Both hospital PTCA volume and cardiologist PTCA volume 
are found to be inversely related to a negative outcome.  Shook et al., (1996) concludes  
that PTCA performed by high-volume operators was less likely to require emergency 
CABG and was also significantly associated with lower hospital morbidity and costs and 
shorter hospital Length of Stay (LOS).  Of particular relevance is work by Hannan 
(1997) on PTCA patients and Jollis et al., (1994,1997) for acute myocardial infarction 
and coronary angioplasty who conclude that volume and short-term complications are 
inversely related to a cardiologist performing more than 75 cases per year.5   
Patients treated by high volume physicians (after adjusting for potential confounding 
factors) have a much lower risk of mortality and of surgical complications associated 
with the treatment undertaken.  This is the conclusion of both Billingsley et al., (2007) 
and Vakili et al., (2001).  Furthermore, the risk of mortality is further reduced if such 
patients are treated in a high volume hospital.  One would expect though that an 
                                                        
5 The American College of Cardiology suggest hospitals undertaking a minimum of 200 PTCA procedures 
per year and an individual surgeon with a minimum of 75 PTCA cases per year. 
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increase in volume has a greater impact on the outcome of a small-volume hospital 
when compared to a large volume hospital.   
The relevance of the volume-outcome relationship in a setting of a single hospital centre 
is less well studied in the literature.  Ross et al., (2010) confirms a diminishing effect on 
volume beyond a particular threshold level for three specific conditions: acute 
myocardial infarction, heart failure and pneumonia.  In a hospital setting where volume 
levels differ across physicians, Kawabuchi and Sugihara (2006) find a non-linear 
volume effect whereby the principle of Ǯthe more the betterǯ, applies only up to a certain 
volume level.  Congestion effects are then likely to set in.  
By focusing on a publically funded health care system, Simunovic et al., (1999) found 
that patients treated by high volume hospitals had a better outcome when treated for 
pancreatic resection.  There is emphasis on the fact that this relationship holds not only 
in the mixed public-private hospitals in the US, as studied by Glasgow and Mulvihill, 
(1996), Gordon et al., (1995) and Lieberman et al., (1995), but also in the publically 
funded hospital setting.  In a public setting there is expected to be less financial and 
logistical barriers to care and better outcomes are linked not only to higher volume 
levels but also to better expertise and resources available in such public institutions.  
The mechanism by which physician and provider characteristics influence outcomes in 
such a setting is also expected to differ from other hospital settings.   
It is evident that a certain amount of interaction between hospital volume and physician 
practice volume exists and that this impacts on health care outcomes.  Although early 
studies like Kelly and Hellinger (1986) find that the volume-outcome relationship 
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reflects hospital rather than physician characteristics, a more recent study by 
Birkmeyer et al., (2003) observed that links between hospital volume and operative 
mortality are largely influenced by surgeon volume, whereby the chance of survival, 
even in high volume hospitals, will most likely increase if treated by a surgeon with high 
volumes.  In 135 studies reviewed by Halm et al., (2000), a statistically significant 
relationship between higher volume and better outcomes was found for 71% of 
hospital volume studies verses 69% for clinician volume studies.  Other more recent 
studies assess simultaneously the impact of hospital and surgeon volume on outcomes 
and find that both high hospital and surgeon volume are linked to lower in-hospital 
mortality (Hannan et al., 2005; Joynt et al., 2011; Schrag et al., 2002; Schrag et al., 2003). 
Indeed, particular physician preferences in the treatment of cases are expected to have 
an impact on outcomes.  Being treated by a specialist in the field or by a more aggressive 
surgeon might have an impact on patient outcomes.  A conservative surgeon might opt 
for limited surgery, making a compromise between control of symptoms and ultimate 
survival, whilst an aggressive surgeon might perform more high risk surgery, increasing 
the risk of complications in an attempt to improve on the chance of survival.  McArdle 
and Hole (1991) reported an improvement in survival rates after colorectal surgery if 
the intervention was carried out by surgeons who had a special interest in the field.   
Advances in medicine and technology are also expected to have an impact on the 
strength of the relationship between outcome and volume levels.  Ho (2000, 2002) 
measured improvements in PTCA outcomes by reducing inpatient mortality and 
emergency bypass procedures and found that over time, the disparity in outcome 
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between low and high volume hospitals has narrowed.  The developments in 
technology may have reduced or eliminated the need to perform a high volume of 
procedures in order to obtain optimal outcomes.  Even though technology has by far 
improved the outcome within hospitals, the impact of volume both in terms of 
physicians and hospitals has still been found to be important.  McGrath et al., (2000) 
find that since the development of coronary stents, patients treated at high volume 
hospitals and by high volume physicians still tend to have better outcomes following a 
PCI.  Patients treated by high volume physicians are less likely to require CABG 
emergency treatment and have a lower risk of mortality within 30 days of intervention.  
The impact of volume on outcome is therefore still strong and significant.   
Measurement of outcomes: All possible outcomes need to be taken into account when 
considering the health consequences of a medical intervention.  Varadhan et al., (2010) 
demonstrate that any analysis into the impact of an intervention within the health care 
sector must consider the full set of possible outcomes which can arise following the 
intervention.  A competing risk is defined by Gooley et al., (1999) as ǲan event whose 
occurrence either precludes the occurrence of another event under examination or 
fundamentally alters the probability of occurrence of this other eventǳ.  Competing risks 
are a common occurrence in medical research and the use of survival analysis 
techniques allow for the incorporation of the impact of all possible outcomes on the 
incidence of the particular event of interest.  
The outcome of care, as well as being measured by in-hospital mortality, should also 
focus on post-operative conditions together with any occurrences of complications 
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which result from the treatment undertaken.  The outcome of the procedure performed 
can be viewed in terms of the state of health of the patient prior to and post the 
procedure.  The study of outcomes, following a PTCA procedure, should not stop when 
the patient is discharged from hospital and survival analysis allow us to study and 
incorporate this time dimension into the analysis.  The choice of the outcome variable 
also has an impact on the assessment made in relation to the success or failure of the 
intervention.  Kawabuchi and Sugihara (2006) use death hazard ratios as a measure of 
outcome and conclude that there is no relationship between outcomes and PTCA 
hospital volume.  This confirms a previous study by Kimmel et al., (2002) which found 
no association between volume and 30 day post-discharge events.   
Since the seminal articles by Fix and Neyman (1951) and Prentice et al., (1978), the 
volume-outcome relationship in the context of competing events has been studied in 
the literature through the use of a number of survival analysis techniques mainly; the 
standard KM method, the CSHF and the CIF.  In the presence of competing events, 
patients are at risk of more than one mutually exclusive event and the use of the CIF is 
encouraged by a number of authors (Andersen et al., 2012; Arriagada et al., 1992; 
Furstova and Valenta, 2011; Gaynor et al., 1993; Gooley et al., 1999; Kim, 2007; Melberg 
et al., 2010; Satagopan et al., 2004; Southern et al., 2006; Teixeira et al., 2013).  In the 
case of more than one type of event (or failure) being present, if such events are 
somehow dependent on each other, then the KM estimate is found to be biased because 
the KM method censors all other events of interest as it assumes that they are 
independent from the primary event of interest (Arriagada et al., 1992; Tai et al., 2001).  
This was confirmed by Melberg et al., (2010) within the setting of a single hospital by 
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studying the impact of competing risk events on the outcome of patients undergoing 
revascularization for coronary artery disease over a 10 year period.  
Klein (2006) argues that in the study of competing risks of relapse and death in 
remission for bone marrow transplantation treatments, the CIF provides a natural way 
to identify the effect of covariates on the failure of treatment.  When competing risks 
events are present the use of survival analysis methods is encouraged and the use of 
the CIF is recognised in the medical and statistical literature as the right tool to use 
(Gooley et al., 1999).  Some authors make use of both the CSHF and the CIF function 
based on the proportional sub-distribution hazards model to evaluate the effect of 
covariates on the event of interest (Beyersmann et al., 2007; Teixeira et al., 2013).   
Cumulative incidence models measure the effect of the covariate on the specific event 
cumulative probability, and this covariate affect may be derived from the direct effect 
of making the event of interest more or less likely to occur, or the indirect effect of 
making competing events more or less likely to occur.  The CIF allows for the 
identification of risk factors for each of the competing events. On the other hand, the 
standard Cox hazard model is not designed to deal with the risk factors which 
contribute to a particular event in the presence of a competing risk.  The CSHF ignores 
competing risks and thus could be inaccurate for this reason.  The use of the CIF model 
is questioned though by Anderson et al., (2012) who argue that individuals who failed 
due to a competing risk should not be in the risk set used to estimate the sub-
distribution function for the event of interest.  
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3.3 Data 
The data used in this population based study comes from the Clinical Performance Unit 
(CPU) which is the unit responsible for collecting all clinical data for activity undertaken 
within the Mater Dei Hospital6 (MDH).  The unit of analysis is the patient and the 
analysis is performed for patients who entered hospital and underwent a PTCA 
procedure in the period 2009 to 2011.   
The following ICD-9-CM7  procedure codes where considered in this study: 0066, 3601, 
3602, 3604, 3606, 3609, 0045, 0046, 0047 and 8856.  The dataset contains 1,626 
hospital visits and identifies both the surgeon who carried out the procedure and the 
consultant who was responsible for the individual patient care for each PTCA patient.  
The dataset provided the information on patient, surgeon and consultant 
characteristics used to identify the main covariates of the study.  Table 3.1 presents a 
list of the principle variables used.  Of particular relevance to this study is the 
information on the job plan contract type of each of the consultants seeing patients 
undertaking a PTCA procedure8.  Consultants working with the Government hospital 
operate either under a, public-only, or a dual practice contract.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
6
 Mater Dei Hospital is the only general acute public hospital in Malta.  
7
 International Classification of Diseases – 9th revision – Clinical Modification (WHO). 
8
 Data on the contract type of each of the surgeons is not provided for this study.   
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Table 3.1: Definition and description of the principal variables 
Variable Description of variable  
 
General variables   
Surgeon The professional responsible for carrying out the 
procedure 
consultant  The professional responsible for the patient whilst in 
hospital for treatment 
Age Age of patient 
LOS The difference between the discharge and admittance date   
diagtotal Number of diagnoses per case 
public-only =1 for consultant exclusive public sector practice contracts 
=0 for consultant public and private practice contracts or 
dual practice 
countconst  Consultant total number of cases 
 
Outcome variables  
success 
 
 
failure 
A procedure that is deemed a success if no other event 
occurs within the 60 day period following discharge date, 
or within the hospitalisation period 
Representing the event whereby a failure (either death or 
readmission) occurs within the 60 day period following 
discharge date, or within the hospitalisation period 
death Patient died within the 60 day period following discharge 
date and/or during the hospitalisation period 
readmission Patient readmitted to hospital within the 60 day period 
following discharge 
  
Volume variables  
counts A cumulative count of cases seen by the surgeon up until the 
date of admission of the patient 
countc A cumulative count of cases under the responsibility of a 
consultant up until date of  patient admission 
vol90s Surgeon cumulative cases over the 90 days prior to the 
patient admission date 
vol90c 
 
cvol 
 
svol 
 
Consultant cumulative cases over the 90 days prior to the 
patient admission date 
=1 if countconst > 100 cases (high volume) 
=0 if countconst < 100 cases (low volume)  
=1 if surgeon volume > 225 cases 
 (high volume) 
=0 if the surgeon volume < 225 cases  
(low volume)  
                   
Source: Based on data drawn from the provided hospital episode database. 
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3.3.1 Measures for outcome indicators 
The event of interest in this study is the efficacy of the treatment, defined by the 
variable, failure, which is a measure of failing from the procedure within the 60 day 
period post the date of discharge or during the hospitalisation period.  A patient may 
die, either during the hospitalisation period or within 60 days from discharge date, 
death, or be readmitted into hospital within 60 days after discharge, readmission.  Both 
events would thus constitute an event  failure.  The time to the first observed event was 
calculated for each patient case and patient follow up was restricted by the latest 
available data9  (December 2011).   
PTCA related deaths are defined using the ICD-10 code provided from the Death 
Register made available by the Health Information Department within the Ministry of 
Health.10  Deaths related to other causes are not considered given that the specific 
interest of the study is to look only at the impact of the PTCA procedure.  Data is 
provided on a patient level basis and an encrypted identity card number allows for the 
identification of readmissions.  The procedural codes of those readmitted are checked 
to establish whether the readmission event is due to the originally undertaken PTCA 
procedure.  PTCA related readmissions are defined by observing the procedure codes11 
assigned to the readmitted patient cases.  Patients might need to return to hospital 
because of other reasons (not related to the PTCA) but given that the focus is on the 
                                                        
9 Data on the date of death were obtained from the Death Registry up to April 2012 and this was used to 
account for deaths post the 60 day discharge date. 
10 The cause of death codes (ICD-10) define deaths in relation to problems of the circulatory system. 
11 The procedural codes (0066, 3601, 3602, 3604, 3606, 3609, 0045, 0046, 0047 and 8856) are used to 
identify readmittance of patients due to PTCA related needs. An analysis of the data shows that there are 
no cases of patients who are readmitted to hospital and then die within the 60 day period. 
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specific PTCA procedure consequences the data used in the study only comprises 
patients readmitted for PTCA related factors. 
 
3.3.2  Measures of volume 
A number of volume measures are used in this study to test the robustness of volume 
indicators to explain the volume-outcome relationship.  In particular, as highlighted by 
Ho (2002) and given the availability of the data, measures of cumulative PTCA volume 
by surgeon, counts, and by consultant, countc, are used as a measure of learning by 
experience.  Alternative measures of volume, vol90s and vol90c are used to reflect the 
most recent activity levels (90 days) of the surgeon and the consultant preceding the 
date of patient admission to hospital.  The dummy variables cvol and svol  are 
constructed as indicators of the total volume levels of consultants and surgeons over 
the course of the three year activity within the hospital.  
 
3.3.3 Description of data and preliminary evidence 
 
Table 3.2 presents the principal characteristics of PTCA activity for the three years 
under study: volume levels, the mean age of patients, the Average Length of Stay (ALOS) 
and the volume and frequency rates for each of the events.   
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Table 3.2: Characteristics of PTCA activity  
Year No of 
cases  
Mean 
age 
ALOS Event success 
cases 
Event death 
cases 
Event 
readmission cases 
2009 
2010 
2011 
Total 
447 
581 
598 
1626 
62.03 
63.00 
63.04 
62.75 
3.98 
4.80 
4.60 
4.50 
 
402(89.9) 
547(94.2) 
564(94.3) 
1513(93.1) 
9 (2.0) 
12(2.1) 
7(1.2) 
28(1.7) 
36(8.1) 
22(3.8) 
27(4.5) 
85(5.2) 
Figures in parenthesis represent frequencies across rows. 
Source: Analysis of hospital episode data. 
 
It can be seen that the ALOS rises in 2010, compared to 2009, but falls marginally in 
2011.  A slight increase in the mean age of the patients and the total number of PTCA 
procedures undertaken over the three years is observed.  The proportion of the event 
success increases over the period.  The number of death and readmission cases 
registered, declines or is maintained at similar levels compared to 2009.  The 
predominant cause of death is I21.9 (acute myocardial infarction) which accounted for 
more than 50% of the deaths falling within this category.12  The average rate of the 
event success over the three year period is 93.1% of cases compared to less than a 2% 
rate for deaths and a rate of around 5% for re-admissions within the 60 day interval 
period.   
 
3.3.4  Data descriptive statistics at the surgeon level 
Table 3.3 presents details of the events of interest by volume of surgeon activity 
categorized into two groups: those dealing with less than 225 cases (defined as low) 
                                                        
12 All other deaths fall within the ǮCerebrovascularǯ diseases category and the Ǯ)schaemicǯ heart disease 
category.  
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and those dealing with more than 225 cases (defined as high) over the three year period 
(undertaking more than 75 cases per year).   
 
Table 3.3: Surgeons undertaking PTCA procedure (2009-2011) 
Surgeon   
category  
 volume 
of cases 
success  
cases 
death 
cases 
readmission  
cases 
mean 
age 
ALOS 
days 
Low 471 90.7 2.1 7.2 60.4 5.4 
High 
All 
1155 
1626 
94.0 
93.1 
1.6 
1.7 
4.4 
5.2 
63.7 
62.7 
4.1 
4.5 
Figures for the competing events represent relative percentages across the row. There are 3 surgeons   
with high volume levels and 9 with low volume levels.  
Source: Analysis of hospital episode data.  
 
Patients who are treated by high volume surgeons spend, on average, fewer days in 
hospital and the average age of such patients tends to be higher when compared to 
those treated by a surgeon in the low volume category.  The proportion of success is 
highest among the high volume surgeon group suggesting a lower risk of failure for 
patients being seen by surgeons with high volume levels A patient seen by a high 
volume surgeon would on average have an overall lower risk of death or readmission, a 
lower overall LOS and a higher probability of a successful outcome.   
 
3.3.5 Data descriptive statistics at the consultant level 
Table 3.4 presents the frequency of events of interest by consultant with low or high 
patient volume levels.  Consultants were also characterized by their job contract plan; 
public-only or dual practice contracts.13  The data show that all consultants on public-
                                                        
13 Data was not available for the number of hours spent practicing in the private sector for dual practice 
contract consultants.  
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only contract arrangements have low patient volume levels.  The mean age and ALOS 
for each category of consultants is also shown.   
 
Table 3.4: Consultants responsible for the PTCA procedure (2009-2011) 
Consultant number of 
 consultants  
volume 
of cases 
success 
cases 
death 
cases 
readmission 
cases 
mean  
age 
LOS 
days 
All 35 1626 93.1 1.7 5.2 62.7 4.5 
low 31 337 94.4 1.8 3.9 63.8 6.9 
high 4 1289 92.7 1.7 5.6 62.5 3.9 
public-only 4 87 97.7 - 2.3 61.6 5.8 
dual practice 31 1539 92.7 1.8 5.4 62.8 4.4 
Figures for the competing events represent relative percentages across the row. All public-only 
consultants fall within the low volume category. 
Source: Analysis of hospital episode data. 
 
Similar rates of death are observed for patients under the care of low and high volume 
consultants.  Slightly higher rates of success are observed for patients under the care of 
low volume consultants.  This result differs from that derived for surgeons and from 
that expected by the practice makes perfect hypothesis.  A possible explanation could 
be the fact that consultants on exclusive public sector contracts have higher success 
rates compared to dual practice consultants and all consultants employed on a public-
only contract fall within the low volume category.  Consultants with low volume levels 
are perhaps better able to manage the cases under their responsibility which possibly 
leads to higher rates of success. 
Patients under the care of consultants with public-only contracts have lower rates of 
readmission compared to patients under the care of consultants on dual practice 
contracts.  Patient readmission rates are higher within the high volume group whilst the 
mean LOS is lower compared to the low volume group.  This is evidence to suggest that 
94 
 
there is a role for the consultant job contract type to explain volume-outcome 
relationships.  There are no cases of death recorded within the category of patients 
under the care of consultants on exclusive public sector contracts.   
 
3.4  Methodology 
 This section describes the empirical framework used to model competing risk events 
in relation to the patient, consultant and the surgeon characteristics, all of which are 
expected to have an impact on the event of interest.   
The majority of the literature that deals with the use of competing risk events, 
concludes that the use of the KM method may not be the most appropriate method to 
use in such circumstances.  Teixeira et al., (2013) and Kim (2007) note that the KM 
technique and its complement (1-KM) have been applied assuming that all other 
competing events, apart from the event of interest, are censored and thus are non-
informative to the analysis of the event of interest.  In such cases this would imply that 
such patients would still be in a position to get the event, given that they are treated as 
censored, and this would lead to overestimating the probability of failure from the 
event of interest.   
The majority of the literature distinguishes between the use of the CSHF and the CIF to 
model competing risk data.  Indeed, many studies, (Furstova and Valenta, 2011; Gooley 
et al., 1999; Kim, 2007; Klein, 2006; Melberg et al., 2010; Pintilie, 2007; Putter et al., 
2007; Satagopan et al., 2004; Southern et al., 2006; Varadhan et al., 2010)  recommend 
the use of the CIF to deal with issues of competing risk data given that such a function 
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also incorporates relevant information arising from other competing risk events.  This 
involves the estimation of the likelihood of one event taking into account information 
with respect to other events.  Bakoyannis (2012) defines the cause specific hazard as ǲthe instantaneous failure rate from a specific cause i given that no failure from any cause has yet occurredǳ, treating observations with failures from all other causes but 
the event of interest as censored.   
Subjects would be censored if they experience an event rather than the event of interest 
(competing risk).  Thus for example when analysing the risk of getting an event 
readmission, subjects who get the event death would be treated as censored.  Under the 
CSHF method, patients who achieve other events rather than the event of interest 
within the 60 day period are censored (this though allows them to achieve the event of 
interest in future days).  Patients would also be censored if the study ends before the 
passage of the 60 day period and the event of interest does not occur.  
 The CIF is on the other hand based on a risk set which is not natural as it includes not 
only subjects who have not yet failed but also subjects who have failed from other 
causes.  This proposition allows for a patient experiencing a competing risk event to be 
censored but in an informative manner.  In estimating the CIF, the occurrence of a 
competing risk event is an event in itself and is thus informative to the determination 
of the probability of failing from the particular event of interest.  This would ensure that 
the impact from each of the competing events on the event of interest is taken into 
account and that any effects which may arise from the relationships between the 
covariates of the model are included.  The effect of covariates on the CIF for competing 
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risks would be derived directly from the CIF.  In view of such characteristics, the CIF 
has been recognised in both the medical and the statistical literature as the right tool to 
use in such circumstances (Gooley et al., 2001). 
The KM and CSHF assume that censoring does not affect potential failure times.  The 
assumption of independence of different event types may not be clinically meaningful, 
particularly in this study whereby the individual is studied over time and the events which occur following the patientsǯ hospitalization are considered to be a result of the 
PTCA procedure performed.  The time to the event of interest and the time to the 
competing events are correlated up to a certain degree.  If patients, who have 
experienced a competing event are  treated as censored then the possibility of achieving 
the event of interest for such patients would still exist, potentially leading to an 
overestimation in the probability of this event.   
 
3.4.1 Modelling based on cause-specific hazards 
The cause specific hazard is denoted by hj(t) which expresses the joint probability 
distribution of failure time T and failure C for a cause j in the knowledge that there are 
other possible competing events.  The adopted function censors those who have 
experienced other events prior to the event of interest.  The function also models the 
effect of covariate effects, X, on the cause specific hazard.  The addition of factors X 
affecting the instantaneous failure rate from a specific cause of type j is given by the 
conditional cause specific hazard:  hj(t/X) 
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t
XtTjCttTtPXth
tj    ),|,(lim)/( 0                                (1) 
In addition to estimating the cause specific hazard of the event of interest, the CSHF 
across different groups is compared.  It is of particular interest in the context of this 
study to look at patients under the care of consultants and surgeons with different 
volume levels and consultants with varying job contract conditions.  Furthermore, the 
study incorporates the effect of covariates, such as the age of the patient, and the 
hospital LOS, on the event of interest.  Within this framework, as discussed by Prentice 
et al., (1978) a semi-parametric Cox regression model (assuming proportional hazards) 
with a completely flexible unspecified baseline hazard is defined.14  The effect of 
covariates on the cause specific hazard for cause j given covariates vector X is modelled 
by:  XBthXth Tjojj exp)()/( ,                                                 (2) 
The first term of the right hand side of the function expresses the baseline hazard 
(where all covariates are set to zero).  The term exp(Bj), represents the relative change 
in the cause specific hazard for the jth cause due to a one unit increase in the 
corresponding covariate.  This identifies any possible factors which could explain the 
occurrence of the event of interest in the presence of competing risks.   
A Cox proportional hazards model is estimated separately for each competing event.  As 
stated by Bakoyannis and Touloumi (2011), cause specific hazard functions, being 
                                                        
14 The assumption of proportionality is tested as it is important to understand that there could be a 
changing effect of a covariate over time rather than a constant hazard assumption over time.   
98 
 
instantaneous risk functions, do not quantify the overall benefit or harm of an exposure 
(be it a treatment or a particular characteristic) to the patient.  The inferences from this 
approach need to be evaluated cautiously because the assumption of independent 
competing events is strongly needed when estimating the CSHF.  Covariate effects in 
the CSHF pertain to the event of interest only, without consideration to how the 
covariates act on competing events.  The CSHF ignores the impact from competing risk 
events and  thus could lead to inaccurate conclusions.  The extent to which this model characterizes the covariateǯs influences solely on risk of the event of interest depends 
on how causes of failures may be inter-related.  Interpreting the cause specific hazard 
as an increase or a decrease in apparent risk has to be treated with caution.   
 
3.4.2 Modelling the cumulative incidence function  
In view of the strong assumptions of independence between events to allow for the 
interpretation of the CSHF, an alternative measure of the distribution of risk; the sub-
hazard distribution function is advocated in the literature.  This serves to deal with the 
limitations raised by Klein (2006) that the CSHF does not directly model the effect of 
covariates on the CIF.  Fine and Gray (1999) developed a model that builds on the Cox 
proportional hazards model and directly links the regression coefficients with the CIF 
whereby all competing events are assumed to have an impact on the coefficients.  In 
such a case, there is a one-to-one relationship between the sub-hazard and the 
cumulative distribution.  Furthermore, it can be noted that the effect of a covariate on 
the CSHF may differ from the effect on the CIF.   
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Competing risk models have the advantage of taking into account the fact that the 
presence of an event which is in competing risk to the event of interest, may preclude 
the incidence of the event under study and may thus alter the probability of occurrence 
for this event.  It is thus more appropriate to estimate event rates by evaluating a CIF 
by taking into account other events within a competing risk framework.  When 
competing risks are present then the way in which covariates are associated with the 
cause-specific hazard may not coincide with the way these covariates are associated 
with the cumulative incidence.  A covariate that has no direct influence on the hazard 
of a primary event can still be significantly associated with the cumulative probability 
of that event, if the covariate influences the hazard of a competing event.  Some effect 
will also arise from the association between covariates and the cause specific hazard 
for the competing events. 
 
The CIF gives the probability of a subject failing due to a cause j in the presence of all 
the competing events before (or up to) time t: 
),()( jJtTptF j                                                      (3) 
The sub-distribution hazard for event j is defined as the probability for a subject to fail 
from cause j at a time t, given the subject experienced no failure prior to t or that if 
failure occurred, it is from another cause prior to t:   
t
XjCtTortTjCttTtPXth
tj    )),,()|,((lim)/( 0                            (4) 
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The risk set is thus a non-natural set as it still includes subjects who fail from another 
cause apart from j and are thus not physically available to fail together with subjects 
who have not yet failed.  The CIF is estimated for each of the events of interest whereby 
individuals experiencing competing events are still held within the risk set so that they 
can be adequately counted as having no chance of failing from the event of interest.  The 
weights used to keep such subjects in the risk set decrease over time as the likelihood 
for these subjects to be censored increases.  Furthermore, when patients fail because of 
competing events, the covariate values for such subjects continue to be used in 
subsequent risk calculations.  Lau et al., (2009) provides an illustration comparing the 
different risk sets for both cause specific and the sub-distribution hazard.  Both risk sets 
would be equal until observing the first competing event and would be smaller in all 
time points for the sub-distribution hazard thereafter.   
The proposed model by Fine and Gray (1999) for the sub-distribution hazard is a Cox–
type semi-parametric proportional hazards model: 
 XBthXth sdTjsdojsdj exp)()/( ,        (sd denotes sub-distribution)  (5) 
The first term on the right hand side of this function denotes a baseline sub-hazard 
function with all covariates set to zero.  X is the covariate vector and the values of B are 
the covariate effects obtained in relation to competing risks j.  This model uses the 
partial likelihood principle15 such that one can assume a constant difference between 
the cumulative incidence functions independent of time t.  The CIF allows for the 
                                                        
15
 The log(-log) transformation. 
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incorporation of the relevant information arising from other competing risk events 
when estimating the likelihood of the event of interest.  Sub-distribution hazard rates 
are assumed to be proportional for all the included covariates.  Based on this model, the 
CIF becomes:  
 t sdjj dsXshXtCIF 0 )/(exp1)/(                                         (6) 
The CIF for competing risk j is therefore a function of the sub-hazard only for cause j, 
with the integral on the right hand side of the function being the cumulative sub-
distribution hazard function (Cleves et al., 2010).  The CIF is estimated directly from the 
regression coefficients obtained by the method proposed by Fine and Gray (1999) and 
the effects of covariates on the cumulative incidence function could thus be derived 
directly from the model for, )/( Xshsdj .   
 
3.5  Results and Discussion  
This section presents the results of the impact of a number of covariates on the event 
of interest, primarily different consultant and surgeon volume levels.  In addition, 
variations in the relationship between consultant volume levels and the events of 
interest due to varying consultant job contract conditions are included.  Results based 
on the CSHF and the CIF using both non-parametric and semi-parametric methods are 
provided.  The conclusions derived from the estimated multinomial logistic regression 
model are presented in Appendix B of this chapter. 
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3.5.1 Non-parametric estimation 
3.5.1.1 The Cause Specific Hazard Function 
Figure 3-1 illustrates the CSHF of the event failure, representing the risk of failing from 
the PTCA procedure.16  The results show that the hazard of failing from the intervention 
within the 60 day period increases as t approaches the 60 day point mark with as 
expected, higher risk in the first few days following the procedure.  Indeed,  Figure 3-2 
illustrates the hazard estimate for the event death, and shows the relatively high risk of 
dying in the immediate days following the undertaking of the procedure .  The hazard 
from this event falls as t increases.  Figure 3-3 shows the hazard estimates for the event 
readmission which increases with t up to around the 50 day point.  
    Figure 3-1: Hazard for event failure                     Figure 3-2: Hazard for event death 
                                   
              
         
Figure 3-3: Hazard for event readmission 
                                                                 
                                                        
16
 The hazard estimate for the risk of failing from the undertaken procedure is composed from the 
addition of the hazard of events death and readmission. 
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In addition to estimating the CSHF for the different failure events, results are presented 
for differences in the hazard rates for the event failure17 when different consultant and 
volume characteristics are considered.  In particular, three groups of characteristics are 
identified: patients under the control of consultants with a low/high volume level of 
patient activity, patients being seen by surgeons with a low/high volume level of patient 
activity and patients being seen by consultants with different job plan contracts.  It can 
be concluded from Figure 3-4 that the rate of failing from the treatment procedure is 
higher if the patient is seen by consultants on high volume levels (cvol=1).  The hazard 
of failure for patients being seen by surgeons at higher volume levels (Figure 3-5) 
compared to patients seen by low volume surgeons varies as t changes.  Figure 3-6 
represents differences due to the job plan contract type of the consultant.18  
 
                 Figure 3-4                                      Figure 3-5                                      Figure 3-6 
    By consultant volume                  By surgeon volume                   By consultant job plan                
   levels (CSHF)                             levels  (CSHF)                 contract type (CSHF) 
                   
 
 
                                                        
17 The other representations for the separate failure events readmission and death are included in 
Appendix A to this chapter in Figure 3-19 and Figure 3-20 respectively.  
18 This primarily represents the Ǯreadmittanceǯ activity and the fact that there are a relatively small 
number of consultants on a public-only contract type. There are no cases of patients who experience the 
event death and are under the care of public-only contract type consultants.  
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The results of the log-rank test for equality of the hazard associated with the event of 
interest for the different groups are presented in Table 3.5.  The results show that 
surgeon volume has a marginally significant effect on the cause specific hazard for the 
event failure.  However, no significant effect of differences in the consultant and 
surgeon characteristics were observed for the hazard functions of the other specific 
events.   
Table 3.5: Log rank test for equality of the cause specific hazard 
p-value Event  
failure 
     Event  
     death 
Event  
readmission 
Consultant volume 0.3231      0.9214 0.2273 
Surgeon volume  0.0785*      0.4234 0.1163 
Consultant contract type 0.1144      0.2085 0.2767 
* Significant at the 10% level of significance. 
 
 
3.5.1.2 The Cumulative Incidence Function   
Figures 3-7, 3-8 and 3-9 show the CIF for the different events of interest.  The 
cumulative incidence of failing from the PTCA procedure within the 60 day period 
increases as t gets closer to 60 days.19  The treatment failure probability can be 
separated into the failure from getting the event readmission or death.   The cumulative 
probability of failing from each of the  events, death and readmission, within 60 days 
also increases as the 60th day following discharge day is approached.   
 
 
                                                        
19 The results obtained from the CIF are compared to those obtained from the use of the KM method and 
it is found that as expected the (1-KM) method overestimates the incidence of the event failure.  
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                     Figure 3-7                                Figure 3-8                                 Figure 3-9 
         CIF for event failure                     CIF for event death               CIF for event readmission
    
The impact of differences in the consultant and surgeon volume levels together with the 
impact of differences in the consultant job plan contract type on the CIF for the failure 
event20 is shown in Figures 3-10, 3-11 and 3-12.  The incidence of failing following the 
PTCA procedure is higher if the patient is under the care of consultants with high 
volume levels.  The incidence of failure for patients being seen by surgeons at higher 
volume levels (Figure 3-11) compared to patients seen by low volume surgeons varies 
as Ǯtǯ changes.  Figure 3-12 represents differences due to the job plan contract type of 
the consultant.21  
 
 
 
                                                        
20 The results for the events readmission and death are included in Appendix A to this chapter in Figure 
3-21 and Figure 3-22 respectively. 
21  This primarily represents the Ǯre-admittanceǯ activity and the fact that there are a relatively small 
number of consultants on a public-only contract type. There are no cases of patients who experience the 
event death and are under the care of public-only contract type consultants. 
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             Figure 3-10                          Figure 3-11                                  Figure 3-12 
CIF by consultant volume       CIF by surgeon volume        CIF by consultant job contract     
                         type      
                  
                   
 
Using the p values obtained from the Pepe and Mori (1993) test, as presented in Table 
3.6, it can be concluded that there is a statistical difference in the CIF curves based on 
the volume levels of the consultant for the event readmission.   
Table 3.6: Pepe and Mori (1993) test comparing the cumulative incidence for the two 
groups: consultant and surgeon volume levels 
p-value Event  
failure 
      Event 
       death 
Event 
 readmission 
Consultant volume 0.1196        0.9606 0.0028** 
Surgeon volume  0.4285        0.4166 0.8343 
Consultant contract 
type 
0.00002***        0.00001** 0.01988** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The differences in the CIF based on the volume levels of the surgeon were found to be 
statistically insignificant whilst the difference in the CIF curve based on the consultant 
contract type is accepted for all event types. 
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3.5.2  Semi-parametric estimation: the CSHF and the CIF   
This section discusses the CSHF and the CIF taking into account differences in 
consultant and surgeon characteristics whilst also controlling for patient related factors 
of age and LOS.22  Covariates are chosen on the basis of a number of regression 
estimations and are dependent on those factors which are expected to affect hazard and 
incidence rates.  Results are also presented for the compounding interaction effects of 
the consultant job contract category on the relationship between the event of interest 
and the different measures of volume.  The results from each of the semi-parametric 
estimation methods are compared for robustness purposes to the obtained estimates 
based on a multinomial logistic model.23   
 
3.5.2.1 Modelling the CSHF 
This section provides the results for the CSHF estimated using the Cox multivariable 
regression model for the failure event.  The events death and readmission constitute a 
failure and a separate CSHF for each of these possible failure events is estimated.  The 
results are presented using different sets of volume variables to capture the robustness 
of the volume measures used.  The effect of the consultant job plan contract type on the 
cause specific hazard is included together with an interaction term to study whether 
differences in the consultant contract type modify the relationship between the volume 
                                                        
22
 The total number of diagnosis for the particular patient, diagtotal, to represent the severity of illness 
for the patient, was also tested in the various estimations undertaken.  
23 A full description of the results obtained using a multinomial logistic model is provided in Appendix B 
to this chapter. The results obtained using this method serve to overall confirm the results obtained 
through the CSHF and the CIF.  
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variable and the event of interest.  Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 present the results for the different CS(Fǯs obtained using the different volume variables under consideration.  
The results in Table 3.7 show that there is a lower (and significant) risk of failing from 
the procedure for patients seen by consultants on public-only job contracts compared 
to patients under the control of dual practice contract consultants (the hazard rate of 
failing falls by 72%).  The hazard rate for the volume variables countc and counts are 
both insignificant and close to 1 indicating that the rate of failure is expected to stay 
fairly flat as volume levels increase.  As expected the covariates for age and LOS 
positively affect the hazard rate for the event death.  The proportional hazard 
assumption24 is clearly accepted for the estimation is columns 3-6 whilst only accepted 
marginally in the first two columns of the same table.  
 
Table 3.7: Cause Specific Hazard at particular event of interest (countc and counts) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
                Event 
Variable 
Failure Failure Re-admit Re-admit Death Death 
public-only 0.281* 0.326 0.390 0.443 - - 
age 1.003 1.004 0.984 0.984 1.068*** 1.070*** 
LOS 1.041*** 1.043*** 1.025 1.027 1.060*** 1.063*** 
countc 0.999  0.999  0.998  
counts  0.999  0.999  0.999 
Observations 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 
Hazard ratios are reported, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
24 Obtained using the estat phtest command in Stata. Data provided in Appendix C to this chapter. 
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Table 3.8: Cause Specific Hazard at particular event of interest (vol90c and vol90s) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
                 Event 
Variable 
Failure Failure Re-admit Re-admit Death Death 
public-only 0.355 0.325 0.466 0.439 - - 
age 1.003 1.003 0.983 0.983 1.066*** 1.066*** 
LOS 1.046*** 1.044*** 1.030* 1.028* 1.069*** 1.065*** 
vol90c 1.004  1.002  1.007  
vol90s  1.000  0.999  1.002 
Observations 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 
Hazard ratios are reported, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract.  
 
 
Table 3.9: Cause Specific Hazard at particular event of interest (cvol and svol) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              Event 
Variable 
Failure Failure Re-admit Re-admit Death Death 
public-only 0.437 0.294* 0.599 0.402 - - 
age 1.004 1.005 0.984 0.985 1.068*** 1.069*** 
LOS 1.050*** 1.042*** 1.034* 1.026 1.070*** 1.062*** 
cvol 1.433  1.447  1.388  
svol  0.703*  0.721  0.678 
Observations 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 
Hazard ratios are reported, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract.  
The baseline, cvol=0 indicates consultant low volume, svol=0 indicates surgeon low 
volume. 
 
Table 3.8 presents the results when the volume variables representing the most recent 
activity of surgeons and consultants prior to the hospital admittance date of the patient, 
vol90c and vol90s are considered.25  There is no statistically significant relationship 
between the event of failure and the most recent activity volume levels of both 
                                                        
25 The proportional bazard assumption is rejected in columns 1,2 whilst the assumption holds for column 
3-6, (obtained using estat phtest command in Stata). The relevant data is provided in Appendix C to this 
chapter.  
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consultants and surgeons.  As expected, the hazard rate for the event of death is 
significant for both changes in age and LOS. 
This results in Table 3.9 show that the hazard rate of failing is lower if a patient is under 
the care of a consultant on a public-only contract.  There is a lower hazard rate of failing 
from the procedure if the patient is seen by a surgeon on a high volume level, possibly 
suggesting that the practice makes perfect hypothesis holds in this case.  On the other 
hand, there is a higher hazard rate of failing from the procedure (however insignificant) 
if the patient is under the care of a consultant with high volume levels.  The proportional 
hazard assumption26 is accepted for the estimation is columns 3-6 whilst rejected in the 
first two columns of the same table. 
We included the interaction term in order to determine whether the consultant job plan 
can modify the effect of volume on the hazard for each of the events of interest.  The 
results are presented in Table 3.10.  We found that if volume (represented by countc) is 
increased by one unit and all other variables are held constant, the hazard of failing 
remains practically the same for those patients under the care of consultants working 
on dual practice contracts.  If volume is increased by one unit and the patient is under 
the responsibility of a consultant on a public-only contract, then the hazard rate of 
failing is equal27 to 1.107.  This rate varies for different levels of volume due to the 
interaction effect. The rate of failing from the procedure undertaken for a change in 
volume is slightly higher for those patients seen by consultants on public-only contracts 
                                                        
26
 Obtained using the estat phtest command in Stata. Data provided in Appendix C to this chapter. 
27 Obtained as the exp((-0.001+0.103)*counc). Values represent the coefficients corresponding to the 
hazard rates provided in Table 3.10. 
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compared to those patients under consultants with dual practice contracts.  If a patient 
is moved from a consultant with a dual practice contract to a consultant with a public-
only contract, at a volume level set to zero and holding all other variables constant, the 
hazard of failing decreases (by around 93%).  However, the effect of the consultant 
contract type on the hazard rate of failing changes with changes in volume levels due to 
the interaction effect.28    
Table 3.10: Cause Specific Hazard at particular event of interest - with interaction terms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
                      Event 
Variable 
Failure Failure Re-
admit 
Re-
admit 
Death Death 
age 1.003 1.003 0.983 0.983 1.068*** 1.066*** 
LOS 1.041*** 1.047*** 1.026 1.030* 1.060*** 1.069*** 
public-only 0.067 0.081* 0.081 0.089 - - 
countc 0.999  0.999  0.998  
countc x public-only  1.108  1.121  0.864  
vol90c  1.003  1.002  1.007 
vol90c x public-only  1.214*  1.243**  1.000 
Observations 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 
    Hazard ratios are reported, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
    The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract.  
 
Similar results (column 2) are obtained when using the volume indicator, vol90c, which 
represents the number of cases seen by the consultant in the last 90 days prior to the patientǯs admission to hospital.  An insignificant hazard rate of failing is obtained with 
respect to changes in volume for patients who are under the care of consultants on dual 
practice contracts.  If volume is increased by one unit and the patient is under the 
responsibility of a consultant on a public-only contract, then the hazard rate of failing is 
                                                        
28 exp((-2.696+(0.103*countc)). Values represent the coefficients corresponding to the hazard rates 
provided in Table 3.10. 
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equal29 to 1.217.  This rate varies for different levels of volume due to the interaction 
effect.  A significant hazard rate of failing for patients under the care of consultants on 
public-only contracts is recorded when the volume variable, vol90c, is used.  If a patient 
is moved from a consultant with a dual practice contract to a consultant with a public-
only contract, at a volume level set to zero and holding all other variables constant, the 
hazard of failing decreases (by around 92%).  The results also show that the likelihood 
of the event death is significantly affected by the LOS and the age covariates.  The 
proportional hazards assumption30 is rejected (at the 90% level of significance) for the 
representations in column 1 and column 2 whilst accepted for all other columns in 
Table 3.10.  The robustness of these results has been assessed in relation to estimates 
obtained from a multinomial logistic model31. The results obtained from the CSHF are 
broadly in line with those derived from the multinomial logistic model. 
The marginal effect of changes in the volume indicator, countc is not constant and varies 
for different values of volume.  The predictions32 of the hazard for the event of interest 
at different volume levels of countc, at each of the different consultant job plan 
contracts, are presented in Figure 3-13 and Figure 3-14.  
 
 
 
                                                        
29
 Obtained as the exp((0.003+0.194)*counc). Values represent the coefficients corresponding to the 
hazard rates provided in Table 3.10. 
30 Obtained using estat phtest command in Stata.  Data provided in Appendix C to this chapter. 
31 A detailed description of the results is presented in Appendix B to this chapter. 
32 Based on equation (1) in Table 3.10. 
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Figure 3-13: The hazard function of failing from the procedure for different volume 
levels for consultants on public-only contracts33 
 
Figure 3-14: The hazard function of failing from the procedure for different volume 
levels for consultants on dual practice contracts34 
 
                                                        
33 The different volume levels applied reflect the current volume levels of the consultants operating 
under the public-only contract type.   
34  The different volume levels applied reflect the current volume levels of the consultants operating 
under the dual practice contract type.   
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The results in Figure 3-13 show that as volume levels for consultants on public-only 
contracts increase, the hazard of failing from the procedure increases.  This reflects the 
positive interaction term for patients under the care of consultants on public-only 
contracts.  The hazard of failing for patients under the care of consultants on dual 
practice contracts (Figure 3-14) is only affected marginally when volume levels for 
these consultants on such contract type increase.  This suggests that changes in failure 
outcomes are more sensitive to changes in volume levels of consultants on public-only 
contracts. 
 
3.5.2.2 Modelling the CIF  
 
Tables 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 present the results of a series of CIFs based on the approach 
proposed by Fine and Gray (1999) to model each of the events using various volume 
measures: countc and counts, vol90c and vol90s,  and cvol and svol.  Table 3.14 shows 
how the consultant job plan contract type modifies the effect of the volume covariates 
on the outcome events.  Variables for patient age and LOS at the hospital are considered 
as the main covariates in the different specifications.35   
As shown in Table 3.11, the sub-hazard for the volume variables countc and counts are 
both insignificant and close to 1 indicating that as the volume of the consultant and 
surgeons increase by one unit the incidence rate for failure is expected to stay fairly flat, 
when keeping all other variables constant. Furthermore, assuming the same level of 
                                                        
35 The total number of diagnosis for the particular patient, diagtotal, which represents the severity of the 
patient case, was also tested in the various estimations undertaken. 
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volume for the consultant in column 1, the sub-hazard rate of failing from the procedure 
is lower for patients being seen by consultants on public-only contracts compared to 
dual practice contracts.  The sub-hazard of failing from the procedure is also lower 
(however insignificant) for patients being seen by consultants on public-only contracts 
compared to dual practice contracts when assuming the same level of volume for the 
surgeon in column 2.  The study found that the incidence of the event failure is affected 
by the LOS covariate whilst the specific event of failure death is affected by the age and 
the LOS covariates.   
Table 3.12 presents the results obtained when the number of cases seen by the 
consultant vol90c and the number of cases seen by the surgeon, vol90s are taken as the 
volume measures.  Insignificant sub-hazard values were obtained for the volume 
measures so that the most recent activity volume levels of the consultant and the 
surgeon did not have an impact on the incidence rate of failing following a PTCA 
procedure.  Keeping all variables constant, the sub-hazard rate of failing from the 
procedure is lower (however insignificant) for patients being seen by consultants on 
public-only contracts compared to dual practice  contracts.  In line with the previous 
table, the results in table 3.12 show that the incidence of the event failure is affected by 
the LOS covariate whilst the specific event of failure death is affected by the age and the 
LOS covariates.   
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Table 3.11: Cumulative Incidence Function at particular events of interest (countc and counts)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
               Event 
Variable 
Failure Failure Re-
admit 
Re-
admit 
Death Death 
 
age 1.004 1.004 0.982* 0.983 1.068*** 1.0699*** 
LOS 1.041*** 1.043*** 1.021* 1.023* 1.060*** 1.0626*** 
public-only 0.281* 0.326 0.370 0.436 - - 
countc 0.999  0.999  0.998  
counts  0.999  0.999  0.999 
Observations 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 
Coefficients reflect Sub-Hazard Ratios,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract. 
 
 
Table 3.12: Cumulative Incidence Function at particular events of interest (vol90c and vol90s) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Event 
Variable 
Failure Failure Re-
admit 
Re-
admit 
Death Death 
age 1.003 1.003 0.982* 0.982* 1.067*** 1.067*** 
LOS 1.047*** 1.044*** 1.026** 1.024** 1.069*** 1.065*** 
public-only 0.355 0.325 0.459 0.432 - - 
vol90c 1.004  1.003  1.008  
vol90s  0.999  0.999  1.001 
Observations 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 
Coefficients reflect Sub-Hazard Ratios,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract. 
 
 
Table 3.13: Cumulative Incidence Function at particular events of interest (cvol and svol) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Event 
Variable 
Failure Failure Re-
admit 
Re-
admit 
Death Death 
age 1.004 1.005 0.983 0.984 1.068*** 1.069*** 
LOS 1.050*** 1.042*** 1.030** 1.022* 1.070*** 1.062*** 
public-only 0.437 0.294* 0.587 0.395 - - 
cvol 1.433  1.438  1.390  
svol  0.703*  0.725  0.676 
Observations 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 
Coefficients reflect Sub-Hazard Ratios,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract. 
The baseline, cvol=0 indicates consultant low volume, svol=0 indicates surgeon low volume. 
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The volume variable is in Table 3.13 measured using a constructed dummy variable 
which distinguishes between high and low volume consultant and surgeons operating 
at the public hospital.  There is a lower hazard rate of failing from the procedure if the 
patient is seen by a surgeon on the high volume level, svol, possibly suggesting that the 
practice makes perfect hypothesis holds in this case.  On the other hand, there is a 
higher hazard rate of failing from the procedure (however insignificant) if the patient 
is under the care of a consultant with high volume levels, cvol.  The results in Table 3.13 
(column 2) show that keeping all variables constant, the sub-hazard rate of failing is 
lower and significant if a patient is under the care of a consultant on a public-only 
contract.  As expected, the cumulative incidence rate of the event death  was found to 
be affected by both age and LOS.  
 
Table 3.14: Cumulative Incidence Function at particular events of interest-with interaction terms 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     Event            
Variable 
         Failure Failure Re-admit Re-admit Death Death 
age 1.003 1.003 0.982* 0.982* 1.068*** 1.067*** 
LOS 1.042*** 1.047*** 1.022* 1.027** 1.0604*** 1.069*** 
public-only 0.067** 0.081*** 0.136** 0.146** - - 
countc 0.999  0.99  0.998  
countc x public-only 1.108**  1.072*  0.993  
vol90c  1.003  1.002  1.008 
vol90c x public-only  1.214***  1.150***  1.000 
Observations 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 
Coefficients reflect Sub-Hazard Ratios,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract. 
 
 
Table 3.14 introduces into the study the effect that the consultant job plan has on the 
relationship between volume and the incidence of the event of interest.  The 
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specification in column 1 shows that if volume is increased by one unit and the patient 
is under the control of a consultant on a dual practice contract, with all other variables 
kept constant, the incidence rate of failing from the PTCA procedure is practically 
unchanged.  If volume is increased by one unit and the patient is under the 
responsibility of a consultant on a public-only contract, then the incidence rate of failing 
is equal36 to 1.107.  The magnitude of this change varies for different levels of volume 
due to the interaction effect.  The incidence rate of failing increases significantly for 
patients being seen by consultants on public-only contracts for a unit change in volume 
compared to patients being under the control of consultants on dual practice contracts.  
The sub-hazard for failing from the procedure for patients under the care of consultants 
with exclusive public sector contracts, at zero volume levels and keeping all other 
variables constant, is lower for patients under the care of consultants on public-only 
contracts compared to dual practice contracts.  The magnitude of this change varies and 
depends on the particular volume level due to the interaction effect.37   
Results based on vol90c (column 2) indicate that the effect of a one unit change in 
volume on the incidence rate of failing for patients under the care of consultants on 
public-only contracts is equal38 to 1.218.  A small positive sub-hazard of failing for 
patients is obtained with respect to volume changes when consultants overseeing the 
patients are on dual practice contracts.  The sub-hazard of failing, at zero volume levels 
                                                        
36 Obtained as the exp((-0.0011+ 0.1029)*countc). Values represent the coefficients corresponding to the 
sub-hazard ratios provided in Table 3.14. 
37 exp((-2.6955+(0.1029*countc)). Values represent the coefficients corresponding to the sub-hazard 
ratios provided in Table 3.14. 
38 Obtained using exp((-0.0008333+0.0779643)*vol90c). Values represent the coefficients 
corresponding to the sub-hazard ratios provided in Table 3.14. 
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and keeping all other variables constant, for patients under the care of consultants with 
exclusive public sector contracts is lower when compared to those patients under the 
care of consultants on dual practice contracts.  The sub-hazard of failing for patients 
under the care of consultants with public-only contracts is around 8% of that for 
patients under the care of consultants who can carry out private practice.  
 
The results show that there is a significant sub-hazard of failing from the event re-
admission for patients with public-only contracts.  Patients under the care of consultants 
who have a public-only contract have a lower sub-hazard for the event re-admission 
compared to those patients who are under the care of dual practice contract 
consultants.  Furthermore, we find positive and significant values for the sub-hazard of 
the interaction term in columns 3 and 4.  If volume is increased by one unit and the 
patient is under the care of a consultant on a public-only contract then the incidence 
rate of being re-admitted is higher compared to the same volume increase of one unit 
for consultants with dual practice contracts.  The robustness of these results has been 
assessed in relation to estimates obtained from a multinomial logistic model.39  The 
results obtained from the CIF are broadly in line with those derived from the 
multinomial logistic model. 
 
The Fine and Gray (1999) model assumes that the effects of the covariates are 
proportional to the sub-hazard of the particular event of interest.  The assumption of 
proportional hazards was tested for a possible changing effect of the covariates over 
                                                        
39 A detailed description of the results is presented in Appendix B to this chapter. 
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the time period.  The plot of the Schoenfeld residuals40 (based on the results presented 
in column 1 in Table 3.14) shown in Figure 3-15, was used to test the proportional 
hazards assumption underpinning the CIF.  Results show that there is an indication of 
no violation of the proportionality assumption.  The assumption of proportionality was 
also tested by introducing time varying coefficients for all of the covariates in the model.  
Figure 3-16 illustrates the Schoenfeld residuals after the time varying coefficients are 
taken into account.  Some of the tested time varying coefficients turned out to be 
statistically significant thus suggesting the rejection of the proportionality assumption.   
 
 
     Figure 3-15: Schoenfeld residuals                         Figure 3-16: Schoenfeld residuals with                                    
        time varying coefficients 
                       
 
 
The marginal effect of changes in the volume indicator, countc is not constant and varies 
for the different values of volume.  Figure 3-17 and 3-18 show predictions41 of the 
incidence rate for the event of interest failure at different volume levels of countc, for 
each of the consultant job plan contract types.  We found evidence of differences in the 
                                                        
40 Based on Grambsch and Therneau (1994). 
41 Based on equation (1) in Table 3.14. 
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CIF for the event of interest, at different levels of volume for particular job plan contract 
types. 
Figure 3-17: Volume variation for consultants on public-only contracts42 
 
Figure 3-18: Volume variation for consultants on dual practice contracts43 
 
                                                        
42 The different volume levels applied reflect the current volume levels of the consultants operating 
under the public-only contract type.   
43 The different volume levels applied reflect the current volume levels of the consultants operating 
under the dual practice contract type.   
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Figure 3-17 shows that the incidence of failure increases if the volume of consultants 
on public-only contracts increases.  This is in line with the results obtained on the 
interaction term for the consultant job plan contract type which shows that the impact 
of a change in volume on the incidence rate of failing for patients under the care of 
consultants with exclusive public sector contracts, is higher. Figure 3-18 provides 
evidence that changes in the volume levels of consultants who undertake private 
practice has little impact on the incidence rate of failing from the procedure 
undertaken.  The incidence of failing for patients under the care of consultants on dual 
practice contracts only changes marginally when volume levels of these consultants 
change.   
3.6 Conclusion 
This study focused on understanding the volume-outcome relationship in the context 
of competing events following a PTCA procedure. The impact of patient focused 
covariates such as age and LOS is included in the analysis.  Furthermore, we studied 
whether the consultant job plan contract type can modify the effect of changes in 
volume on the hazard rate of each of the events of interest.   
Both non-parametric and semi-parametric survival analysis methods were used in the 
study together with the use of a multinomial logistic model to test for the robustness of 
the obtained results.  Results based on the non-parametric CSHF and the CIF show that 
there is a slightly higher rate of failure following the PTCA procedure for patients who 
are under the care of consultants with high volume levels.  The results obtained from 
the non-parametric methods, in relation to the variation in failure rates due to 
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difference in job plan contract type, are to be treated with caution and one 
acknowledges the contrainst due to the significantly limited dataset available.  
The results obtained from the semi-parametric models show that there is a lower risk 
of failure from the PTCA procedure for patients being under the care of consultants with 
public-only job contracts compared to patients under dual practice consultants.  Some 
evidence of higher risk of failure for patients under the care of consultants with high 
volume levels is also noted.  Furthermore, a change in volume was found to have an 
even higher impact on the sub-hazard rate for failing if patients were under the 
responsibility of consultants practicing exclusively in the public sector. This could 
indeed reflect the capacity constraints within which consultants working at the public 
hospital operate, whereby added activity for such consultants could lead to an impact 
on overall outcomes.  On the other hand, one finds some evidence of a lower risk of 
failure for patients seen by surgeons with high volume levels, possibly implying some 
evidence of the presence of the practice makes perfect hypothesis.  Also, and not 
surprisingly, our findings show that the likelihood of death of a patient undergoing a 
PTCA procedure is affected significantly by their age and LOS at hospital. 
The results based on the multinomial logistic estimations confirm the results obtained 
from the CSHF and the CIF functions.  One finds that there is a lower risk for a patient 
to register a failure event  after the PTCA procedure if the patient is under the care of a 
consultant on a public-only contract with the public hospital.  Patients being seen by 
consultants on high volume levels are more likely to have an event failure during the 60 
day period.  Moreover, a change in volume was found to have an even higher impact on 
124 
 
the incidence for failing if patients were under the responsibility of consultants 
practicing exclusively in the public sector compared to dual practice consultants.  
The survival models used assume  homogeneity where all individuals are subject to the 
same risks embodied in the hazard function.  When we introduce covariates we relax 
this assumption by introducing observed sources of heterogeneity.  There could though 
also be unobserved sources of heterogeneity that are not being captured by the 
covariates.  A problem of concern is the omission of variables (counfounders) that affect 
the event of interest variable and that such variables are likely to be correlated with the 
included control variables.  Indeed, there could be an intrusive effect of omitted 
variables and as stated by Heckman and Singer (1981) the estimates of the parameters 
of duration models, are influenced by the distribution of unobservables as this could 
lead to estimates which poorly describe the true behavioural models generating 
duration data. 
 
Furthermore, in this study we have controlled for a range of patient and consultant 
characteristics which could possibly influence the volume-outcome relationship, 
particularly, patient age, severity of illness and consultant job contract type. One 
recognises that there are though a number of other factors which consultants put into 
the balance when making a choice between a dual practice contract and a public-only 
contract with the public hospital.  The observed impact on outcomes may thus be due 
to factors other than the direct variation arising from the particular job contract type.  
The data for consultant job contract type may be thus capturing factors which affect the 
actual decision of the consultant to choose the particular type of job plan contract.   
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The identification of the volume-outcome relationship could in the context of this study 
be partly controlled by the fact that there is only one single public hospital on the island 
which deals with the health care needs of the Maltese population.  Consultants cannot 
move to other public hospitals and all consultants considered in this study work within 
the same public sector structure.  This reduces the possible biases which can arise when 
patients could be referred to hospitals with different characteristics thus possibly 
affecting outcomes.  Furthermore, the size of the sample used within this study is 
constrained by the fact that the sample includes all the existing PTCA activity carried 
out by consultants within the hospital over the three year period, thus serving to reduce 
potential biases in sample selection.  
 
It is indeed possible that consultants with different skills and work/leisure preferences 
have a tendency to opt for a particular type of contract type and thus outcomes are also 
influenced by such factors rather than just the particular job contract type.  Consultants 
might base their choice of job contract type also on what they perceive to be the mostly 
sought out form of contract type requested and desired by their patients.  Patient 
preferences will thus have an impact on consultant job contract type.  Furthermore, one 
could consider data in relation to years of experience at the job (to measure skills) and 
an indicator of work/leisure preferences to help disentangle the confounding impact of 
such factors on outcomes.  Determining the possible reasons underlying the decision 
by consultants to work under the conditions of a particular type of job contract could 
add to a better explanation of the drivers of the relationship between outcomes and the 
consultant job contract type.  This is important especially for policy related reasons.  
Further work in this area would be a possible extension to this research work. 
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These conclusions contribute towards a better understanding of the existence, nature 
and possible channels for explaining the relationship between volume and competing 
risk outcomes within a unique public hospital setting like that of Malta.  Furthermore, 
this study helps provide evidence on some of the factors which are likely to have an 
impact on treatment effectiveness.  In particular, further investigation into the 
behavioural patterns of consultants and surgeons within such a hospital setting would 
serve to obtain a better understanding of the contribution of health professionals 
towards outcome effectiveness.  A possible further extension for this study could be to 
incorporate additional information on the characteristics of the surgeons working 
within the hospital and thus to analyse their particular impact of patient outcomes.  One 
would expect that even within a single hospital setting, differences in the behaviour of 
consultants and surgeons at an individual level exist and such differences could have 
an impact on outcome.  The broadening of this study to include other procedures within 
the hospital, apart from PTCA, would help set up effective policy initiatives within the 
health care sector.   
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Appendix A 
This appendix includes the non-parametric CSHF and CIF for each of the events of 
interest: failure, death and readmission. The impact of changes in consultant volume 
levels, surgeon volume levels and consultant job plan contract type on the CSHF and CIF 
are presented.  
Figure 3-19: Cause Specific Hazard Function – for the event readmission 
 
 
Figure 3-20: Cause Specific Hazard Function – for the event death 
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Figure 3-21: Cumulative Incidence Function – for the event readmission 
 
 
 
Figure 3-22: Cumulative Incidence Function – for the event death 
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Appendix B 
 
The results obtained from a multinomial logistic model for outcomes within the 60 day 
period following the undertaking of the PTCA procedure are presented in Tables 3.15, 
3.16 and 3.17.  This is carried out to check for the robustness of the results obtained  
using the survival analysis estimation methods.  To this effect results are compared to 
the estimation results obtained from the use of the CSHF and the CIF presented in 
Sections 3.5.2.1 and 3.5.2.2.  Tables 3.15, 3.16 and 3.17 present the result of outcomes 
at 60 days for the estimations carried out using the different volume measures: countc 
and counts, vol90c and vol90s and cvol and svol respective.  This type of modelling 
structure also allows for the control of the possible influence of additional variables on 
the failure event.  
 
The first two columns within the tables represent the event failure which could 
constitute either of the events death or readmission.  Columns 3-6 within each of the 
tables represent separate estimations for each of the possible events which could lead 
to failure.  
 
The results in Table 3.15 confirm that there is a lower risk for a patient failure event 
after the PTCA procedure if the patient is under the care of a consultant on a public-only 
contract with the public hospital.  As the volume of the consultant increases (countc) 
and the volume of the surgeon (counts) increases given that the odds ratio is very close 
to one then there is not likely to be any difference to the probability of failure.  The 
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relative risk of the particular failure from event death is expected to be higher as age 
and LOS increase.    
 
Similar results are obtained in Table 3.16 which presents the relative risk of failure 
when the volume variables representing the most recent activity of consultants and 
surgeons prior to the patient hospital admittance date (vol90c and vol90s) are 
considered.  These results are also comparable to the results in Table 3.8 using the CSHF 
and Table 3.12 using the CIF within the main text of the Chapter.  
 
The results in Table 3.17 confirm the results obtained in Table 3.9 and Table 3.13 
whereby the event failure for a patient is less likely if a patient is under the control of 
public-only contract consultants.  Patients being seen by consultants on high volume 
levels are more likely to have an event failure (although insignificant). Patients being 
seen by surgeons on high volume levels are less likely to have a failure event during the 
60 day period.  The results also confirm that the relative risk of failure from death is 
expected to be higher as age and LOS of patients increase.    
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Table 3.15: Multinomial logistic regression (countc and counts) - odds ratios 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        Event 
Variable 
Failure Failure Re-admit Re-admit Death Death 
age 1.002 1.003 0.984 0.985 1.068*** 1.070*** 
LOS 1.051*** 1.054*** 1.034* 1.036* 1.078*** 1.081*** 
public-only 0.234** 0.286* 0.313 0.379 - - 
countc 0.998*  0.999  0.998  
counts  0.999*  0.999  0.998 
Constant 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.169*** 0.155*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Observations 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 
         *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract. 
 
  
Table 3.16: Multinomial logistic regression  (vol90c and vol90s) - odds ratios 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        Event  
Variable 
Failure Failure Re-admit Re-admit Death Death 
age 1.001 1.002 0.983 0.984 1.067*** 1.066*** 
LOS 1.057*** 1.055*** 1.038* 1.037* 1.088*** 1.084*** 
public-only 0.298* 0.282* 0.376 0.370 - - 
vol90c 1.002  1.000  1.008  
vol90s  0.998  0.997  1.002 
Constant 0.050*** 0.056*** 0.140*** 0.150*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Observations 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 
         ***   p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract. 
 
 
Table 3.17: Multinomial logistic regression  (cvol and svol) - odds ratios 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        Event 
Variable 
Failure Failure Re-admit Re-admit Death Death 
age 1.002 1.004 0.984 0.986 1.068*** 1.069*** 
LOS 1.061*** 1.053*** 1.044** 1.035* 1.088*** 1.080*** 
public-only 0.380 0.252* 0.507 0.334 - - 
cvol 1.424  1.436  1.412  
svol  0.668*  0.678  0.657 
Constant 0.037*** 0.062*** 0.096*** 0.157*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Observations 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 
        ***   p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract. 
     The baseline, cvol=0 indicates consultant low volume, svol=0 indicates surgeon 
          low volume. 
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The effect on the occurrence of a failure event, arising from differences in the consultant 
job plan type, given a change in volume is studied by adding an interaction term to the 
analysis.  Results are shown in Table 3.18.  These results can be compared to those in 
Table 3.10  (based on the CSHF) and Table 3.14 (based on the CIF).  Overall similar 
conclusions can be made when interpreting such results.  If volume is increased by one 
unit and the patient is under the care of a consultant with a dual practice contract, with 
all other variables kept constant, the risk of failure is practically unchanged.  If volume 
is increased by one unit and the patient is under the care of a consultant on a public-
only contract then the relative risk of failure is expected to increase by a factor of 
1.06944.  The impact of a change in volume on the relative risk of the event failure is 
found to be higher for patients under the care of public-only consultants.  The relative 
risk of patients from the event failure for patients under the care of consultants with 
public-only contracts is less compared to those being under the care of dual practice 
consultants (at zero volume levels and keeping all other variables constant).  In view of 
the interaction term applied within the multinomial logistic regression model, the 
magnitude of this change varies at the particularly set volume levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
44
 Obtained as exp(-0.002+0.069)* countc). Values represent the coefficients corresponding to the sub-
hazard ratios provided in Table 3.18. 
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Table 3.18: Multinomial logistic regression output (with interactions) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
                Event    
Variables 
Failure Failure Re-admit Re-admit Death Death 
age 1.002 1.002 0.984 0.983 1.068*** 1.067*** 
LOS 1.052*** 1.058*** 1.034* 1.039** 1.078*** 1.088*** 
public-only 0.087 0.090* 0.125 0.115 - - 
countc 0.998*  0.999  0.998  
countc x public-only 1.072  1.066  1.006  
vol90c  1.002  0.999  1.008 
vol90c x public-only  1.162  1.156  1.022 
Constant 0.066*** 0.050*** 0.168*** 0.139*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Observations 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 
 Coefficients reflect odds ratios,  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract. 
 
 
Similar conclusions are derived from the results in columns 3-6 of Table 3.18 for the 
different particular failure events of death and readmission when compared to results 
in Tables 3.10 and 3.14.  The public-only variable coefficients are though not 
statistically significant in most of the cases. 
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Appendix C 
Table 3.19: Proportional (azard test based on the Ǯestat phtestǯ command in Stata. 
p value Table 3.7 Table 3.8 Table 3.9 Table 3.10 
Equation 1 0.0567* 0.0524* 0.0174** 0.0814* 
Equation 2 0.0543* 0.0253** 0.0360** 0.0573* 
Equation 3 0.9272 0.9049 0.1387 0.9239 
Equation 4 0.9242 0.6843 0.3506 0.8030 
Equation 5 0.9328 0.9951 0.9928 0.9743 
Equation 6 0.6706 0.8029 0.9905 0.9990 
                      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Modelling Consultant Practice Heterogeneity arising from 
Contract Type within the Context of an Acute General Public 
Hospital 
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Abstract 
 
This paper reviews the behaviour of consultants working in the context of very specific 
incentives and work practices within the Maltese )slandsǯ only public hospital.  It 
focuses on the extent to which the consultantsǯ job plan affects practice variation.  We 
exploit the data available on the investigations carried out at patient level in the 
undertaking of the Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty (PTCA) 
procedure.  These investigations were further subdivided into two categories: those 
performed within the first two days of hospital stay and those performed during the 
remaining hospital stay period.  Practice variation within each of the two categories is 
analysed in this paper.  The analysis found that the job contract type of the consultant 
had a significant effect on practice variation even after controlling for patient casemix.  
Furthermore, the impact on practice variation due to differences in job contract type 
was significantly different when the investigations were compared before and after the 
first two days of hospital stay.   
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4.1 Introduction and Motivation 
Variations in practice patterns have important consequences for the quality and cost of 
health care treatment.  Medical variation is the difference in the use of health care 
services or resources between individuals or groups of patients who share a similar 
health status or medical condition.  In the literature, such variation in practice patterns 
has often been linked to patients not receiving the best possible care or receiving extra 
care, which in turn leads to inappropriate and inefficient use of available resources.  Is 
variation always necessarily bad? Some variation might be expected in a health care 
setting but it is the magnitude of the variation which causes concern.  Wennberg and 
Gittlesohn (1973) have argued that a reduction in variation will lead to improved 
efficiency, have an impact on patient welfare and thus have an impact on health 
outcomes.   
This paper studies the behaviour of consultants working in the context of very specific 
incentives and work practices created within Mater Dei Hospital (MDH), the only 
publically funded general acute hospital on the Islands of Malta.  The consultant is the 
hospital professional who is primarily responsible for the patient care.  Although many 
studies focus on variation between hospitals or between different geographic areas, 
this study will look at variation at the individual consultant level within a single 
hospital.  Work by (Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Harper et al., 2001) and Jacobs et al., (2006) 
shows a preference for comparison between departments rather than whole hospitals 
to ensure that similar specialty activities are analysed.  In this study it will be assumed 
that consultants decide on treatment practices after considering all the conditions and 
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characteristics of the health care system within which they practice.  The importance of the consultant contract job type in explaining practice heterogeneity will be the studyǯs 
primary focus.  
Data from the Maltese health care system is used in this study.  Patients are assigned to consultants, who take on the responsibility for the patientǯs case on the basis of the 
diagnosis made and the date in which they are admitted to hospital.  Patients have no 
choice of the hospital they can attend, although they can decide to Ǯopt outǯ and visit a 
private hospital/clinic1, if they so wish.  
In this paper, practice variation will be measured using the number of investigations 
ordered and performed on a patient who undertook a PTCA proceduce during their 
hospital stay.  PTCA is a procedure used to widen narrowed arteries.  In the procedure 
the cardiologist inserts a catheter with a deflated balloon at its tip into the narrowed 
artery.  The balloon is then inflated, helping to compress the plaque and thus enlarge 
the blood vessel.  Blood could then flow more easily.  In comparison to open heart 
surgery this procedure is less invasive and in general considered to be less expensive.  
The choice of the PTCA procedure for this study was made for a number of reasons. 
PTCA is a relatively standard procedure for patients with fairly similar characteristics. 
This makes it a good candidate for testing for the effect of variation in treatment which 
could be possibly linked to medical practice.  Given that itǯs a fairly standard procedure 
one would expect the treatment to be offered to such patients to be relatively similar. 
                                                        
1 A number of small private clinics and hospitals can be found in Malta. Activity levels in such sectors are 
relatively low and it very much depends on a small private health insurance market.  
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There is in fact a very limited number of ICD-9-CM specific codes which are used to 
define this procedure.  This should make the group easier to manage, thus treating a 
less diverse set of patients limiting heterogeneity in the treatment process across this 
particular procedure.  Furthermore, PTCA is a procedure performed by highly trained 
and specialised doctors whose abilities and good judgement are considered to be of 
importance to the success of the intervention.   
 
The consultant responsible for the admitted patient has direct control over the number 
of investigations carried out at the hospital.  Variation in such decisions could reflect a consultantǯs strategic behaviour due to their type of contract and/or the consultantǯs 
treatment preferences.  The relationship between the specific consultant contract 
conditions and the number of investigations ordered by the consultant will be tested in 
the empirical part of this paper.   
 
This paper will add to the literature by analysing how practice variation differs by 
consultant job contract type in relation to the different time periods during which the 
patient is in hospital.  The available data allow for the number of investigations carried 
out at the hospital to be further subdivided into activity undertaken in the first two days of the patientǯs stay in hospital and that carried out in the remaining time the patient 
spends at the hospital.  These sub-samples of data will be used to identify whether 
differences in the number of investigations within each period vary with different 
consultant job contract types.   
The activity undertaken in the first two days following admission is considered by the 
consultant to be an absolutely necessary part of the procedure that is being performed.  
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Some of the investigations performed in the remaining part of the hospital stay, though 
important for the success of the procedure, might reflect behaviour variation in 
consultant practice.  This paper will test how much of this variation is due to the 
particular job contract type of the consultant.  A two-stage multilevel modelling 
approach will be adopted given that patient level data can be clustered within 
consultant categories.2 This will identify variation arising from patient characteristics 
and/or from consultant related differences.  An Estimated Dependent Variable model 
(EDV) will be used to identify reasons for consultant related variations.  This level of 
analysis ensures that the causes behind such variations are clearly identified, which 
otherwise might not be the case if the analysis is undertaken at an aggregated level. 
The results presented in this paper will show that both the job contract type and the 
volume levels of the consultant significantly affect practice variation.  The existence of 
higher practice variation linked to consultant characteristics in the post two day 
hospital stay period is also verified.  The fact that patients are being seen by consultants 
who can dual practice increases the practice variation especially within the post 2 day 
hospital stay period.  There is a compounding impact of the job plan contract type on 
the relationship between volume and practice variation whereby the responsiveness of 
practice variation to volume changes is positively stronger for consultants working 
exclusively with the public hospital. 
The paper is organized as follows: the following section, Section 4.2, provides an 
overview of the literature relating to consultant behaviour variation within a number 
                                                        
2 A one-stage multilevel model is also estimated to check for the robustness of the results.  
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of institutional settings, identifying the main sources of variation and how these impact 
on consultant behaviour.  Section 4.3 introduces a theoretical model specification which 
will be used to motivate the empirical approach, described in Section 4.4.  Section 4.5 
describes the available population based dataset highlighting some descriptive 
information.  This is followed by a discussion of the key results derived from the 
estimations.  The final section, Section Ͷ.͹, presents the studyǯs conclusions.   
 
4.2  Literature  
 
In this section a review of the literature that relates to the identification of the most 
important factors that influence practice variation is presented.  The modelling of these 
factors within a utility function for the consultant, as reviewed by a number of authors, 
is then critically assessed.  This section closes with an assessment of the expected 
consultant behavioural responses that result from changes in the main determinants of 
utility. 
Determinants of practice variation: The literature on health care practice variation is 
extensive and diverse, and primarily seeks to identify the determinants of care 
variation.  The interaction between the patient and the consultant partly explains 
behaviour but there is also an impact from the joint interaction among consultants, 
patients and the hospital.  The variation in hospital and consultant utilization rates 
across different areas of clinical practice has been widely documented and three key variables are identified as influencing the consultantsǯ strategic behaviour: consultant 
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and patient characteristics, current practices within the organization and 
environmental setting characteristics.   
Grytten and Sorensen (2003) show that practice variation by diagnosis and treatment 
type explains more than 40% of the variation in expenditure on laboratory 
investigations, consultations and expenditure on specific procedures in Norway.  
Variation is said to persist even when age, gender, and socio-economic variables are 
controlled for.  Practice patterns are the result of the training and clinical experience 
gained by consultants and there are a number of consultant practice patterns which 
persist over different clinical scenarios, as highlighted by OǯNeill and Kuder ȋʹͲͲͷȌ.  In 
a paper by Mercuri et al., (2012), practice variations exist even in very small geographic 
areas despite adjustment for casemix and the fact that consultants operate using similar 
resources.  In a number of other studies which deal with variations in practice style 
within particular centres (de Jong et al., 2006; Hayward et al., 1994; Westert et al., 
1993), mixed results are obtained with consultants choosing a patient Length of Stay 
(LOS) which is in line with the Average Length of Stay (ALOS) of the particular hospital 
in which they operate.   
The majority of the literature focuses on patient and consultant behaviour under 
different institutional frameworks.  Early studies in the Ǯ͸Ͳs and Ǯ͹Ͳs linked variation 
to patient context and circumstantial differences (Andersen and Newman, 1973; 
Anderson and Mooney, 1990; Ro, 1969; Wennberg and Gittlesohn, 1973) whereas more 
recent research (Allard et al., 2011; Biglaiser and Ma, 2007; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011; 
O'Neill and Kuder, 2005) has associated variation to the differences in behavioural and 
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distributional factors related to remuneration systems and workload levels for 
consultants rather than differences related to patient related illness.  The consultant 
treatment and referral decisions serve to influence the patientǯs expected utility and the 
prevalence of treatment variation leads most scholars to conclude that uncertainty is 
the main factor leading to variation from what constitutes the optimal treatment 
process.   
The consultant is an agent of an uninformed patient and Wennberg (1985) claims that 
uncertainty is the most important factor influencing physician behaviour.  This 
uncertainty could be related to the initial health status or unknown patient preferences, 
described by Pauly (1980) as irreducible uncertainty, or even the absence of 
information on the consequences of health care treatment that is shared equally by the 
doctor and the patient.  The unexplained residual variance in the function used to 
explain practice differences would serve as a proxy for the uncertainty attributed to 
physician practice style.  However, practice style maybe just one of all possible 
divergences and thus one cannot attribute all variation to this factor.   
Indeed, consultants are assumed to not only consider their own welfare but to balance 
their own gained welfare against the welfare of their patients in their decision making.  
Ellis and McGuire (1986) build a model on the premise that benefits to the patient and 
to the hospital are the main arguments in the utility function of the consultant.  The role 
of ethics in the treatment of patients is given priority by Evans (1974) whilst financial 
returns are considered as the main variable influencing consultant behaviour by Pauly 
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and Redish (1973) and Pauly (1980).  The concern for the social good as a determinant 
of utility gained by a consultant is also considered by Eisenberg (2002).    
A consultantǯs instructions and advice are an institutional reality in the health care 
sector and Farley (1986) concludes that the pattern of medical treatment is largely 
determined by consultants and not by the result of marginal choices made by patients.  
Eisenberg (2002) finds that around 90% of the health care expenditure is a direct result 
of consultant decisions in the choice of clinical practice.  Although this does not prevent 
patients from being involved in the decision making process, in most cases it means that 
the course of treatment is not controlled by the patient even though it is the patient who 
decides when to seek and start treatment.  This puts consultants in a position where 
they can actually allocate resources.  Indeed, consultants adopt their own individual 
strategies in their endeavour to maximize their own utility function against a number 
of constraints.    
Particularly in view of the given size of the market, it is likely that the consultant 
undertaking the procedure in question holds information on other consultants offering 
the same or similar services.  Competition among experts serves to limit the potential 
exploitation of the consumer (Winand, 1997; Wolinsky, 1994)  and as noted by Pauly 
and Satterthwaite (1981), the amount of information which patients have of the 
practice of the consultants in relation to the number of consultants available in the 
market also affects consultant decisions.  It is likely that in cases where there are only 
a few consultants operating in a particular field, each of the consultants would have a 
reputation which is well known within the community and most patients would also be 
154 
 
well informed about such consultant characteristics.  Consultants expect to be judged 
by their patients on the basis of the benefit or gain they expect to receive from 
treatment.    
Modelling of consultant behaviour:  Consultants have different beliefs, work within 
different hospital environments and job contract conditions and consider their own 
income streams in their decision making.  Nevertheless, they are all expected to take 
into account the benefit to the patient in their decision making.  Consultant behaviour 
has over the years mainly been modelled on income, leisure and inducement, whereby 
income and leisure are expected to positively impact utility whilst inducement is 
expected to impact it negatively (Pauly and Redisch, 1973; Evans, 1974; Pauly, 1980; 
Wilensky and Rossiter, 1983; Ellis and McGuire, 1986; McGuire and Pauly, 1991; 
Blomqvist and Leger, 2005; Gruber and Owings, 1996; Grytten and Sorensen, 2003; 
Rickman and McGuire, 1999)).  De Jaegher and Jegers (2000) add to this that the 
number of patients in the clientele of the consultant should be considered as part of the 
utility function of the consultant. 
Papers by Evans (1974) and Fuchs (1978) model consultant behaviour by maximizing 
a utility function which includes income and inducement as arguments of interest.  
McGuire and Pauly (1991) model consultant behaviour by adding leisure to the utility 
function.  Target income behaviour and profit maximization lie at opposite ends of a 
spectrum of income effects.  Evans (1974) defines inducement as the ǲpersuasive 
activity of the consultant to shift the patientǯs demand curve according to the 
consultants self-interestǳ.  
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Indeed, inducement could be a source of additional income to the consultant.  However, 
because of ethical considerations, this is assumed in most work to negatively affect 
overall consultant utility.  In this context inducement means a loss in utility and 
consultants balance the marginal utility of income against the disutility of exploiting 
patients to obtain it (Evans, 1974; Pauly, 1980; Wilensky and Rossiter, 1983).  There is 
a moral cost of providing inappropriate medical treatment and there is an expected cost 
due to peer review, loss of reputation and loss of future patients.  According to Dranove 
(1988), there are decreasing returns to consultant inducement because patients can 
begin to disbelieve their consultant and decide to shift to  another consultant.   
On the determinants of doctor’s behaviour and dual practice: It is of interest to evaluate 
the response of consultant behaviour to changes in the factors which affect utility.  The 
behaviour of the consultant (to hospitalize, to treat or to take time to diagnose 
carefully) is influenced by both the financial and non-financial incentives of the job.  Do 
consultants actually seek to achieve some level of target income?  If consultants are 
employed on a fee per patient system then greater competition will make consultants further exploit the Ǯinformation advantageǯ i.e. their knowledge and information they 
have to hand, to see more patients (Feldman and Sloan, 1989; Rice and Labelle, 1989).  
On the other hand, if consultant income is independent of output, there is no incentive 
to induce activity within the same public hospital.  Some level of inducement to the 
private sector may still be evident although difficult to measure.  Indeed, one needs to 
distinguish between volume (first visit) inducement and intensity response 
inducement.  Wennberg et al., (1982) assumes that practice style affects only intensity 
demand, a finding confirmed by the work of Mitchell and Sass (1995) and Mitchell et 
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al., (2000), whereby supplier inducement effects were found for the provision of 
laboratory investigations and ancillary services.    
Consultants on a fixed salary are expected to offer the most comprehensive treatment 
option to their patients by engaging in the provision of a complete set of possible 
investigations together with the basic necessary procedures.  This is in contrast to 
providing only a minimum number of investigations over and above the basic necessary 
procedures.  The provision of the most comprehensive treatment serves to enhance the consultantǯs image and reputation as highlighted by Gonzalez (2004) apart from the 
fear of dealing with a malpractice lawsuit, as identified by Gal-Or (1999).  It is common 
in some hospital settings that health care authorities set out treatment guidelines to 
support the diagnosis of patients so as to ensure a streamlined level of service.  Carlsen 
et al., (2003) finds some contradicting evidence, whereby the effect of payment 
schemes on the number of consultations and the number of ordered laboratory 
investigations is not found to be as strong.   
Consultant behaviour is also expected to be influenced by the particular and specific 
conditions of work that defines the relationship between the consultants and the 
provider of health care services.  In the literature there are mainly two distinguishable 
substitution effects that affect the labour supply of doctors: one is between labour and 
leisure and the other between public and private sector health care practices.  Of 
particular relevance to this study is the latter given that the majority of consultants 
working at the public hospital have dual practice contracts.  This particular contract 
type, dual practice, means that the consultant, apart from being an agent of the patient 
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and the public hospital, has also to consider his own return from private practice in 
decisions to maximize his utility.   
A number of papers have dealt with consultantsǯ response to the form of consultant job 
contract type (Blomqvist, 1991; Ellis and McGuire, 1990; Ellis and McGuire, 1986).  In 
their review of the dual practice literature, Socha and Bech (2011) did not find 
conclusive evidence as to the effect of dual practice on public health care although the 
negative effects seem to be apparent.  In fact, dual practice consultants are expected to 
have good income opportunities within the private sector and might decide to 
concentrate more of their efforts in their private sector activity with negative 
implications on availability, costs and quality for the public health care sector.   
 
Patients treated at the public hospital are assigned to consultants who are either 
engaged by the hospital on a public-only contract or on a dual practice contract.  The 
consultant is the key decision maker who selects the level of services provided to a 
patient.  The income earned by the consultant from the public hospital is independent 
of the number of cases seen or the number of investigations ordered. However, 
consultants who dual practice are also interested in their future private income stream 
and this is expected to be affected by their overall success and reputation gained from 
the activity undertaken at the public hospital.  Gonzalez (2004) concludes that when 
allowing dual practice,  consultants use the public sector to improve their reputation 
and thus earn more revenue from their private practice. 
. 
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The prevalence of dual practice contracts may indeed present a puzzle as it is at odds 
with basic labour supply theories which predict that individuals normally prefer to 
work for longer hours in their higher paid job instead to undertaking multiple jobs 
(Lang 1994).  Indeed, theories of incentive design predict that employers seek to ensure 
that their workers do not divert their attention to other tasks or jobs (Holmstom 1999).  
There must be some form of complementarity in allowing dual practice in terms of 
benefits for the consultants and the government/hospital alike.  A number of models of 
dual practice reviewed by Eggleston (2006) conclude that this depends on the ability of 
the government to monitor activity within the hospital whereby the potential social 
costs of dual practice have to be set against the costs of enforcing stricter restrictions. 
 
The possibility of dual practice gives a kind of performance based incentive to 
consultants to increase their effort levels.  When allowing private practice the 
government is giving out a salary together with a non-wage Ǯbenefitǯ to the consultants. 
This ensures that the government recruits good quality doctors at relatively modest 
rates.  The possibility of private practice is seen by consultants as an opportunity to 
increase strategic influence, clinical autonomy and the realisation of individual 
aspirations as a clinician.  Higher skilled consultants potentially anticipate higher 
earnings from private practice and thus the possibility of dual practice for high skilled 
consultants is more valued if the individual thinks that he is in a better position to have 
a lucrative private clinic clientele.  As consultant skill increases the marginal benefit of 
private practice is expected to  increase. 
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The temptation to earn private profits also serves to attract the best consultants to the 
public hospital, thus enhancing the quality of the public service.  Gonzalez (2004), finds 
that there is an incentive for dual practice doctors to enhance their reputations by practising Ǯover provisionǯ of health care services to earn a good reputation and thus 
support their private practice.  The consultants private practice could indeed be using 
public facilities to treat private pay patients (Gruen 2002, Ferrinho 2004).  
Furthermore, results of tests carried out at the public hospital could be discussed at the 
private clinic (Mitchell JM 1995 and MsGuire 2002).  Such a practice is not without its 
drawbacks as consultants could practice skimping during their work hours in the public 
hospital.  Physicians using public resources to treat their private clients would clearly 
undermine the efficiency of the overall public health care service apart from gaining 
from a cost advantage over those who only practice privately.  
 
Bir and Eggleston (2003) consider access enhancement whereby public providers 
practicing dual practice make use of the public services to treat their private patients.  
Furthermore, in the context of free public care provision and the availability of private 
care, Brekke and Sorgard (2007) conclude that allowing dual practice would lead to the 
use of the public health services by those who would have otherwise purchased care 
from the private sector.  This has the effect of crowding out private financing and creates 
a burden on society as a result of the additional taxation which will be needed to finance 
the increase in public expenditure.  Moonlighting by consultants might though lead to a 
more efficient health care service within the public sector, as savings made as a result 
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of patients deciding to use private treatment, could be used to improve the quality of 
the public health care (Biglaiser and Ma, 2007). 
Bloor et al., (2004) looked at the variation in activity rates of consultant surgeons 
working in the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK.  Consultants with freedom to 
carry out private practice had high NHS activity rates compared to those hired on a full-
time contract.  Furthermore, if private sector activity is reduced this would not 
necessarily increase NHS activity and this could become a possible barrier to increasing 
productivity within the NHS.  Consultants only involved in public health care provision 
are assumed by Socha (2010) to be more mission oriented and thus better represent 
the interests of the public.  Gonzalez (2005) concludes that dual practitioners are 
usually assumed to try to maximize income which favours longer waiting times in order 
to boost their private practice income through cream skimming.  The reputation of such 
consultants in the public hospital is also at stake and such consultants are inclined to 
provide the best service at the public hospital to improve their reputation. 
The current literature acknowledges that the availability of patient level data allows the 
partitioning of practice variation into that which arises from individual factors and that 
which is attributable to providers within which such individuals are clustered.  The 
methods adopted in the treatment of hierarchical structured data vary in relation to the 
aims of the study and the limitations imposed by the available data sources.  The use of 
a single level model which ignores the natural clustering of the data structure assumes 
that units are independent.  This approach ignores that the patient clustering imposes 
some correlation structure on the data and this invalidates classical OLS assumptions 
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leading to inefficient estimates.  Moreover, a single level approach to the analysis of 
such hierarchically structured data will fail to exploit the full richness of the 
information contained within and between the various levels of data.  However, the 
particular sample size considerations of this dataset might suggest that there could be potential gains of Ǯborrowing strengthǯ across groups and thus seek to increase 
efficiency for the obtained estimates through the use of a single level model. 
 
Another approach suggested by Rice and Leyland (1996) is to undertake an aggregate 
level analysis by using group level mean values.  Amongst the drawback with this 
method are the problems envisaged by the so called ecological fallacy3 and the fact that 
statistical estimates can be unreliable resulting in large standard errors (often due to 
the high collinearity between explanatory variables).  It is also of concern that the 
aggregation of variables tends to provide unreliable estimates when the number of 
individuals within the higher level groups are small as inference would be based on 
small samples.  This is a cause of concern in view of the sample properties of the dataset 
used in this study.  Olsen and Street (2008) recommend the use of panel data estimators 
within a multilevel modelling framework given that the number of consultants is too 
small to apply models at the consultant level with averaged patient data.   
 
Multilevel models address the estimation problems that arise from the correlation 
structure of clustered data, attributing variability in the dependent variable to the 
specific hierarchical levels of the model.  The application of multilevel modelling 
                                                        
3 Ecological fallacy refers to the case where aggregate level associations are wrongly inferred to exist at 
the individual level.  
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techniques in the field of health economics has become more common following the 
work of (Rice and Jones, 1997; Rice and Leyland, 1996).  Individual patients (micro 
units) can be clustered within particular groups (macro units) on the basis of the 
common characteristics which they possess.  Individuals under the control of a 
particular consultant are expected to receive similar treatment compared to patients 
with similar conditions but under the responsibility of different consultants.  
The use of the multilevel modelling technique allows the researcher to investigate the 
nature of the between group variability and the effects of group level characteristics on 
individual outcomes thus capturing more information from the hierarchically clustered 
available data (Hvenegaard et al 2009). Various types of estimators have been 
suggested in the literature to estimate the consultant effect parameter4 with the 
random or fixed component effects commonly used to obtain the consultant effect.  The 
choice of whether a random effects or a fixed effect component model is to be used 
requires careful consideration and the choice of method may be determined by the data 
generating process and also the type of inference sought.  In this regard, the fixed effects 
model allows for the separation of the effect of patient characteristics from consultant 
characteristics which could be correlated with patient characteristics (Cookson and 
Laudicella 2011). 
 
                                                        
4 Schmidt and Sickles (1984) propose the use of a fixed effects model, Kumbhakar and Lovell, (2000) 
propose the use of a random effects model estimated by GLS, Pitt and Lee, (1981) propose the use of a 
random effects model estimated by Maximum Likelihood. The pros and cons of each of these model 
specifications are summarized in a table provided by Jacobs et al., (2006) pp. 74. 
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Laudicella et al., (2010) find that the health care resource group of the patient captures 
much of the variation in the costs of treatment in the NHS, however, other factors are 
also important in explaining such differences.  In fact, more information could therefore 
be obtained from the available patient level data if the hierarchically clustered data is 
taken into account.   
 
4.3 Theoretical model 
 
In order to motivate our empirical question of whether there is variation in practice at 
a consultant level due to contract variation, we model a basic utility maximization 
problem of a consultant providing services within the unique public hospital.  The 
consultant is employed in the public sector and can practice some form of dual practice 
i.e. working a number of hours per week working in the private sector.  Consultants 
operate under a contract, C, that can be a full time contract with the public hospital or 
part time, which allows them to practise in the private sector.  The consultant has a 
number of decision variables under his control, primarily the number of investigations, 
T, that are ordered to be performed at the hospital, and the level of effort the consultant 
devotes to the health care system, e.   
As the consultantǯs private sector activity cannot be observed, the focus of the study 
will be on consultant behaviour within the public sector.  The consultant obtains utility, 
U(), from his income, Y, where UY>0, and a reputation gained from his rate of success in 
the provision of health care services, S, where US>0. His income is contingent on the 
type of contract he has, C.  Success, S, is dependent positively on the number of 
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investigations, T, the consultantǯs experience measured as volume of patients treated, 
V, patient casemix characteristics, M, and the effort exerted, e.  Finally, effort, e(), creates 
disutility, Ue<0 and depends positively on volume, eV>0, the consultant type of contract, 
C and on patient casemix characteristics, M.  Thus, a function of utility can be expressed 
as:  
                                  ܷ = ܷሺ�ሺ�ሻ, ܵሺܶ, ܸ, �, �ሻ, �ሺܸ, C, �ሻሻ    
The constraint the consultant faces is the number of hours/activity he can work in each 
sector and the amount of leisure time he desires.  The type of contract chosen by the 
consultant significantly affects the number of hours available to treat patients within 
the private sector.  Thus, the consultant chooses an optimal number of investigations 
T* and e* in the public sector that maximizes his utility subject to his time and income 
constraints, ie., those solving the problem  
����.� ܷ(�ሺ�ሻ, ܵሺܶ, ܸ, �, �ሻ, �ሺܸ, �, �ሻ)    , subject to time and income constraints 
which also depend on the type of contract, C.    
The First Order Conditions, (FOC), of this maximization problem5 implicitly define 
reduced forms for how the optimal number of investigations, T*, and the effort level, e*, 
depend on the exogenous variables, i.e. C,V,M.  
                                                        
5 i.e., 0
 T
SU
dT
dU
s   and 0.   eUeSUdedU s  , where the signs below each expression indicate 
the sign of the marginal utility terms.                         
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As we do not observe effort e , the empirical section associated with this study will concentrate on estimating the reduced form of the consultantǯs number of 
investigations, T*, which depends on C and V, given the consultant and patient 
characteristics.  This also takes into account the particular characteristics of the Maltese 
health care setting whereby the number of investigations ordered by the consultant, T* 
is expected to be the prime variable available to the consultant to impose his sytle of 
treatment onto the patient.  To illustrate this we will use data on patients who have 
received PTCA treatment within the public hospital.  The focus will be the number of 
investigations ordered by the consultants and administered during the patientsǯ stay in 
hospital. 
 
4.4 Empirical approach  
 
This section describes the empirical approach used to investigate consultant practice 
variation by using the number of investigations performed at patient level.  This involves looking at the importance of consultantsǯ contract type as the prime 
determinant to explain practice variation.  The clustering of patients under different 
consultants imposes a correlation structure on the data, reflecting the shared 
experiences of being treated by the same consultant.  Two randomly selected 
individuals treated by the same consultant would be expected to receive more similar 
treatment than two individuals being treated by different consultants.  The variation in 
treatment between consultants could also depend on the fact that consultants also treat 
a different mix of patients.   
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The possibility of using patient level data ensures that more detailed information rather 
than just DRG related data could be used to obtain information on the patient 
(Hvenegaard et al., 2009).  The use of the available administrative (not sample) patient 
level data helps to deal with differences in patient characteristics whilst offering 
analytical advantages in terms of analysis of consultant characteristics affecting 
practice variation.  Inference about the variables of interest will be more robust if based 
on individual rather than aggregated data as standard errors will be more precisely 
estimated (Rice and Leyland 1996).   
Given an individual based dataset, a two stage model is used to reflect the literature on 
the use of Estimated Dependent Variable (EDV) models in applied political studies, as 
presented by (Karen and Shively, 2005; Laudicella et al., 2010; Lewis and Linzer, 2005) 
as well as a number of studies relating to pupil achievement within the education 
system6, as reviewed by Rice and Leyland (1996).  
A first stage regression of the number of investigations will be undertaken at patient 
level against a number of patient characteristics which are likely to explain and 
determine the number of investigations for the patient: 
                  ijjijxij xy                                (1st stage regression) 
where yij, is the number of investigations carried out for patient i as ordered by 
consultant j and this is the variable of interest used to measure variation in practice 
style.  The vector of patient characteristics, xij, comprises the patientǯs age and a 
                                                        
6 Karen and Shively (2005)  and Lewis and Linzer (2005) discuss the use of EDV models within a two-
stage approach providing consistent and efficient estimates.  
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measure of severity represented by the Charlson Comorbidity Index.  The term µj is a 
consultant time-invariant fixed effect7 that captures unobserved heterogeneity across 
consultants over and above that described by the explanatory variables in the 
regression.  This term provides each consultantǯs average contribution to the number 
of investigations per case after controlling for the explanatory factors which also affect 
the number of investigations undertaken.   
The proportion of variance attributed to the consultant can be judged as an indicator of 
the degree of influence of the consultant on the number of investigations 
recommended.  A second stage regression will deal with factors which explain such 
variation: 
           jjjj vC  321^        (2nd stage regression) 
where j
^  represents the consultant fixed effects estimated from the first stage 
regression, χj is a vector of variables capturing particular consultant characteristics, 
apart from the job contract type of the consultant, Cj, which is reviewed separately in 
this study.  A number of different measures of consultant volume levels constitute the 
vector χj .  Of primary interest to this study is the relevance of the consultant job contract 
type, Cj, to explain variations in j
^ .  The use of the Efron robust standard error is 
implemented to deal with the heteroscedastic sampling errors of the estimated 
dependent variable which might result in biased standard errors for the second stage 
                                                        
7 The purpose of the estimation process is to generate inferences about individual consultants.  The table 
provided by Jacobs et al., (2006) provides a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different model specifications.  
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regression.  The use of Efron heteroscedastic standard errors applied in this study are 
said to yield consistent standard error estimates even in small samples (Lewis and 
Linzer 2005)8, even though the OLS estimator may be inefficient. 
The approach described above makes use of the multi-level structure of the available 
data to analyze data grouped into hierarchical macro units (consultants), with a 
number of micro units (patients) within each, to obtain the consultant fixed effects.  The 
subscript j introduces an important characteristic to the regression as it allows the 
intercept and coefficients to vary across consultants to ensure that independently 
distributed consultant fixed effects are obtained (Laudicella et al., 2010).  The two stage 
model has the advantage of allowing for the partition of the overall variation into that 
due to differences in patients and that arising from differences in the consultant 
propensity to prescribe investigations or tests.  In this instance, higher level effects are 
not viewed as nuisance parameters but are of central importance to the analysis.  This 
would lead to a better exploration of the relationship between individuals and the 
contexts in which they belong.  Another advantage of the two-stage model is that it 
parallels closely the data generation process, which consists of aggregating patient data 
into consultant clusters. 
Two assumptions are important to note with regards to the data used in the model.  
Separability is assumed between the variables of interest to ensure that the influence 
of patient characteristics can be singled out and removed from the influence of 
                                                        
8 Efron standard errors are based on the Jacknife technique of Efron (1982) and are typically more 
accurate than the White standard errors (McKinsie and White 1985) in samples smaller than 250 
observations (Long and Ervin 2000). Lewis and Linzer (2005) recommend the use of the Efron residuals 
in their tested scenarios undertaken using a small sample (n=30). 
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consultant characteristics on the number of investigations per case.  Furthermore, it is 
assumed that consultants share the same number of investigations function.  This 
assumption can be used to describe how variables at the consultant level influence the 
consultant decisions with regards to the number of investigations and thus provide 
information on the factors which determine the variation in the average number of 
investigations j
^  across different consultants.   
The use of the two-stage model is in this paper evaluated against the use of a one-stage 
multilevel model9 which includes group level predictors as explanatory variables.  
Jusko and Shively (2005) show that in general there are potential efficiency gains from 
estimating both the bottom and top level parameters in a single stage model.  Lewis and 
Linzer (2005) state that this especially holds when the amount of information available 
to estimate the bottom level effects in each top level group is small. 
Any efficiency gains from running a single stage model would have to be evaluated 
against the possible loss in the efficiency of parameter estimates within the two stage 
model.  It could well be that the extra effort to fit the more complex single stage 
hierarchical model would provide less of benefit in comparison to the simple two stage 
Estimated Dependent Variable (EDV) model.  The two–step strategy is seen by Jusko 
and Shively (2005) as a go between those who are concerned with the fact that the 
complexities of the individual (patient) cases must be taken care of together with the 
need to draw broad comparisons across consultants.  
                                                        
9
 
ijjjzijxij zxy    whereby Ǯyij Ǯ is the dependant variable,  ǮxijǮ is the explanatory variable at the patient level,  Ǯzjǯ is the explanatory variable at the consultant level, Ǯµjǯ is the residual fixed 
parameter at the consultant level and Ǯϵijǯ is the residual parameter at the patient level.  
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One can raise questions about the accuracy of the estimates and the associated standard 
errors given the relatively small sample sizes usually encountered in such studies.  Of 
particular concern to the data described above is what constitutes a sufficient sample 
size for accurate estimation and evaluation purposes.  Issues related to sample size 
within a multilevel regression model have been given particular attention in the 
literature10.  
 
Although the results in the literature are not completely in agreement with each other, 
they all seem to conclude that in general, the estimates from regression coefficients 
(OLS) are generally unbiased although less efficient because of the generally larger 
sampling variance.  A large number of groups appears to be more important than a large 
number of individuals per group.  As to the variances, estimates of the lowest level 
variances are generally accurate but the group level variances are sometimes 
underestimated. Busing (1993) and Van der Leeden and Busing (1994) suggest a 
sample size of 100 to achieve accurate group level variances. 
 
Kreft (1996) suggests a rule of thumb, the 30/30 rule, whereby a sample of at least 30 
groups with at least 30 individuals per group is recommended.  Within the context of a 
one stage multilevel model this advice seems to be sound if the interest is in the fixed 
parameters.  If the interest is in the random part, i.e. the variance and covariance 
components and their standard errors, the number of groups should be considerable 
higher.  This advice is also repeated in other more recent work by (Bell et al., 2010) 
                                                        
10 Mass and Hox (2004, 2005), Snijders (2005), Bell et al., (2010),  Hox (2010),  Snijders and Bosker 
(2012). 
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which bases such conclusion on the work of Hox (1998), Maas and Hox (2002 and  
2004).  Hox (1998) also recommends that at least 20 observations at level 1 and 50 
groups at level 2 are necessary when examining interactions across levels.  Similar 
conclusions are given by Maas and Hox (2004) whereby if one is only interested in the 
fixed effects of the model, then even ten groups can lead to good estimates. 
 
The question of what constitutes a sufficient sample size for accurate estimation will 
remain.  Increasing the size of the number of groups is usually difficult in practice due 
to cost related issues and due to the fact that for some studies this is impossible given 
that all the groups possible are already incorporated within the database.  The size of 
the sample within this study is constrained by the fact that this study, which focuses on 
the particular PTCA activity undertaken within the hospital already includes all the 
existing consultants within the hospital.  Given that the objective of the paper is to study 
the behaviour of consultants in Malta, the size of the hospital automatically leads to a 
restriction on the possible size of the sample.  Although one would ideally adhere to 
these sample size guidelines, the nature of the research in question makes these sample 
size suggestions difficult to achieve.  Olsen and Street (2008) show that the comparison 
of organisations, when the number of organisations is small, is possible and better 
inference could be made if patient level data is used.  There is indeed an element of 
compromise which needs to be achieved between the accuracy of the estimates and the 
possible use of such estimates for policy recommendation purposes. 
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4.5 Data and variables  
The data used in this study come from the Clinical Performance Unit (CPU) within the 
principal hospital of Malta.  The database used is an administratively provided data set 
of all the PTCA activity undertaken at the public hospital.  The unit of analysis is the 
patient and the analysis is performed for patients who entered hospital and underwent 
a PTCA procedure between 2009 and 2011.  The following ICD-9-CM procedure codes 
were considered in this study: 0066, 3601, 3602, 3604, 3606, 3609, 0045, 0046, 0047 
and 8856.  Table 4.1 provides the main descriptive statistics for the variables under 
consideration.   
Table 4.1: Definitions and sample statistics of the main variables 
Variable  Definition Mean Std.dev. 
inv  Number of investigations  for patient i  35.3 32.1 
invf2d  Investigation in first 2 days at the hospital  23.1 14.1 
inva2d  Investigation after first 2 days at the hospital  16.8 26.7 
countconst  Consultant total number of cases  299 176 
countc  A cumulative count of cases under the 
responsibility of a consultant up until  date of 
patient admission 
150.4 133.7 
vol90c  Consultant cumulative cases over the  
90 days prior to the patient admission date   
26.1 17.4 
age  Age of patient  62.7 10.5 
diagtotal Number of diagnoses per case 1.12 0.94 
CharlsonI  Charlson Comorbidity Index    
public-only  =1 for exclusive public sector practice contracts  
=0 for public and private practice contracts or dual 
practice 
  
cvol  = 1 if countconst > 100 cases (high volume)  
= 0 if countconst < 100 cases (low volume)    
  
Source: Based on data drawn from the provided hospital episode database. 
 
The dataset identifies the consultant for each PTCA patient and contains a total of 1,626 
hospital visits.  The dataset provides information at patient level for age, together with 
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a number of consultant characteristics used to identify the main covariates of the study.  
Data are also available at a patient level for the number of diagnoses per case, diagtotal, 
the number of investigations11 carried out at a patient level, inv, and the date when each 
of the investigations was undertaken.  This gives the ability to distinguish between 
those investigations undertaken in the first two days of hospital admission, invf2d, and those investigations carried out during the rest of the patientsǯ hospital stay, inva2d.   
These patients are clustered into 35 different consultants, four of which have a public-
only type of contract compared to the rest who can dual practice.  Consultants choose 
between two work plan options, public-only, whereby consultants cannot undertake 
any private practice and dual practice whereby consultants can practice in both the 
private and the public sector.  Data on the job plan contract type of all the consultants 
undertaking PTCA activity is provided for this study. 
All consultants carrying out the PTCA treatment at the public hospital are included in 
the dataset and thus the complete population of the PTCA activity undertaken at the 
hospital is considered.  The analysis of the number of investigations ordered and 
carried out at the hospital on a patient level shows that there is considerable variation 
among patients in the number of investigations ordered by consultant with the average 
being 35 but with a large standard deviation of 32.   
                                                        
11 Table 4.13 in Appendix B of this chapter identifies the main investigations/tests carried out for PTCA 
patients.  Data on the resources allocated to each of the investigations was not made available for this 
study and thus no particular weighting structure was applied to the different investigations carried out 
for the patients undertaking a PTCA. 
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Based on advice provided by hospital practitioners, the investigations that take place within the first two days of a patientǯs hospital stay are considered as absolutely 
necessary and variation between consultants in the ordering of such investigations is 
not expected to be large.  On the other hand, investigations carried out during the rest of the patientǯs hospital visit, though important for the success of the procedure, might 
reflect an element of consultant practice behaviour.  The average number of 
investigations within the first two days of hospital stay is of 23 with a standard 
deviation of 14.1.  The average number of investigations within the post 2 day hospital 
stay is of 17 with a standard deviation of 26.7.  The variation noted in the number of 
ordered investigations within the post 2 day period is relatively higher.  
The number of investigations ordered by the consultant is also expected to be 
dependent on volume levels and a number of volume measures were constructed to 
test the robustness of this relationship.  The four volume measures applied in the study 
are defined in Table 4.1.  An analysis of the available data shows that there are no 
consultants on public-only contracts with high volume levels, cvol=1, whilst consultants 
on dual practice contracts fall both within the high and the low volume categories.  
There are 4 consultants with high volume levels.  The average age of patients 
undertaking this procedure is around 63 years and the majority of patients treated are 
males (77% males and 23% females).  The ALOS of patients admitted for this procedure 
is 4.5 days.  Most of the cases treated have just one diagnosis which reflects the fact that 
patients treated are clear identifiable cases which are in need of a PTCA intervention.  
The Charlson Comorbidity Index, referred to as Charlsonl is used as a measure of 
severity of patient illness.  The concentration of volume within a few number of 
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consultants is expected given the Ǯsmallǯ nature of the Maltese hospital setting and the 
particular procedure under study. The procedure under study (PTCA) is a relatively 
complex intervention which requires a considerable degree of skill by the doctor.   
 
The consultant responsible for the patient has direct control over the number of 
investigations performed for the admitted patient and differences in this variable are 
an indication of the behaviour of the consultant on how to best treat the patient.  
Physicians are not constrained by the hospital in their treatment recommendations and will consistently apply their Ǯrulesǯ of practice when treating similar patients 
(Weinstein 2004).  Information on the variation in individual physician behaviour is 
thus approximated by using the variation in the number of investigations ordered by 
the consultants.  The number of investigations ordered is thus one of the few channels 
available for the consultant whereby his treatment style could be imposed on the 
overall process of treatment undertaken by the patient.  This could help explain some 
element of practice variation once the differences in patient characteristics are 
controlled for.   
 
Patients admitted for the PTCA procedure remain under the care of the same consultant 
throughout their entire hospital visit which ensures that treatment can be attributed to 
just one consultant.  It is important to note that all investigations considered in this 
study are undertaken at the public hospital.  It has not been possible to differentiate 
between investigations undertaken in the public sector but which could have instead 
been carried out in the private sector once the patient is discharged from hospital. 
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Table 4.2 shows data for the mean number of diagnosis per patient, the Charlson 
Comorbidity Index, the total mean number of investigations performed and the 
investigations performed in the pre- and post- 2 day hospital stay period.  The mean 
LOS for the different category type of patients is also provided.  Table 4.2 also shows 
variations for patients who are under the care of consultants with varying job contracts  
and volume characteristics.   
 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for variables of interest by consultant job plan  
Source: Analysis of the hospital episode database. 
 *All consultants falling under the public-only category have low volume levels. 
 
Patients being seen by consultants on public-only contracts (row 2) compared to those 
on dual practice contracts (row 3) tend on average, to have a higher number of 
diagnoses and a higher overall average LOS.  The overall number of investigations 
ordered for such patients tends on average, to be lower.  It is particularly interesting to 
note that whilst there is minimal difference in the number of investigations performed 
within the first two days of admittance (22.01 compared to 23.14) between patients 
Row  Mean no 
of 
diagnosis 
Charlson 
Index 
Mean no of 
investigations 
(total stay) 
Mean 
LOS 
invf2d inva2d  
1 All patients 1.12     0.407 35.3 4.5 23.07 16.82 
2 public-only  & 
low volume*  
1.21     0.402 32.8 5.78 22.01 14.08 
3 dual practice-
All  
1.11     0.407 35.4 4.43 23.14 17.02 
4 dual practice & 
high volume  
1.07     0.408 36.2 3.86 24.33 16.32 
5 dual practice &  
low volume  
1.34     0.404 32.7 7.34 19.0 19.59 
6 low volume-All 1.31     0.403 32.8 6.98 19.73 18.18 
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seen by consultants on different job plans, this difference widens when the number of 
investigations performed at the hospital in the period post the first two days of 
admittance is considered (14.08 compared to 17.02).   
Consultants on dual practice contracts who have a high volume of patients, as defined 
by cvol (row 4) tend to order more investigations on average and their patients spend 
fewer days in hospital compared to patients seen by low volume consultants also on 
dual practice contracts (row 5).  Furthermore, patients under the care of consultants on 
dual practice contracts and with high volume (row 4) have, on average, the highest 
mean number of investigations for all categories.  The consultant contract type tends to 
influence the time period when investigations are performed (rows 5 against row 2), 
where more investigations, on average, take place in the first two days following 
hospital admittance for patients under the care of public-only contract consultants.  
Patients under the care of consultants with low patient volume levels but who have the 
possibility of undertaking private practice, have more investigations performed 
towards the end of their hospital stay.   
Figure 4-1 shows the variation in the number of total investigations carried out during 
the full hospital stay for patients grouped by consultant and also the variation by job 
contract type.  Figures 4-2 and 4-3 separate the investigations into those carried out 
prior and post the 2 day hospital stay mark, showing also the variation by job contract 
type in each case.   
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Figure 4-1: Variation in number of total investigations by consultant (left) and by 
consultant job plan contract type (right)   
. 
Figure 4-2: Variation in number of investigations for all consultants (left) and by 
consultant job plan type (right) for the first 2 days of hospital stay   
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Figure 4-3: Variation in number of investigations for all by consultants (left) and by 
consultant job plan type (right) after the first 2 days of hospital stay   
 
Variation is present in all the representations although as expected the variation in the 
number of investigations per patient in the post 2 day hospital admission period is 
greater.  Indeed, part of this variation might be explained by the behavioural 
characteristics of the consultants themselves particularly the job contract type of the 
consultant.  There is an indication of a greater degree of variation in the number of 
investigations for patients seen by consultants on dual practice contracts.   
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4.6 Results and Discussion 
 
The initial set of results in this section present the 1st stage regression used to obtain 
estimates of the consultant fixed effects.  The 2nd stage regression results are then 
estimated; first considering all the investigations carried out during the patient stay at 
the hospital and then re-estimated to check the robustness of the results when different 
investigation period dates are considered.  The compounding effect of the consultant 
job plan on the relationship between volume and practice variation is estimated 
considering all investigations that took place over the full hospital stay period and then 
re-estimated to incorporate the different dates when the investigations were 
performed.12  The resulting marginal effects on practice variation arising from changes 
in volume for different job plan contract conditions are also presented.  
 
4.6.1 First stage regression  
 
Table 4.3 shows the 1st stage regression results for three different investigation period 
dates: all cases taken together, inv; those performed within the first two days, invf2d; 
and those performed after the first 2 days, inva2d.    
 
 
 
                                                        
12 The results of the estimated one-stage multilevel model used to check for the robustness of the results 
obtained from the two-stage estimation method are included in Appendix C of this chapter.  
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Table 4.3: First stage regression results  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable inv invf2d inva2d 
age 0.186** -0.099*** 0.385*** 
CharlsonI 17.870*** 10.388*** 4.483** 
Constant 13.798** 23.452*** -10.088 
Observations 1,162 1,160 864 
R-squared 0.105 0.199 0.032 
sigma_u 29.64 6.839 27.96 
sigma_e 29.90 12.36 25.57 
rho 0.496 0.234 0.544 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 4.3 shows that age and the measure of severity are statistically significant in 
explaining the number of investigations for PTCA patients.  Column (2) shows that age 
is negatively related to having investigations performed within the first 2 days and this 
is possibly related to the fact that differences could exist in the number of investigations 
ordered due to age concerns.  The variable rho, is of particular interest as it gives a 
measure of the variation of j
^ , or the extent of variation from the average for different 
consultants13.   
From column (1) it can be noted that around 50% of the variation in the number of 
investigations is due to consultant level variation rather than the characteristics of 
patients.  When investigations during the first two days of admission are considered, 
column (2), the variation shown by the difference in consultants is around 25% 
compared to around 54% for the investigations performed after the first two days, 
column (3). There is a greater proportion of variation in the number of investigations 
                                                        
13 where j
^  represents the consultant fixed effects estimated from the first stage regression. 
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occurring at the consultant level in the post 2 day hospital stay period.  The 
investigations ordered and carried out by the consultant during the first two days of 
hospital stay are as expected very much dependent on the patient characteristics.  To 
this effect a higher R2 value is reported in column (2) compared to column (3), and this 
is substantiated by the lower Ǯrhoǯ value representing variation due to consultant 
factors reported in column (2).  It is in this context that investigations carried out during the first two days of patient hospital stay are referred to as Ǯabsolutely necessaryǯ so as 
to indicate that these tests are absolutely necessary in terms of the particular treatment 
needs of the patient.  Absolutely necessary tests are tests which are considered to be 
indispensable for the overall treatment of the patient and such test would be expected 
to be carried out in the first days of the patient hospital stay.  
 
If the consultant had to order tests which might also be important for the treatment of the patient but which are not Ǯabsolutely necessaryǯ then the hypothesis here is that 
these are ordered in the post 2 day period.  In the post 2 day period the role of 
consultant decisions in the choice of investigations ordered and carried out is expected 
to be higher.  One would expect more flexibility in the choice of tests/investigations for 
consultants in the post 2 day hospital stay period.   
 
4.6.2 Second stage regression – all investigations 
 
In the 2nd stage regression the influence of particular consultant characteristics on the 
variance in j
^  was analyzed.  The estimate of the fixed effect component resulting from 
the 1st stage regression equation was retained and used as an input for the 2nd stage 
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regression results, as presented in Table 4.4.  A number of volume indicators, cvol, 
countconst, countc and vol90c, were applied to test the robustness of the volume 
measure in explaining consultant practice variation.   
Table 4.4: Second stage regression results – all investigations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent      
variable j
^
 j
^
 j
^
 j
^
 
public-only -0.5016 -1.6432 -0.9989 -1.1670 
cvol -0.1342    
countconst  -0.0049**   
countc   -0.0046**  
vol90c    -0.0385** 
Constant 0.1313 1.3879* 0.6830 0.9653 
Observations 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 
R-squared 0.0002 0.0113 0.0055 0.0070 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,    
The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract.  
 
 
The results presented in Table 4.4 show that the job contract type of the consultant, is 
not statistically significant in explaining the variance in j
^  when investigations over the 
entire hospital stay are considered.  This indicates that the variation arising from 
consultant practices as identified in the 1st stage regression is not due to the differences 
in the job contract type of the consultant.  However, some evidence is found of lower 
practice variation when consultant volume levels increase.14   
 
4.6.3 Second stage regression – with dated investigation categories 
 
Table 4.5 shows variation in consultant practice when the number of investigations 
carried out on patients are divided into those which are performed in the first two days 
                                                        
14A statistically insignificant coefficient is obtained when the cvol indicator is used as a measure of  
volume. 
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of hospital stay (columns 1-4) and those performed in the post 2 day hospital stay 
period (columns 5-8).  It can be seen that there is a statistically significant effect of the 
consultant contract type on the variation in j
^  in column (1).  However, the consultant 
job plan contract type variable is statistically insignificant when other volume 
indicators are taken into account, suggesting that the job plan type of the consultant 
does not explain practice variation in the first two days of hospital stay.  Whilst 
recognizing that the consultant job plan type variable is not significant in explaining 
variation in the investigations carried out during the first two days of hospital stay, a 
significant and positive relationship is found between volume levels of the consultants 
and practice variation.    
Table 4.5: Second stage regression results – investigations (<2 and >2 days) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 <2 days <2 days <2 days <2 days >2 days >2 days >2 days >2 days 
 
Dependent  
variable j
^
 j
^
 j
^
 j
^
 j
^
 j
^
 j
^
 j
^
 
public-only 2.109*** 0.382 0.1620 0.2913 -5.029*** -4.199*** -3.293*** -3.515*** 
cvol 2.75***    -3.362**    
countconst  0.0017***    -0.007***   
countc   0.0015***    -0.0069***  
vol90c    0.016***    -0.057** 
Constant -2.147*** -0.4601* -0.2186 -0.402** 2.812** 2.154** 1.1604* 1.568* 
Observations 1,160 1,160 1,160 1,160 864 864 864 864 
R-squared 0.187 0.012 0.0057 0.0118 0.03 0.025 0.016 0.018 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract.  
 
A negative and statistically significant coefficient on the job plan contract type variable 
is obtained in columns (5) to (8) of Table 4.5.  Consultants on public-only contracts have 
lower levels of practice variation.  The contract type of the consultant explains a 
proportion of the variation observed in the number of investigations performed on the 
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patient.  This supports the preliminary evidence found in the data whereby patients 
under the care of consultants on exclusive public sector contracts have fewer 
investigations in the post 2 days of their hospital stay.  The fact that patients are being 
seen by consultants on dual practice contracts serves to positively explain part of the 
variation in practice patterns for the post 2 day hospital stay period.   
A negative coefficient is observed for the different volume indicators.  This suggests that 
lower consultant volume levels lead to higher practice variation when dealing with 
investigations carried out in the post 2 day hospital stay period.  This is in contrast to 
the positive relationship observed between volume and practice variation in the first 
two days of hospital stay and could be explained by the fact that consultants with lower 
volume levels might decide to use such lower overall activity levels to increase the 
number of investigations ordered in the post 2 day hospital stay period.  Both the 
consultant job plan type variable and each of the volume variables are important to 
explain practice variation.   
 
4.6.4 Second stage regression – all investigations with interaction term and 
marginal effects  
 
Table 4.6 shows the estimation results when the interaction term between the volume 
variable and the consultant job plan type variable is applied to all the investigations 
carried out on the patient during the full hospital stay.  The average marginal effects 
arising from these results are provided in Table 4.7.     
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The estimation result identifies the compounding effect of the job plan type variable on 
the relationship between volume and practice variation.  A number of different volume 
indicators were tested to assess the robustness of the volume indicator.  An interaction 
term for cvol was not included given that there were no consultants on public-only 
contracts who performed more than 100 cases over the three year period. 
Table 4.6: Second stage regression results – all investigations – with interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Dependent variable j
^
 j
^
 j
^
 
public-only -22.8746*** -4.9670*** -5.3864*** 
countconst -0.0050**   
public-only#countconst 0.8987***   
countc  -0.0047**  
public-only#countc  0.3330***  
vol90c   -0.0450** 
public-only#vol90c   0.9323*** 
Constant 1.4212* 0.6948 1.1255 
Observations 1,162 1,162 1,162 
R-squared 0.0616 0.0125 0.0349 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract.  
 
The results in columns (1) to (3) show a negative value for the public-only coefficient 
which reflects a lower level of practice variation for those patients being seen by 
consultants on public-only contracts compared to consultants on dual practice contracts 
when volume is set to zero.  The three measures of volume are negative and significant.  
This represents the slope coefficient for patients being seen by consultants on dual 
practice contracts.  The value of the public-only by volume interaction term is positive 
and significant in all cases representing the difference in the responsiveness of practice 
variation to volume changes when consultants on public-only contracts are considered, 
compared to those consultants who are on dual practice contracts. 
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Table 4.7: Marginal effects (all investigations) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Volume 
measure 
Type of 
Contract 
 
dy/dx 
 
dy/dx 
 
dy/dx 
countconst dual practice -0.005**   
 public-only 0.894***   
countc dual practice  -0.005**  
 public-only  0.328***  
vol90c dual practice   -0.045** 
 public-only   0.887*** 
Observations  1,162 1,162 1,162 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The average marginal effects provided in Table 4.7 confirm that there is a significant 
difference in the slope of the volume indicators for different job plan contracts.  A fall 
in volume leads to an increase (though minimal) in consultant practice variation for 
those on dual practice contracts.  This relationship is positive (and stronger) for those 
on public-only contracts implying that increases in volume levels for consultants on 
public-only contracts will have a greater impact on practice variation15.  The results are 
consistent for all three measures of volume.   
Furthermore, there is a significant difference in practice variation levels for patients 
seen by consultants on different contract types.  Figure 4-4 represents the difference in 
practice variation levels for patients being seen by consultants on different contract 
types as volume16 levels change.  Different measures of volume: countconst, countc and 
vol90c are represented in each of the plots.  The plots of the confidence interval for the 
difference between the two groups is also shown and whenever the 95% confidence 
                                                        
15
 The value of 0.894 in column 1 of Table 4.7 shows that when the volume for consultants on public-only contracts ȋrepresented by ǮcountconstǯȌ changes by one unit ȋand all other variables are kept fixedȌ there 
is an increase in practice variation of 0.894. 
16 The chosen value for the volume indicators represents the range of possible volume levels in the 
dataset with values taken between 5 and 50 cases, using multiples of 5 cases.   
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interval for the difference does not include zero, then the difference can be considered 
to be statistically significant.  
Figure 4-4: Differences in practice variation levels (inv) between public-only and dual 
practice contracts for different volume indicators at different volume values  
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Data for the discrete change from the base level for each of the volume indicators is 
included in the Appendix17 to this chapter.  At very low levels of volume there is a 
negative difference between investigations ordered by public-only and dual practice 
consultants.  The number of investigations ordered by public-only consultants are less 
than those ordered by dual practice consultants at low volume levels.  As levels of 
volume for consultants on public-only contracts rise investigations increase by more 
than investigations ordered by dual practice consultants and thus the difference 
becomes positive.  A possible explanation for this could be the fact that as volume 
increases the possibility of ordering investigations by dual practice consultants is 
reduced as public-only consultants increase their number of investigations ordered.  
The differences in practice levels between public-only and dual practice contract 
consultants increased as the value of volume increased.  This difference was found to 
be statistically significant18 for most of the different values of volume and for each of 
the volume indicators applied.    
 
4.6.5 Second stage regression - with dated investigation categories – with 
interactions and marginal effects 
 
Table 4.8 shows the results for the compounding effect of the consultant job plan type 
on the relationship between volume and practice variation for different dated 
investigation periods.  The results, based on investigations undertaken in the first 2 
                                                        
17 Refer to Table 4.10. 
18 The differences in effect on practice variation between consultants on different contract conditions are 
illustrated for the different volume levels with confidence interval bands to indicate the statistical 
significance of such differences.   
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days following admittance to hospital, are presented in columns (1) to (3), whilst 
columns (4) to (6) show the results for investigations occurring after the first 2 days of 
hospital stay.  A number of different volume indicators were applied to test the 
robustness of the volume indicator.  An interaction term on the cvol variable was not 
applied.19 
 
Table 4.8: 2nd stage regression results – investigations with interactions (<2 and >2 days) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
Dependent variable 
<2 days 
j
^
 
<2 days 
j
^
 
<2 days 
j
^
 
>2 days 
j
^
 
>2 days 
j
^
 
>2days 
j
^
 
public-only -9.045*** -1.6291** -1.346*** -21.139*** -6.324*** -7.161*** 
countconst 0.002***   -0.0072***   
public-only#countconst 0.399***   0.7062***   
countc  0.0015**   -0.0069***  
public-only#countc  0.1503***   0.2499***  
vol90c   0.014**   -0.0638*** 
public-only#vol90c   0.362***   0.7489*** 
Constant -0.4453* -0.2132 -0.3398* 2.1835** 1.1715* 1.7246* 
Observations 1,160 1,160 1,160 864 864 864 
R-squared 0.1047 0.0190 0.0511 0.0548 0.0196 0.0374 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract.  
A positive and significant volume coefficient for the interaction term is obtained in all 
specifications, indicating a positive difference in the responsiveness of practice 
variation when patients are under the care of public-only contract consultants in 
comparison to those on dual practice contracts.  The responsiveness of practice 
variation to changes in volume for patients seen by consultants on dual practice 
contracts varies between the two periods of investigation; it is positive and significant 
for investigations in the first two days of hospital stay but negative for investigations in 
the remaining hospital stay period.  We found  that as volume levels of consultants on 
                                                        
19 There are no consultants on exclusive public contracts who perform more than 100 cases and thus the 
cvol volume variable is not used as an interaction term. 
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dual practice contracts decreased, higher practice variation was observed in the post 2 
day hospital stay period.  
 
The average marginal effects provided in Table 4.9 show a significant difference in the 
slope of volume indicators for different consultant job plan contracts.  Results are 
presented for the different investigation periods.  Columns (1) to (3) show that there is 
an increase in practice variation as volume increases for consultants on dual practice 
contracts.  A similar relationship (although stronger) is obtained for those on public-
only contracts with increases in practice variation expected as volume increases.  The 
results are consistent for all three measures of volume used in the analysis.   
Table 4.9: Marginal effects – investigations (<2 and >2 days) 
Volume Type of  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
measure  contract dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx 
  <2 days <2 days <2 days >2 days >2 days >2 days 
countconst dual practice 0.002***   -0.007***   
 public-only 0.401***   0.699***   
countc dual practice  0.002**   -0.007***  
 public-only  0.152***   0.243***  
vol90c dual practice   0.014**   -0.064*** 
 public-only   0.376***   0.685*** 
Observations  1,160 1,160 1,160 864 864 864 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The specifications in columns (4) to (6) show that practice variation increases with a 
fall in volume for patients seen by consultants on dual practice contracts.  For 
consultants on public-only contracts practice variation is expected to increase as 
volume increases. The results are consistent for all three measures of volume used in 
the analysis.  The coefficients obtained for consultants on public-only contracts are 
greater in magnitude when compared to those obtained for dual practice consultants.  
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There is a difference in the impact on practice variation when volume changes for 
consultants on dual practice contracts if investigations over the two different periods 
are compared.   
The results in Table 4.8 also show that for both investigation periods, a negative and 
significant coefficient value for the consultant job plan variable was obtained.  This 
indicates a lower constant level of practice variation for patients seen by consultants 
on public-only contracts compared to consultants on dual practice contracts when the 
volume is set to zero.  A greater negative level effect of public-only contracts on practice 
variation was found for the post 2 day hospital stay period.   
The difference in practice variation levels between consultants with different job plan 
contracts varied for different values of volume.  The lines in Figures 4-5 and 4-6 
represent the difference in practice variation (both for invf2d and inva2d) for patients 
being seen by consultants on different job contract types as volume20 levels change.  
Different measures of volume: countconst, countc and vol90c are represented in each of 
the figures.  The plots of the confidence interval for the difference between the two 
groups of consultant job contract types is also shown and whenever the 95% 
confidence interval for the difference does not include zero, then the difference can be 
considered to be statistically significant.  Figures 4-5 and 4-6 indicate that there is 
indeed difference in practice variation (both in invf2d and inva2d) between patients 
under the care of consultants on different job plan contracts as volume levels change. 
                                                        
20 The chosen value for the volume indicators represents the range of possible volume levels in the 
dataset with values taken between 5 and 50 cases, using multiples of 5 cases.   
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Figure 4-5: Differences in practice variation levels (invf2d) between public-only and 
dual practice contracts for different volume indicators at different volume values 
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Figure 4-6: Differences in practice variation levels (inva2d) between public-only and 
dual practice contracts for different volume indicators at different volume values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
195 
 
The results presented in the Appendix21 show the discrete change in practice variation 
from the base level considering different volume measures for investigations 
performed in the pre- and post 2 day hospital stay period.  The difference in practice 
levels for patients seen by consultants on public-only contracts compared to dual 
practice contracts was found to be negative for very low levels of volume but increased 
with higher levels of volume.  The differences in practice levels between public-only and 
dual practice contract consultants increased as the value of volume increased.  This 
difference is statistically significant22 for the majority of the different values of volume 
tested.  Some statistically insignificant differences are recorded at very low volume 
levels.    
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
This paper studies the behaviour of consultants working under very specific incentives 
and work practices created within the context of an acute general public hospital, the 
only acute general hospital on the Islands of Malta.  Variations in practice patterns have 
important consequences for the quality and cost of health care treatment.  Differences 
in practice variation, represented by the number of investigations performed on the 
patient, have been attributed to individual patient characteristics, consultant 
characteristics and their integrated effects.    
                                                        
21 Refer to Table 4.11 and Table 4.12. 
22 The differences in effect on practice variation between consultants on different contract conditions are 
illustrated for the different volume levels with the confidence interval bands to indicate the statistical 
significance of such differences.   
196 
 
The theoretical model suggests an empirical framework for investigating the role of the 
number of investigations in explaining practice variation for the treatment of PTCA.  A 
multilevel modelling approach was used to test this hypothesis linking practice 
variation in the behaviour of the consultant to the consultant job contract type. 
The available data allowed the study of the variation at the individual patient level on a 
consultant by consultant basis.  A number of data limitations have to be highlighted. 
Data on activity by consultants working in the private sector were not available and this 
prevented the study of the behaviour of the consultant when such activity levels 
changed.  Furthermore, data is not available on how many of the patients who receive 
PTCA treatment at the public hospital, seek private sector intervention prior or post to 
their admittance to the public hospital.  The number of investigations ordered during 
the hospital stay period could depend on patient private sector visits however, this is 
not controlled for within the regression analysis.  Of particular interest to this study 
would be a measure of how much of the currently undertaken investigations within the 
public hospital could in fact be carried out within the private sector setting.  The shift 
of activity from the current public hospital setting to the private setting will help to free 
up resources within the public hospital.  No conclusions could thus be drawn on the 
merits of undertaking any of this activity in the private sector once the patient is 
discharged from hospital.  
 
The possibility of distinguishing between patients who had visited a private consultant 
prior to the public hospital visit and those who visit the consultant post discharge 
would serve as an additional control variable to better understand the possible reasons 
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of practice variation amongst PTCA patients.  Moreover the available data allows only 
for the separation of consultants between those who can and those who cannot practice 
privately but does not provide information on the amount (hours per week) of private 
sector activity carried out by the dual practice consultants.  There could indeed be an 
element of practice variation which depends on the size of the private sector practice 
of the consultant.  
 
No particular weighting structure is applied to the different investigations ordered and 
carried out for the patients undertaking a PTCA within this study.  There could indeed 
be a case in favour of weighting tests/investigations on the basis of some agreed rule.  
Data on costs associated with each of the tests could be suggested as a possible 
weighting rule, or the use of an indicator which measures the relative importance of the 
particular test for the overall treatment of the patient.  A limitation of the study is that 
such information is not available and thus the weighting of tests is left as a point for 
further research.  
 
In view of the very limited data available on surgeons working within the hospital, 
surgeon characteristics are not controlled for in this study.  It is the consultant who is 
responsible for the patients who orders such investigations but information on 
surgeons (who work under the control of the consultant) could also be a source of 
explanation of practice variation.  Further research in this area would incorporate the 
role of surgeon characteristics, primarily surgeon volume levels and the surgeon job 
plan contract type to help in the explanation of practice variation patterns.   
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In this study we have controlled for a range of patient and consultant characteristics 
which influence practice variation, particularly patient age, severity of illness, 
consultant volume levels and job contract type.  One though recognises that there are a 
number of other factors which consultants put into the balance when making a choice 
between a dual practice contract and a public-only contract with the public hospital.  The 
observed impact on practice variation may thus be due to factors other than the direct 
variation arising from job contract type.  There may potentially be other explanations 
as to why variation in practice differs between consultants rather than the job contract 
type on which this study focuses.  
 
It is indeed possible that consultants with different skills and work/leisure preferences 
have a tendency to opt for a particular type of contract type and thus their practice 
decisions are also influenced by such factors rather than just the particular chosen job 
contract type.  Consultants might base their choice of job contract type also on what 
they perceive to be the mostly sought out form of contract type requested and desired 
by their patients.  Patient preferences will thus have an impact on consultant contract 
type.  Data on patient preferences for being treated by dual or public-only consultants 
is not available.  Furthermore one could consider data in relation to years of experience 
at the job (to measure skills) and some form of indicator of work/leisure preferences 
to help disentangle the confounding impact of such factors on practice variation 
between consultants.  Work in this area is a possible avenue for further research.  
 
Issues related to the sample size of the available data are a source of concern.  Indeed, 
the small sample size used in this work is the result of the particular characteristics of 
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the single hospital and the procedure under study.  The results obtained show that 
despite the limitations arising from the small number of consultants, significant results 
are found for the estimated coefficients.  Indeed, the results derived from the two stage 
model are robust when compared to estimates derived from the one-stage multilevel 
approach.  A possible suggestion for future work would be to carry out the analyses 
across a whole department or unit rather than basing the analysis on a single 
procedure.  This would help to increase the sample size, both at the patient and at the 
consultant level.  There is though a drawback related to the fact that differences across 
departments would be expected to be bigger given the diverse range of patients treated.  
In addition any possible policy recommendations under such conditions have to be 
made with caution given the variation in treatments being offered at each department.  
There is indeed an element of compromise which needs to be achieved between the 
accuracy of the estimates and the possible use of such estimates for policy 
recommendation purposes.  Policy recommendations are thus to be devised with 
caution and in recognition of such characteristics.   
 
The results indicate that a proportion of the practice variation occurs at the consultant 
level, after controlling for a number of individual patient characteristics.  Indeed, this 
variation differs when the data for investigations is categorized into investigations 
occurring within or after the first 2 days of hospital stay.  The results indicate that 
greater variation occurs at the consultant level when investigations in the post 2 day 
hospital stay period are considered.  This is the period which is most likely to be used 
by the consultants to put into practice their particular style of treatment.   
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The results also suggest that when investigations in the post 2 day hospital stay period 
are analyzed, the job plan contract type of the consultant has an effect on practice 
variation.  Indeed, lower practice variation was observed amongst patients under the 
care of consultants on public-only contracts.  Changes in volume have contrasting 
impacts on practice variation, with a negative impact obtained when dealing with 
investigations occurring after the 2 day stay period at the hospital.  A reduction in 
consultant volume levels is likely to cause an increase in practice variation.  The 
relationship between consultant volume and practice variation is positive when 
investigations in the first two days of hospital stay are considered.   
There is also a compounding effect of the consultant job plan on the relationship 
between volume and practice variation.  A positive coefficient describes the 
responsiveness of practice variation to changes in volume when patients are under the 
care of public-only contract consultants in comparison to those on dual practice 
contracts.  An increase in volume levels for consultants on public-only contracts will 
lead to a positive increase in practice variation.  The responsiveness of practice 
variation to changes in volume levels for patients seen by consultants on dual practice 
contracts varies between the two periods of investigation.  It can be concluded that as 
volume levels of consultants on dual practice contracts decrease, higher practice 
variation results in the post 2 day hospital stay period. 
Furthermore, it was found that there was a difference in practice variation levels 
between public-only and dual practice contract consultants.  This difference varied for 
different values of volume.  The difference in practice levels for patients being seen by 
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consultants on public-only contracts compared to dual practice contracts was found to 
be negative for very low levels of volume but increased and turned positive with higher 
levels of volume.  The differences in practice levels between public-only and dual 
practice contract consultants increased as the value of volume increases.  
Finally, we found that a greater proportion of variation in practice patterns, particularly 
in the post 2 day hospital stay period, could be explained by consultant characteristics.  
Patients seen by consultants who can practice privately were more likely to receive more investigations in their patientsǯ last days of hospital stay compared to other 
patients.  Furthermore, there is the impact of changing volume levels on explaining 
practice variation with differences arising for different periods of investigation and for 
different consultant job contract conditions.  The results obtained lead to the conclusion 
that the job plan contract type of the consultant is important in explaining variations in 
the number of investigations undertaken especially in the post 2 day hospital stay 
period. 
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Appendix A 
Table 4.10: Differences in practice variation levels – all investigations 
Differences in practice variation levels (All investigations) between job plan contract types at 
different values for the volume measure (from 5 to 50 cases in multiples of 5 cases), countconst 
 
 
Differences in practice variation levels (All investigations) between job plan contract types at 
different values for the volume measure (from 5 to 50 cases in multiples of 5 cases),  countc  
 
 
Differences in practice variation levels (All investigations) between job plan contract types at 
different values for the volume measure (from 5 to 50 cases in multiples of 5 cases), vol90c 
 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
                                                                              
         10      22.06203   .7488711    29.46   0.000     20.59427    23.52979
          9      17.56837   .7507431    23.40   0.000     16.09694     19.0398
          8      13.07471   .7550195    17.32   0.000      11.5949    14.55452
          7      8.581045   .7616597    11.27   0.000      7.08822    10.07387
          6      4.087383   .7706026     5.30   0.000      2.57703    5.597737
          5     -.4062786   .7817693    -0.52   0.603    -1.938518    1.125961
          4      -4.89994    .795066    -6.16   0.000    -6.458241    -3.34164
          3     -9.393602    .810388   -11.59   0.000    -10.98193   -7.805271
          2     -13.88726   .8276226   -16.78   0.000    -15.50937   -12.26515
          1     -18.38093   .8466531   -21.71   0.000    -20.04034   -16.72152
         _at  
1.cjobplan    
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
                                                                              
         10      11.68154    3.07257     3.80   0.000      5.65941    17.70366
          9      10.01668   2.676223     3.74   0.000     4.771374    15.26198
          8      8.351814   2.286553     3.65   0.000     3.870252    12.83338
          7      6.686952   1.907654     3.51   0.000     2.948019    10.42589
          6      5.022091    1.54746     3.25   0.001     1.989125    8.055056
          5      3.357229   1.222615     2.75   0.006     .9609487     5.75351
          4      1.692368   .9693339     1.75   0.081    -.2074918    3.592227
          3      .0275061   .8538719     0.03   0.974    -1.646052    1.701064
          2     -1.637355   .9291144    -1.76   0.078    -3.458386    .1836754
          1     -3.302217   1.158481    -2.85   0.004    -5.572797   -1.031637
         _at  
1.cjobplan    
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
                                                                              
         10      41.23055   5.170939     7.97   0.000     31.09569     51.3654
          9      36.56886   4.612031     7.93   0.000     27.52944    45.60827
          8      31.90717    4.05539     7.87   0.000     23.95875    39.85558
          7      27.24547   3.502096     7.78   0.000     20.38149    34.10946
          6      22.58378   2.954031     7.65   0.000     16.79399    28.37358
          5      17.92209   2.414758     7.42   0.000     13.18925    22.65493
          4       13.2604    1.89181     7.01   0.000     9.552521    16.96828
          3       8.59871   1.403557     6.13   0.000     5.847789    11.34963
          2      3.937019   1.002063     3.93   0.000      1.97301    5.901027
          1     -.7246725   .8254847    -0.88   0.380    -2.342593    .8932478
         _at  
1.cjobplan    
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
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Table 4.11: Differences in practice variation levels – investigations <2 days  
Differences in practice variation levels (<2 days investigations) between job plan contract types at 
different values for the volume measure (from 5 to 50 cases in multiples of 5 ), countconst 
 
Differences in practice variation levels (<2 days investigations) between job plan contract 
types at different values for the volume measure (from 5 to 50 cases in multiples of 5), countc 
 
Differences in practice variation levels (<2 days investigations) between job plan contract types at 
different values for the volume measure (from 5 to 50 cases in multiples of 5), vol90c 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
                                                                              
         10      10.90904   .2604502    41.89   0.000     10.39857    11.41951
          9      8.913641   .2415601    36.90   0.000     8.440192     9.38709
          8      6.918243   .2281032    30.33   0.000     6.471169    7.365317
          7      4.922845   .2210738    22.27   0.000     4.489548    5.356141
          6      2.927447   .2210858    13.24   0.000     2.494126    3.360767
          5      .9320486   .2281382     4.09   0.000     .4849059    1.379191
          4     -1.063349   .2416152    -4.40   0.000    -1.536907   -.5897923
          3     -3.058748   .2605217   -11.74   0.000    -3.569361   -2.548134
          2     -5.054146   .2837745   -17.81   0.000    -5.610333   -4.497958
          1     -7.049544   .3103984   -22.71   0.000    -7.657913   -6.441174
         _at  
1.cjobplan    
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
                                                                              
         10      5.885778   1.295169     4.54   0.000     3.347293    8.424263
          9      5.134285    1.12205     4.58   0.000     2.935107    7.333462
          8      4.382791   .9515917     4.61   0.000     2.517706    6.247877
          7      3.631298   .7855292     4.62   0.000     2.091689    5.170907
          6      2.879805   .6273627     4.59   0.000     1.650196    4.109413
          5      2.128312   .4848818     4.39   0.000     1.177961    3.078662
          4      1.376818   .3763443     3.66   0.000     .6391971     2.11444
          3      .6253252   .3363899     1.86   0.063     -.033987    1.284637
          2     -.1261681   .3868847    -0.33   0.744    -.8844481     .632112
          1     -.8776613   .5011983    -1.75   0.080    -1.859992    .1046694
         _at  
1.cjobplan    
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
                                                                              
         10      16.73957   2.235455     7.49   0.000     12.35816    21.12098
          9      14.93103   1.991878     7.50   0.000     11.02702    18.83504
          8      13.12249   1.749086     7.50   0.000     9.694342    16.55063
          7      11.31395   1.507455     7.51   0.000     8.359389    14.26851
          6      9.505407   1.267652     7.50   0.000     7.020855    11.98996
          5      7.696867   1.030952     7.47   0.000     5.676239    9.717495
          4      5.888327   .8001124     7.36   0.000     4.320136    7.456519
          3      4.079787   .5821494     7.01   0.000     2.938795    5.220779
          2      2.271247   .3987673     5.70   0.000     1.489677    3.052816
          1      .4627069   .3170679     1.46   0.144    -.1587348    1.084149
         _at  
1.cjobplan    
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
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Table 4.12: Differences in practice variation levels – investigations >2 days 
Differences in practice variation levels (>2 days investigations) between job plan contract types at 
different values for the volume measure (from 5 to 50 cases in multiples of 5), countconst 
 
Differences in practice variation levels (>2 days investigations) between job plan contract 
types at different values for the volume measure (from 5 to 50 cases in multiples of 5), countc 
 
 Differences in practice variation levels (>2 days investigations) between job plan contract 
types at different values for the volume measure (from 5 to 50 cases in multiples of 5), vol90c 
 
 
 
                                                                              
         10      14.17023     .99855    14.19   0.000     12.21311    16.12736
          9      10.63923   .9827194    10.83   0.000     8.713132    12.56532
          8       7.10822   .9751988     7.29   0.000     5.196866    9.019575
          7      3.577214   .9761802     3.66   0.000     1.663936    5.490492
          6      .0462075   .9856382     0.05   0.963    -1.885608    1.978023
          5     -3.484799   1.003333    -3.47   0.001    -5.451296   -1.518302
          4     -7.015805    1.02884    -6.82   0.000    -9.032295   -4.999316
          3     -10.54681   1.061596    -9.93   0.000     -12.6275   -8.466121
          2     -14.07782   1.100955   -12.79   0.000    -16.23565   -11.91999
          1     -17.60882   1.146235   -15.36   0.000     -19.8554   -15.36224
         _at  
1.cjobplan    
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
                                                                              
         10      6.172578   2.827144     2.18   0.029     .6314776    11.71368
          9      4.922915   2.473065     1.99   0.047     .0757959    9.770033
          8      3.673252   2.127191     1.73   0.084    -.4959668     7.84247
          7      2.423589   1.794273     1.35   0.177    -1.093122    5.940299
          6      1.173926   1.483062     0.79   0.429    -1.732822    4.080673
          5     -.0757375   1.210417    -0.06   0.950    -2.448111    2.296636
          4     -1.325401   1.008131    -1.31   0.189    -3.301301    .6504997
          3     -2.575064   .9236499    -2.79   0.005    -4.385384   -.7647431
          2     -3.824727   .9876803    -3.87   0.000    -5.760544   -1.888909
          1      -5.07439   1.176213    -4.31   0.000    -7.379725   -2.769054
         _at  
1.cjobplan    
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
                                                                              
         10      30.28542   4.052277     7.47   0.000     22.34311    38.22774
          9      26.54076   3.607063     7.36   0.000     19.47105    33.61048
          8       22.7961   3.165559     7.20   0.000     16.59172    29.00048
          7      19.05144   2.729567     6.98   0.000     13.70159    24.40129
          6      15.30678   2.302221     6.65   0.000     10.79451    19.81905
          5      11.56212   1.889396     6.12   0.000     7.858969    15.26527
          4      7.817456   1.503105     5.20   0.000     4.871425    10.76349
          3      4.072794   1.169931     3.48   0.000     1.779771    6.365817
          2      .3281328   .9476628     0.35   0.729    -1.529252    2.185518
          1     -3.416529   .9204895    -3.71   0.000    -5.220655   -1.612402
         _at  
1.cjobplan    
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
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Appendix B 
 
Table 4.13:  Main investigations ordered for patients undergoing PTCA treatment 
Investigation/test name Number of investigations carried out 
Renal Profile (Serum) 6785 
CK (Serum) 6783 
Estimated GFR 5657 
Full Blood Count 3465 
APTT 3130 
Troponin I 2796 
Coagulation Screen 2419 
Chest X-Ray 1035 
Magnesium (Serum/Plasma) 1010 
Lipid Profile (Serum) 956 
Glucose - Random (Urgent) YELLOW CAP 925 
Liver Profile (Serum) 894 
Calcium and Phosphate (Serum) 699 
CKMB Isoenzyme (Serum) 654 
CKMB/CK Ratio (Serum) 652 
Amylase (Serum/Plasma) 495 
Glucose - Random (Plasma) 486 
Type and Screen 445 
INR 443 
Osmolality Calculated 412 
Thyroid Function Test 401 
Calcium (Serum) 337 
Alpha-Hydroxybutyric Acid (Serum) 334 
TSH and FT4 302 
Antibody Screen. 298 
AST (Serum) 297 
C-Reactive Protein (Serum) 279 
Prothrombin Time (PT) 244 
Protein and Albumin (Serum) 206 
Source: Analysis of hospital episode data. 
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Appendix C 
 
In view of the envisaged statistical concerns expected due to the relative small size of 
the dataset, a one-stage multilevel model was used to check for the robustness of the 
effect of job contract type and consultant volume levels on the number of investigations 
ordered by consultants within the public hospital.  Tables 4.14-4.16 below represent 
the results obtained.23  Table 4.14 presents the results when all the investigations 
carried out during the hospital stay period are taken into account.  Table 4.15 presents 
the results when the investigations during the first two days of hospital stay are taken 
as the dependent variable.  Table 4.16 presents the results based for the investigations 
carried out in the post 2 day hospital stay period.   
 
The results in Table 4.14 (all investigations) show that age and the measure of severity 
(Charlsonl) are positive and statistically significant in explaining the number of 
investigations for PTCA patients.  The results in columns 2-5 are roughly in line with 
those obtained from the two stage estimation process showing that the job contract 
type of the consultant is not statistically significant in explaining differences in the 
number of investigations when the full set of investigations carried out during the 
patient hospital stay is considered.  The robustness of the results obtained for the 
                                                        
23 To ease in the comparison of results the tables include a reference heading within each column to 
indicate the comparable column of results already presented in Section 4.6 of the study.  
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various volume indicators using the two stage regression is questioned when such 
results are compared to the values obtained from the one-stage multilevel model 
estimation.  Whilst similar results in terms of magnitude of effect are obtained the 
volume coefficients are found to be statistically insignificant (columns 2-5). 
 
The results in column 6-8 of Table 4.14 include the interaction term between the 
various volume indicators used and the job contract type of the consultant. These 
results are comparable to the results in Table 4.6.  The robustness of the age and 
severity measures is confirmed.  A negative and significant coefficient for patients being 
seen by public-only contracts is also obtained in column 6 using the one-stage multilevel  
modelling approach24.  The results obtained for the different volume measures in 
columns 6-8 are similar to those obtained under the two stage modelling framework 
(although statistically insignificant) 25.  Similar results are recorded for the public-only 
by volume (countconst) interaction term between the two estimation methods.  This 
represents the difference in the responsiveness of practice variation to volume changes 
when consultants on public-only contracts are considered compared to those 
consultants on dual practice contracts.  
 
The results within the lower section of the table (the random effects parameters) show 
that the standard deviation of the error term at the consultant level is significant 
although very small (indicating very slight variation in the intercept due to the 
                                                        
24 The coefficient for public only contracts in columns 7-8 are insignificant.  
25 This confirms some of the concerns related to the use of the two stage approach – of obtaining biased standard error values, thus leading to inaccurate Ǯpǯ and Ǯtǯ values.  
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consultant effect).  The Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC)26 measures the 
proportion of the variance explained by the grouping structure.  Very low values for the 
ICC are obtained using the results obtained from Table 4.14.  This indicates that a very 
low proportion of the variance is explained by the grouping structure.   
 
                                                        
26 Estimated using the formulation in (ox ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ǮMultilevel Analysis –Techniques and Applicationsǯ 
Second Edition, pg 15.    
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Table 4.14:  One-stage multilevel model results with Ǯinvǯ as the dependant variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p-values in parentheses,  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract. 
sd(_cons) refers to the standard deviation at the consultant level, sd(residual) refers to the standard deviation at the patient level.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Reference table in Chapter Table 4.3 (1) Table 4.4 (1) Table 4.4 (2) Table 4.4 (3)  Table 4.4 (4)  Table 4.6 (1) Table 4.6 (2) Table 4.6 (3) 
 
inv inv inv inv inv inv inv inv 
Fixed effect parameters         
age 0.159* 
(0.0568) 
0.158* 
(0.0602) 
0.155* 
(0.0634) 
0.158* 
(0.0576) 
0.157* 
(0.0599) 
0.160* 
(0.0545) 
0.161* 
(0.0541) 
0.156* 
(0.0613) 
CharlsonI 18.15*** 
(0.0000) 
18.17*** 
(0.0000) 
18.27*** 
(0.0000) 
18.08*** 
(0.0000) 
18.21*** 
(0.0000) 
18.04*** 
(0.0000) 
18.13*** 
(0.0000) 
18.30*** 
(0.0000) 
public-only  
 
-0.617 
(0.8768) 
-1.690 
(0.6582) 
-0.126 
(0.9728) 
-0.890 
(0.8115) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cvol  
 
-0.290 
(0.8984) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
countconst  
 
 
 
-0.00512 
(0.3381) 
 
 
 
 
-0.00514 
(0.3353) 
 
 
 
 
countc  
 
 
 
 
 
0.00209 
(0.7742) 
 
 
 
 
0.00222 
(0.7596) 
 
 
vol90c  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0251 
(0.6422) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0212 
(0.6959) 
public-only  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-22.68** 
(0.0500) 
7.631 
(0.2473) 
1.862 
(0.6940) 
public-only#countconst  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.888* 
(0.0546) 
 
 
 
 
public-only #countc  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.651 
(0.1559) 
 
 
public-only #vol90c  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.607 
(0.3451) 
Constant 15.32*** 
(0.0050) 
15.64*** 
(0.0078) 
16.94*** 
(0.0030) 
15.11*** 
(0.0064) 
16.03*** 
(0.0046) 
16.75*** 
(0.0033) 
14.93*** 
(0.0070) 
15.94*** 
(0.0048) 
Random effects parameters         
sd(_cons) 0.000000449*** 
(0.0001) 
0.00000592*** 
(0.0026) 
1.31e-09*** 
(0.0000) 
3.90e-08*** 
(0.0000) 
0.000000159*** 
(0.0005) 
8.58e-08*** 
(0.0002) 
0.000000143*** 
(0.0002) 
0.000000294*** 
(0.0001) 
sd(residual) 30.44*** 
(0.0000) 
30.44*** 
(0.0000) 
30.43*** 
(0.0000) 
30.44*** 
(0.0000) 
30.44*** 
(0.0000) 
30.38*** 
(0.0000) 
30.41*** 
(0.0000) 
30.43*** 
(0.0000) 
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The results in Table 4.15 deal with the investigations carried out over the first two days 
of hospital stay.  The results obtained for the age and severity variables using the one-
stage multilevel modelling approach are broadly in line with those obtained using the 
two stage approach.  Age is negatively related to having investigations performed 
within the first 2 days of hospital stay.  A positive and significant coefficient is obtained 
for the severity variable.  The results in columns 2-5 are roughly in line with those 
obtained from the two stage fixed effect estimation process showing that the job 
contract type of the consultant is not statistically significant in explaining differences in 
the number of investigations during the first two days of hospital stay.  The robustness 
of the results obtained for the volume indicators in the two stage estimation method 
(measured by cvol and countc) are confirmed from the results obtained from the one-
stage multilevel model estimation (same sign and magnitude).  
 
The results in column 6-8 of Table 4.15 include the interaction term between the 
various volume indicators used and the job contract type of the consultant.  The 
robustness of the age and severity measures is confirmed.  There is some variation in 
the results obtained for the coefficient value of the consultant job plan contract variable.  
The results in columns 6,7,8 compared to those obtained from the two stage modelling 
framework show that the original results lack some robustness.  The significant and 
positive volume coefficient (measured by countconst) for the interaction term, indicates 
a positive difference in the responsiveness of practice variation when patients are 
under the care of public-only contract consultants in comparison to those on dual 
practice contracts.  
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The results within the lower section of the table (the random effects parameters) show 
that the standard deviation of the error term at the consultant level is not significant 
indicating no variation in the intercept due to the consultant.  Very low (close to zero) 
ICC values are obtained when using the results from Table 4.15, thus indicating a low 
proportion of the variation being explained by the consultant grouping structure.  
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Table 4.15:  One-stage multilevel model results with Ǯinvfʹdǯ as the dependant variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Reference table in Chapter Table 4.3 (2) Table 4.5 (1) Table 4.5 (2) Table 4.5 (3)  Table 4.5 (4)  Table 4.8 (1) Table 4.8 (2) Table 4.8 (3) 
 invf2d invf2d invf2d invf2d invf2d invf2d invf2d invf2d 
Fixed effect parameters         
age -0.110*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.106*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.107*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.111*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.108*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.107*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.111*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.107*** 
(0.0016) 
CharlsonI 10.56*** 
(0.0000) 
10.47*** 
(0.0000) 
10.51*** 
(0.0000) 
10.42*** 
(0.0000) 
10.50*** 
(0.0000) 
10.46*** 
(0.0000) 
10.42*** 
(0.0000) 
10.50*** 
(0.0000) 
public-only  
 
1.953 
(0.2528) 
0.999 
(0.5843) 
0.895 
(0.6126) 
0.901 
(0.6123) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cvol  
 
2.856*** 
(0.0078) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
countconst  
 
 
 
0.00428 
(0.2309) 
 
 
 
 
0.00401 
(0.2296) 
 
 
 
 
countc  
 
 
 
 
 
0.00705** 
(0.0455) 
 
 
 
 
0.00708** 
(0.0451) 
 
 
vol90c  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0496 
(0.1066) 
 
 
 
 
0.0517* 
(0.0995) 
public-only  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-8.158 
(0.1209) 
1.729 
(0.5434) 
1.514 
(0.4871) 
public-only#countconst  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.393* 
(0.0654) 
 
 
 
 
public-only #countc  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0710 
(0.7079) 
 
 
public-only #vol90c  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.143 
(0.6190) 
Constant 23.45*** 
(0.0000) 
21.77*** 
(0.0000) 
22.60*** 
(0.0000) 
22.98*** 
(0.0000) 
22.61*** 
(0.0000) 
22.65*** 
(0.0000) 
22.94*** 
(0.0000) 
22.55*** 
(0.0000) 
Random effects parameters         
sd(_cons) 1.696 
(0.2029) 
0.970 
(0.9631) 
1.632 
(0.2037) 
1.625 
(0.2127) 
1.620 
(0.2060) 
1.446 
(0.3645) 
1.656 
(0.1955) 
1.701 
(0.1710) 
sd(residual) 12.35*** 
(0.0000) 
12.35*** 
(0.0000) 
12.34*** 
(0.0000) 
12.33*** 
(0.0000) 
12.34*** 
(0.0000) 
12.33*** 
(0.0000) 
12.33*** 
(0.0000) 
12.33*** 
(0.0000) 
p-values in parentheses,  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract. 
sd(_cons) refers to the standard deviation at the consultant level, sd(residual) refers to the standard deviation at the patient level.  
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The results in Table 4.16 deal with the investigations carried out during the post 2 day 
hospital stay for the patient.  Results show that both age and the measure of severity 
are positive and statistically significant in explaining the number of investigations for 
PTCA patients carried out in the post 2 day hospital stay period.  The results in column 
2-5 for the coefficient of the public-only variable and the various volume indicators are 
roughly in line in terms of magnitude and sign when compared with those obtained 
when undertaking the two stage estimation procedure.  The statistical robustness of 
the results obtained from the two stage method is though questioned given that the 
coefficient obtained on the public-only variable and the various volume indicators lack 
statistical significance.  
 
The results in column 6-8 of Table 4.16 include the interaction term between various 
volume indicators and the job contract type of the consultant.  The LR test carried out 
between these three specifications and the comparable specifications in columns 3-5 
confirm an improvement in specification (LR values of 0.11, 0.0235, 0.0481 
respectively).  The robustness of the age and severity measures is confirmed.  Results 
show that similar coefficients in terms of magnitude and sign (although insignificant) 
are generally obtained for each of the volume indicators using the one-stage multilevel 
modelling approach.  This measures the responsiveness of the number of investigations 
to changes in volume of patients seen by consultants on dual practice contracts.  The 
results obtained in column 6 show a significant and negative coefficient for the 
consultant job plan variable (-21.12), indicating a lower level of investigations for 
patients seen by consultant being under the care of consultants who have public-only  
contracts compared to dual practice contract consultants.  This result confirms the 
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conclusions obtained in column 4 of Table 4.8.  A similar result (although of a smaller 
magnitude and statistically insignificant) for the coefficient of the job plan variable is 
obtained when the volume indicator being considered is vol90c.  A positive although 
statistically insignificant coefficient for the interaction term between the volume 
measure countconst and job plan is obtained raising some robustness issues with the 
coefficients of the two stage model.  There are some concerns with regards to the 
interaction terms obtained in columns 7 and 8 of Table 4.16 in comparison to the results 
obtained for similar estimations using the two stage approach.  A negative and 
significant coefficient for the interaction term is obtained when the one-stage multilevel 
modelling approach is applied indicating a negative difference in the responsiveness of 
the number of investigations ordered as volume changes for patients who are under the 
care of public only contract consultants. 
 
The results within the lower section of the table (the random effects parameters) show 
that the standard deviation of the error term at the consultant level is significant 
indicating some variation in the intercept due to the consultant effect.  The Intraclass 
Correlation Coefficient (ICC) obtained for the results in Table 4.16 particularly for the 
estimations carried out in column 4, 7 and 8 show that some of the variance in the 
number of investigations carried out in the post 2 days hospital stay period is indeed at 
the consultant level.  
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Table 4.16:  One-stage multilevel model results with Ǯinvaʹdǯ as the dependant variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Reference table in Chapter Table 4.3 (3) Table 4.5 (5) Table 4.5 (6) Table 4.5 (7)  Table 4.5 (8)  Table 4.8 (4) Table 4.8 (5) Table 4.8 (6) 
 inva2d inva2d inva2d inva2d inva2d inva2d inva2d inva2d 
Fixed effect parameters         
age 0.363*** 
(0.0000) 
0.344*** 
(0.0000) 
0.355*** 
(0.0000) 
0.364*** 
(0.0000) 
0.357*** 
(0.0000) 
0.362*** 
(0.0000) 
0.373*** 
(0.0000) 
0.376*** 
(0.0000) 
CharlsonI 4.086** 
(0.0101) 
4.576*** 
(0.0050) 
4.391*** 
(0.0065) 
4.253*** 
(0.0089) 
4.358*** 
(0.0068) 
4.210*** 
(0.0092) 
4.287*** 
(0.0081) 
4.452*** 
(0.0056) 
public-only  
 
-5.188 
(0.1913) 
-4.242 
(0.2627) 
-6.208 
(0.2835) 
-3.806 
(0.3016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cvol  
 
-3.582 
(0.1297) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
countconst  
 
 
 
-0.00726 
(0.1867) 
 
 
 
 
-0.00721 
(0.1893) 
 
 
 
 
countc  
 
 
 
 
 
0.00415 
(0.6626) 
 
 
 
 
0.00569 
(0.5549) 
 
 
vol90c  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0713 
(0.1909) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0476 
(0.6413) 
public-only  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-21.12* 
(0.0613) 
4.173 
(0.6234) 
-0.515 
(0.9523) 
public-only#countconst  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.704 
(0.1125) 
 
 
 
 
public-only #countc  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.005** 
(0.0207) 
 
 
public-only #vol90c  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.200*** 
(0.0044) 
Constant -8.417 
(0.1224) 
-4.629 
(0.4352) 
-5.953 
(0.2969) 
-5.686 
(0.3385) 
-6.344 
(0.2598) 
-6.307 
(0.2688) 
-5.333 
(0.3816) 
-4.089 
(0.5171) 
Random effects parameters         
sd(_cons) 0.000000241*** 
(0.0000) 
8.43e-08*** 
(0.0002) 
4.18e-08*** 
(0.0000) 
8.065*** 
(0.0096) 
0.00000233*** 
(0.0034) 
8.70e-08*** 
(0.0000) 
10.63*** 
(0.0000) 
13.29*** 
(0.0000) 
sd(residual) 26.39*** 
(0.0000) 
26.35*** 
(0.0000) 
26.36*** 
(0.0000) 
26.02*** 
(0.0000) 
26.36*** 
(0.0000) 
26.32*** 
(0.0000) 
25.80*** 
(0.0000) 
25.63*** 
(0.0000) 
p-values in parentheses,  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
The baseline, public-only=0, indicates consultant is on a dual practice contract. 
sd(_cons) refers to the standard deviation at the consultant level, sd(residual) refers to the standard deviation at the patient level.  
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The results from the one-stage multilevel modelling approach provide some element of 
robustness check for the coefficients derived from the two stage modelling approach.  
The results show that the small sample sizes available and used within this study might 
be a constraint to the statistical significance of the obtained results.  An increase in the 
sample size may indeed help to obtain more robust estimates.  Policy recommendations 
based on the above results are thus to be articulated with caution and in recognition to 
this important limitation.  
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Chapter 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
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This study was set out to assess the activity undertaken within the very specific and 
particular health care sector in Malta.  To this effect, the measurement of hospital health 
care output, through the applicaton of a DRG system, serves as a tool to help describe, 
manage and measure resource use.  The study also sought to evaluate and understand 
the relationship between health care outcomes and the behaviour of physicians 
working at the public hospital.  Of specific interest to the study is the role of the specific 
consultant job contract type arrangement in explaining  hospital outcomes.  The 
relationship between the health care providers, the hospital authorities and the 
patients is expected to influence the current and future workings of the Maltese health 
care system.  It is the scope of this study to contribute towards a better understanding 
of this relationship as this leads to improvements in the setting of policy within the 
health care sector.  
This section presents the conclusions of the chapter specific analysis carried out within 
this thesis.  The potential implications on the overall running of the health care system 
is discussed and the relevance of the conclusions within the context of the known 
literature is assessed.  Whilst acknowledging that this study has encountered a number 
of limitations, a number of recommendations, both for further research and for policy 
implementation purposes, are proposed for consideration of the health care 
authorities. 
In the context of the available data for the Maltese health care sector, the results of the 
research show that there is a firm basis for the implementation of a DRG casemix 
classification system, at least initially to help describe and manage resource use.  Every 
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medical case treated at a hospital carries with it an economic component and the use of 
DRGs would allow hospital management authorities to think along product lines.  In the 
context of the ever escalating health care expenditure and the increasing pressure to 
control spending, DRGs provide policy makers with an additional tool to achieve more 
transparent and efficient resource use.  
The application of the MS-DRG (Version 27) Grouper software, although not specifically 
configured for the Maltese health care system, proved to be a good starting point given 
that this was the first occasion for Maltese data to be applied to a casemix Grouper 
software.  As noted in the literature, a health care Grouper software is considered useful 
if it partitions the hospital episode population in an informative way, both in terms of 
the clinical inputs required and also the resources that are expected to be used in the 
treatment of patients.  The Coefficient of Variation (CV) and the Coefficient of Multiple 
Determination (R2) applied in this analysis showed that the derived DRGs carried a 
certain degree of homogeneity within the set groups and also demonstrated an 
adequate degree of heterogeneity when compared to the other derived DRG categories.  
An R2 obtained of approximately 0.3 compared well with studies reported for other 
countries.  Furthermore, following a data trimming exercise, around 85% of the DRG 
cases had a CV of less than 1 implying that the DRGs obtained were homogeneous 
within the groups identified.   
One recognizes that most LOS distributions used in this study are asymmetric and the 
presence of high outlier values has a significant impact on the R2 values obtained.  In 
view of the characteristics of the data under analysis and given the relative smallness 
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of the dataset, outlier values are removed from the study and various trimming 
algoritms are applied.  Nothwithstanding this process, the distributional properties of 
the data where found to still not fully satisfy the estimation requirements and this is 
considered as a limitation of this study.  One though finds that the use of the MDC 
categories in such instances helps to achieve better distributional properties for the 
data in hand.  
Homogeneous DRG categories provide the policy maker with an additional tool to gauge 
efficiency in the treatment of cases as it identifies those cases that use more hospital 
resources than the average case.  However, the variation in resource use may also be 
due to other factors not specifically captured by the DRG classification.  These include 
the individual and behavioural characteristics of the consultants and surgeons working 
within the hospital.  The DRG system provides a solid basis for studying the 
performance of the consultants and surgeons working within the hospital.  The 
variation in health care outcomes and practice patterns arising due to such factors was 
studied in Chapters 3 and 4 as part of this research.  
In view of the fact that this study is the first application of a casemix system grouper to 
the Maltese health care system, one recognises the limitations imposed by the 
deficiencies in the current available dataset.  The data used for this study were not 
collected specifically for the application of a DRG system and therefore, considerable 
improvements in the configuration of the DRG categories will be made if missing or 
miscoded data is kept to a minimum.  It is positive to note that nothwithstanding such 
limitations, the results obtained are fairly in line with other literature focusing on 
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similar countries.  The experience from other health care systems shows that the 
introduction of the DRG system will itself lead towards an improvement in the data 
collection process.  This is a positive implication of the introduction of the DRG system.  
The success of the DRG system depends primarily on the quality of the collected data 
and thus the collection of more accurate information will serve to provide an added 
instrument for the allocation of the public hospital budget.  This  provides a better 
picture of the current hospital outputs being derived for the amount of resources 
invested by the government in the health care system.  
The research undertaken reveals that there is a need to adequately deal with outlier 
cases especially in view of the size of the Maltese health care sector.  In fact, dealing 
with defined outliers would result in average savings of approximately 1 day in terms 
of length of stay for the hospital.  Based on insights gained from this study, further work 
on the understanding of the factors which underpin the presence of outliers is 
recommended.  Indeed, given the small size of the dataset, the applied trimming options 
have an impact on the results, apart from the fact that there could be other factors which 
need to be controlled for when trying to understand the underpinning differences in 
resource utilisation within DRGs.  Furthermore, with DRGs in place, the Maltese 
hospital authorities would be in a better position to plan for cases which are likely to 
end up as outlier cases.  Also of interest for further study is the fact that a number of the 
obtained DRG groups include only few episodes of care, primarily due to the given size 
of the health care sector.  This entails a further challenge to the use of DRGǯs  when 
applied to aid in the process of budget allocation for the different health care activities 
undertaken within the hospital.  
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)n the authorǯs view, although the introduction of such a system in Malta may be a long 
and complex process, which will require both the commitment of the hospital 
management team and hospital practicing professionals, a functioning casemix system 
would serve to benefit the entire health care provision system in Malta.  In view of the 
current economic and political commitments, the use of the casemix system for 
financing purposes may be still far from materializing however having a DRG system in 
place would lead to more informed decisions and potentially better policy.  On a 
practical level, the information gained from the setting of a DRG system could serve as 
an instrument for the allocation of public hospital budgets. Activity that can be 
measured can be managed more effectively and efficiently.   
It is recommended that a different DRG Grouper software system, rather than the MS 
DRG (Version 27.0), should be applied to the data to obtain further evidence in relation 
to the gains of applying a casemix system.  This would serve to further assess the quality 
of the available data.  It is recommended that one should consider possible adaptations 
to the already available casemix Groupers used by other countries to make them more 
appropriate to the particular data and characteristics of the Maltese health care system.  
Most countries adopting a DRG system have chosen to go down this route.  
Furthermore, this study would benefit from the incorporation of additional years of 
data as this would help to assess the consistency of hospital activity measurement for 
the years under study.  
The incentives and benefits resulting from the introduction of the DRG casemix system 
are expected to have a significant impact on the economic underpinnings of the health 
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care system.  The benefits expected to be achieved within the health care system 
following the introduction of DRGǯs are based on the experience of other countries and 
reflect the realities of the current state of the Maltese health system.  The experience 
gained from other countries shows that such a development will have an impact on both 
resource use and the overall management of the available resources.  The most recent 
developments within the Maltese health care system are increasingly pointing towards 
the need for the adoption of a DRG casemix system.   
Chapter 3 of this thesis focused on competing risks events to assess the nature of the 
volume-outcome relationship for consultants and surgeons practicing at the hospital 
level.  Whereas most of the literature has sought to analyse the volume-outcome 
relationship amongst different hospitals, this study specifically looked at 
understanding the volume-outcome relationship at the individual consultant and 
surgeon level operating within a single and sole public hospital setting.  A number of 
different volume measures where adopted to assess the sensitivity of the results to 
changing volume definitions.  The impact of different consultant job contract conditions 
on the relationship between the event of interest and volume levels was of particular 
interest. 
Data for PTCA activity undertaken between 2009 and 2011 within the Maltese health 
care sector were applied to both non-parametric and semi-parametric survival analysis 
methods.  Both methods confirmed differences in the treatment failure probability due 
to differences in consultant and surgeon volume levels and variations in the consultant 
job contract characteristics.  The robustness of the results obtained using the survival 
232 
 
modelling methods where confirmed though the use a multinomial logistic model.  The 
research found that the treatment failure probability was slightly higher if the patient 
was under the care of consultants with high patient volume levels or if the procedure 
was performed by surgeons with low volume levels.  The results obtained for patient 
outcomes as surgeon volume levels increase support the practice makes perfect 
hypothesis.  The same result cannot be confirmed when consultant volume levels are 
considered.   
The research also concluded that the rate of failure from the treatment procedure was 
slightly lower if patients were seen by consultants operating exclusively with the public 
sector.  Consultants on public-only contracts had low patient volume levels compared 
to consultants on dual practice contracts and this could be one possible explanation for 
this result.  Furthermore, this would imply that consultants on public-only contracts are 
in a better position to manage there public hospital workload given that they are fully 
focused on their practice within the public hospital.  The performance of dual practice 
contract consultants within the public hospital, as viewed by the patient in general, is 
of concern to such consultants as this is expected to have an impact on their reputation.   
Furthermore, the impact of changes in volume on the hazard rate of the events of 
interest was found to be affected by the consultant job plan contract type.  The analysis 
showed that there was only a slight increase in the incidence of failure from the 
intervention for the patient under the control of a consultant on a dual practice contract, 
if volume was increased.  If a patient was under the control of a consultant with a public-
only contract, then the incidence of failing increases by more when volume changed 
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compared to those patients under consultants with dual practice contracts.  A unit 
change in volume was found to have a bigger impact on the hazard rate of failing if 
patients were under the care of consultants with public-only job contracts.  The clear 
policy implication from this conclusion is that policies aimed at varying patient volume 
levels for consultants on public-only job contracts could result in an impact on outcomes 
and have to be treated with extreme caution.  The research also showed that the 
likelihood of the event death is primarily affected, as expected,  by the covariates for age 
and patient LOS at the hospital.  
Whilst noting the conclusion from this study one acknowledges a number of limitations.  
The survival models used assume homogeneity where all individuals are subject to the 
same risks embodied in the hazard function.  This study controls for a range of patient 
and consultant/surgeon characteristics however there could indeed still be unobserved 
sources of heterogeneity in the estimations.  The empirical estimates obtained from 
these models are sensitive to the choice of the Ǯa prioriǯ identifying assumptions and the 
distributional assumptions of the unobservables can have an impact on the results 
obtained.  This could lead to estimates which poorly describe the true behavioural 
models generating survival analysis data. 
 
There is also concern that potential confounding effects on the volume-outcome 
relationship can arise from the fact that the consultant choice of contract type depends 
on particular issues which would indirectly influence the outcome of the procedure. 
The ability to disentangle and single out the factors affecting the choice of contract type 
by the consultant would help to gauge their particular impact on outcomes which 
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impact would have otherwise been incorporated within the consultantǯs chosen job 
contract type.  Morover, the available data lacks information on the contract type 
conditions of the surgeons working within the public hospital.  A possible extension for 
this study could be to incorporate additional information on the characteristics of the 
surgeons working within the hospital and thus to analyse their particular impact of 
patient outcomes and how surgeons and consultants interact when treating a patient.  
 
The importance which consultants place on the role of their involvement within the 
private sector for their personal career development could also be a factor which affects 
the choice of job contract type.  Further work in this regard should be considered.  To 
this effect, data on the different skill levels of consultants, such as the number of years 
of practising as consultants and the university institution from which they obtained 
their training, would be possible proxies.  Furthermore, the collection of information in 
terms of their work and leisure preferences and the number of hours spent working 
within the private sector could serve as indications of the importance which 
consultants place on their activity in the private sector.   
 
We do not have data on patient preference for being treated by dual or public-only  
consultants.  However, consultants might base their choice of job contract type also on 
what they perceive to be the mostly sought out form of contract type requested and 
desired by the patient.  The patientǯs preference can have an influence on consultant 
practice as patients with certain preferences might seek out care from consultants on 
particular job contract types.  If patients have the ability to somehow influence the job 
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contract type decision of who is responsible for their treatment then this could have an 
impact on overall outcome differences between consultants.   
Nevertheless one recognises the unavailability of data in this regard and this makes it 
difficult to single out the potential confounding effects.  Work in this area is being 
suggested as one of the possible avenues for future research. Whereby one can study 
the identification of patient preferences which are expected to influence the decision of 
consultants to choose one type of contract over another and the impact of this on the 
volume-outcome relationship.  Determining the causes of the effect of contract type on 
outcome is important especially for policy reasons.  
 
The fact that this study focuses on a single hospital setting, whereby no other public 
sector hospitals exist would serve to reduce the possible confounding effects which 
arise from the choice available to consultants to practice in other public sector 
institutions.  The identification of the volume-outcome relationship could in the context 
of this study be partly controlled by the fact that there is only one single public hospital 
on the island.  Furthermore, the size of the sample used within this study is constrained 
by the fact that the sample includes all the existing PTCA activity carried out by 
consultants within the hospital over the three year period, thus serving to reduce 
potential biases in sample selection.  
The above results provide an important contribution towards understanding the 
possible interlinkages which exist within the setting of the single hospital in relation to 
consultant and surgeon volume levels and to other consultant related characteristics.  
One would expect that even within a single hospital setting, differences in the behaviour 
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of consultants and surgeons at an individual level exist and such differences could have 
an impact on outcome.  Decisions by policy makers to implement measures which are 
likely to affect the volume levels of both surgeons and consultants working within the 
hospital should therefore also consider the specific job working conditions of the 
consultants.  The widening of this study to other specific procedures within the hospital 
would help policy makers improve their assessment of the sensitivity of changes in 
volume and other consultant and surgeon characteristics on hospital outcomes. This 
contributes towards the setting up of effective policy initiatives within the health care 
sector. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis studied the heterogeneity in practice patterns, analysed at the 
individual consultant level within the single hospital setting.  The emphasis was on 
whether variation depends on the consultant job plan contract type after controlling 
for patient and consultant characteristics.  In the developed theoretical model 
consultants are assumed to gain utility from the income earned and the reputation 
gained  from the success achieved when exerting effort in the provision of health care 
services.   
The empirical analysis used data drawn from investigations on patients who received 
PTCA treatment between 2009 and 2011.  These investigations were further 
subdivided into those performed within the first two days of hospital stay and those 
performed during the rest of the patientsǯ hospital stay period.  The analysis implicated 
that after controlling for a number of patient characteristics, a proportion of the 
observed practice variation occurred at the consultant level.  Furthermore, practice 
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variation was found to differ by consultant job contract type and varied in magnitude 
in relation to the period when the investigations were undertaken.   
The use of the available administrative (not sample) patient level data helps to deal 
with differences in patient characteristics whilst offering analytical advantages in terms 
of the analysis of consultant characteristics which are expected to affect practice 
variation.  The two stage model used in this study is based on the individual based data 
thus  allowing for the partitioning of the overall variation into that due to differences in 
patients and that arising from differences in the consultant propensity to prescribe 
investigations or tests.  The results from the two-stage model are evaluated against 
those based on a one stage multilevel model which includes group level predictors as 
explanatory variables. 
As expected, a proportion of the variation in investigations carried out in the post 2 day 
hospital stay period could be attributed to consultant related differences.  The variation 
in practice patterns, during the post 2 days of hospital patient stay was found to be 
negatively related to the fact that consultants operate on exclusive public sector 
contracts.  Patients under the care of consultants who also practiced privately were 
likely to register higher variation in practice patterns for investigations carried out in 
the post two day hospital stay period.  From this observation it can be implied that 
consultants are more likely to use the post two day hospital stay period to implement 
their own style and treatment preferences when dealing with patients. 
The relationship between consultant volume levels and practice variation also differed 
under the different periods of study.  A positive relationship between volume levels and 
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practice variation was found for investigations carried out in the first two days of 
patient hospital stay.  On the other hand, greater variation was found in the number of 
investigations carried out in the post two day patient hospital stay period when 
consultant volume levels fell.  A possible explanation for this is that consultants with 
lower patient volume levels would have more flexibility to order additional investigations for their patients during the patientsǯ post two day hospital period. 
The job plan contract type of the consultant was found to have a compounding effect on 
the relationship between volume and practice variation.  An increase in the volume 
levels of consultants who can only practice in the public hospital will lead to an increase 
in practice variation.  The research found that the response of practice variation to 
changes in volume levels for consultants on dual practice job contracts varied between 
the two different periods.  In particular, an increase in volume would lead to an increase 
in variation during the first two days of hospital stay and a fall in variation during the 
rest of the hospital stay period.  Therefore it can be concluded that consultants on dual 
practice contracts would increase variation in practice if they had lower volume levels 
in the post two day patient hospital stay period.  
The difference in practice variation levels between consultants with different job plan 
contracts also varied at different values of volume.  The difference in practice variation 
was found to be negative at very low levels of volume for patients being seen by 
consultants on public-only contracts compared to dual practice contracts.  However, this 
difference turned positive and increased as values of volume levels increased. 
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A number of data limitations have to be highlighted. Data on activity by consultants 
working in the private sector was not available and this prevented the study of the 
behaviour of the consultant when such activity levels changed.  There could indeed be 
an element of variation in practice patterns which depends on the size of the activity in 
the private sector for the consultants who also practice within the public hospital.  
 
Furthermore, information is not available on how many of the patients who receive 
PTCA treatment at the public hospital, seek private sector intervention prior or post to 
their admittance to the public hospital.  Of particular interest to this study would be a 
measure of how much of the currently undertaken investigations within the public 
hospital could in fact be carried out within the private sector setting.  The shift of 
activity from the current public hospital setting to the private setting will help to free 
up resources within the public hospital having significant implications on the overall 
running of the hospital.  Due to the lack of data, no conclusions could be drawn on the 
merits of undertaking any of this activity in the private sector once the patient is 
discharged from hospital.  
 
A possible extension of this study is to focus on the relative importance of each of the 
investigations being carried out at the public hospital,  No particular weighting 
structure is applied to the different investigations ordered and carried out for the 
treatment of PTCA within this study.  Work on the weighting of investigations and its 
resulting impact on practice patterns is left as a point for further research.  
 
In view of the very limited data available on surgeons working within the hospital, 
surgeon characteristics are not controlled for in this study.  It is the consultant, who is 
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responsible for the patient, who orders such investigations.  Surgeons, who work under 
the control of the consultant, could also be a source of explanation of practice variation.  
Further research in this area would incorporate the role of surgeon characteristics and 
specifically the surgeon job plan contract conditions to help in the explanation of 
practice variation patterns.   
 
Furthermore, whilst noting that in the study we have controlled for a range of patient 
and consultant characteristics one though recognises that there are a number of other 
factors which consultants put into the balance when making a choice between a dual 
practice contract and a public-only contract with the public hospital.  The observed 
results may thus be due to factors other than the direct variation arising from job 
contract type.  Data for consultant job contract type may be thus capturing factors 
which affect the actual decision of the consultant to choose the particular type of job 
plan contract.  There may potentially be other explanations as to why variation in 
practice differs between consultants rather than the job contract type variable 
identified in this study.  Work on the identification of factors which determine the 
consultants choice of contract condtions and the impact on practice variation is a 
possible area for further research. 
 
Issues pertinent to what constitutes a sufficient sample size for accurate estimation and 
evaluation purposes have been reviewed.  The size of the dataset in this study is in fact 
constrained by the characteristics of the Maltese health care sector.  Better inference is 
expected to be achieved if patient level data is used in such instances.  A possible 
suggestion for future work would be to carry out the analyses across a whole 
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department or unit rather than basing the analysis on a single procedure.  This would 
help to increase the sample size, both at the patient and at the consultant level.  A 
possible drawback would be related to the fact that differences across departments 
would be expected to be bigger given the diverse range of patients treated.  Any possible 
policy recommendations under such conditions have to be made with caution given the 
variation in treatments being offered at each department.  There is indeed an element 
of compromise which needs to be achieved between the accuracy of the estimates and 
the possible use of such estimates for policy recommendation purposes. 
 
In view of the envisaged statistical concerns expected due to the relative small size of 
the data, a one stage multilevel model was used to estimate the effect of job contract 
type and consultant volume levels on the number of investigations ordered by 
consultants within the public hospital.  The results obtained from the one stage 
multilevel modelling approach provide some element of robustness check for the 
coefficients derived from the two stage modelling estimations.  The results show that 
the small sample size available and used within this study might be a constraint to the 
statistical significance of the obtained results.  The complete population of the PTCA 
activity undertaken at the hospital is considered in this study and thus the option of 
increasing the sample size under current conditions is not available.  Policy 
recommendations are to be articulated with caution and in recognition to this 
important consideration.  
The above findings provide interesting results in terms of understanding the role of 
consultant volume levels and job contract conditions to explain practice variation 
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within this particular hospital setting.  Practice variation has implications on efficiency 
levels within the hospital apart from the expected impact on patient outcomes.  The 
study of the impact of practice variation amongst consultants on patient outcomes 
within this setting is an area for further research.  
Further work, applied to other specific procedures within the hospital setting, would 
provide policy makers with a better view of the importance of specific consultant 
characteristics in explaining differences within other treatment practices offered at the 
hospital.  This would give policy makers the opportunity to better appreciate the role 
of individual consultant characteristics in explaining variation in practice patterns 
within the whole hospital.  
In summary, the research undertaken and described in this thesis recommends a 
number of important policy considerations that will benefit both the health care setting 
in Malta and health care practice in general.  A hospital cannot be managed efficiently 
without an adequate measure of output.  Furthermore, it is only by fully understanding 
the impact of certain characteristics of consultant and surgeon working patterns on 
patient and hospital outcomes, that effective policy options could be formulated.  The 
findings of this thesis may contribute towards the design of policies which are based on 
the knowledge gained of the link between the variation in practice patterns and 
volume-outcome relationships to the different consultant job contract types.  The 
conclusions of this thesis help in setting policy strategies based on evidence informed 
research within the health care sector. 
 
